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ABSTRACT
This dissertation perceives a similarity between two activities: that of coordi-
nating the search for simulation traces toward reaching verification closure,
and that of coordinating the search for a proof within a theorem prover. The
programmatic coordination of simulation is difficult with existing tools for dig-
ital circuit verification because stimuli generation, simulation execution, and
analysis of simulation results are all decoupled. A new programming language
to address this problem, analogous to the mechanism for orchestrating proof
search tactics within a theorem prover, is defined wherein device simulation
is made a first-class notion. This meta-language for functional verification
is first formalized in a parametric way over hardware description languages
using rewriting logic, and subsequently a more richly featured software tool
for Verilog designs, implemented as an embedded domain-specific language in
Haskell, is described and used to demonstrate the novelty of the programming
language and to conduct two case studies. Additionally, three hardware
description languages are given formal semantics using rewriting logic and we
demonstrate the use of executable rewriting logic tools to formally analyze
devices implemented in those languages.
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The International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) [41] is a
biennial report on technical challenges confronting the global semiconductor
industry, representing a consensus view of major industry associations from
Asia, Europe, and the United States. Topics ranging from device physics to
embedded software are discussed and analyzed to identify research directions
and potential solutions, speculating over a fifteen-year time span. The topic
of this dissertation is the part of the digital circuit design process called
functional verification, wherein a device is evidenced to coincide with its
high-level design specification, and about which the 2009/2010 ITRS makes
the following statements.
“Implied needs are in: (1) verification, which is a bottleneck that
has now reached crisis proportions . . . ”
“. . . due to the growing complexity of silicon designs, functional
verification is still an unresolved challenge, defeating the enormous
effort put forth by armies of verification engineers and academic
research efforts.”
“Multiple sources report that in current development projects
verification engineers outnumber designers, with this ratio reaching
two to one for the most complex designs.”
[41, Design]
The above quotations demonstrate the practical importance, and indeed
the urgency of, concerted research efforts aimed at improving functional
verification: effecting verification closure faster, at a higher quality, and
with fewer engineering resources. Many aspects of the functional verification
process warrant attention from researchers, however in this dissertation, we
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Figure 1.1: Coverage Closure Feedback Loop.
address just one, coverage closure. This is the iterative process of generating
stimuli, running simulations, and assessing various coverage metrics (e.g. see
[6]), as depicted in Figure 1.1.
Janick Bergeron, a highly regarded engineer who has written extensively
on functional verification (e.g. [5, 6]), recently said about the coverage closure
process:
Something that is challenging and time-consuming is an ideal
candidate for automation. In [contemporary verification practice],
the Holy Grail is the automation of the feedback loop between
the coverage metrics and the constraint solver.
[7, July 5, 2010]
Fully automating this feedback loop is an unreasonable goal, as doing so
would imply an efficient automated algorithm for reaching coverage closure;
indeed, this is why it is described above as being “the Holy Grail”. However,
2
it is wrong to view automation as something that must be done in full, or not
at all; as this dissertation will demonstrate, many opportunities for partial
automation of the coverage closure feedback loop exist and can be taken
advantage of.
The main contribution of this dissertation is the development of a program-
ming language that allows for the entire coverage closure feedback loop to be
coordinated programmatically and in a uniform way. As a result, verification
engineers can easily construct programs that partially automate this feedback
loop, doing so in a way that is general-purpose, tailored for a particular
device, or even tailored for an individual coverage goal. The ratios of stimulus
generation, simulation, and analysis are made completely flexible, so that a
verification engineer can target different strategies. Strategies with a high
amount of simulation per loop iteration may be useful in early stages of design
when many coverage goals are still outstanding, for example; whereas in later
stages of the verification process, tighter iterations of the loop may be used
to generate highly targeted simulations for coverage goals that have proved
difficult to discharge.
The design of our programming language is based on a similarity perceived
between two activities: that of coordinating the search for simulation traces
toward reaching coverage closure, and that of coordinating the search for
a proof within a theorem prover. Theorem proving systems traditionally
orchestrate the search for a proof through the use of a meta-language, an
idea that originates with the programming language ML, which was originally
developed with the express purpose of facilitating interaction with the LCF
theorem prover [29, 30]. This dissertation extends that idea and applies
it to simulation-based functional verification, yielding a meta-language for
functional verification.
Our meta-language is called fvml and is largely characterized by making
simulation a first-class data type that is manipulated by the programmer.
This expresses the view that a simulator serves a purpose similar to that of the
core theorem prover within the context of the analogy above. As a first-class
concept provided by fvml directly, simulation traces become values of an
appropriate data type and a set of operations are provided to manipulate
values of that data type, such as fine-grained control over advancing simulation.
fvml is developed in this dissertation both formally and at the level of an
implementation, and its utility is justified with pedagogical examples and the
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presentation of larger case studies.
An example of a specific case where our meta-language may be brought to
bear is as an alternative to highly targeted testing, such as when a directed test
is created to discharge a difficult coverage goal. Targeted stimulus generation
consumes a disproportionate amount of time in contemporary methodology.
According to Tom Borgstrom, Program Director of the Verification Group at
Synopsys:
Today it is not uncommon to go from 0% to 80% coverage in
just a few days after the [constrained-random] testbench is up &
running.
What about the remaining 20%?
Today, one of the long poles in verification is coverage convergence
– the process where verification engineers analyze the coverage
generated by constrained-random tests, identify gaps or “coverage
holes”, and adjust the verification environment to try to fill the
gaps. If you think this sounds laborious, repetitive and time-
consuming you’d be correct. I’ve spoken to chip designers who
say a third of their overall chip development schedule is spent
in this iterative, largely manual, coverage convergence phase of
verification.
[9, July 6, 2010]
Filling coverage holes that are part of the “remaining 20%” typically
means either modifying constraints in a random testbench or simply writing a
directed test. As the above quotation suggests, this is typically tedious work
with substantial manual intervention by the verification engineer: viewing
waveforms, determining possible changes to the test to better target the
unfilled coverage goal, and then making those modifications. The alternative
that fvml provides is the ability to write a program operating in a tight
feedback loop attempting to find an appropriate stimulus and removing the
need, as much as possible, for intervention by the engineer.
An example that we will employ in a subsequent chapter to illustrate this
idea is a program that solves a digital circuit version of a “maze”. Instead of
analyzing the circuit manually, determining the exact way out of the maze, and
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then writing a directed test navigating that path, our meta-language allows a
verification engineer to write a program that solves mazes in a general way
through a backtracking-based search. This is an efficient, targeted strategy, is
easier to write than a directed test because the internal structure of the maze
does not need to be known, and is also resilient to changes in the configuration
of the path of the maze.
An important side note that must be mentioned has to do with symbolic
simulation. Our meta-language, as described above, is constructed around
the idea that simulation becomes a first-class concept; however, simulation
need not be limited in the usual way to just concrete stimuli. Advances in
SMT solving technology make the use of general capabilities for symbolic sim-
ulation highly desirable, even in the context of a simulation-based verification
methodology and without attempting formal verification. As one concrete
example, expounded upon in a subsequent chapter, incorporating symbolic
simulation provides the essential infrastructure to implement targeted testing
strategies like the one described in [34], which serves as the basic idea under-
lying the popular Magellan tool from Synopsys (e.g. see [93, 92]), and can be
constructed in just a few lines of code in our meta-language.
Regarding the meta-language for functional verification, this dissertation
makes a number of contributions, derived largely from our set of works
[53, 51, 52]. The specific contributions of this dissertation to functional
verification are as follows:
1. It identifies a problem with contemporary functional verification method-
ology that is of substantial practical importance: the inability to effec-
tively orchestrate the coverage closure feedback loop programmatically.
2. It proposes, as a way of remedying this problem, a programming lan-
guage, or meta-language, for functional verification where simulation
becomes a first-class concept.
3. It defines a formal semantics of such a meta-language, called fvml, as an
embedded domain-specific language within rewriting logic, and which
is, in addition, parametric on the hardware description language (HDL)
used to develop the device-under-test.
4. It specifies an implementation of such a meta-language specialized for
testing Verilog devices, called vlogml, as an embedded domain-specific
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language in Haskell.
5. It provides a set of pedagogical vlogml programs that demonstrate the
novel capabilities made possible through our meta-language.
6. It provides two case studies that demonstrate vlogml programs analyz-
ing more substantial devices, including a bus-master controller and a
simple microprocessor.
Implicit on the approach to functional verification and the meta-language
features of vlogml just summarized, there are two additional ideas that are
developed in this dissertation:
• parameterizability : The meta-language is formalized in such a way that
it is really a parametric language [L]ml, where L is the HDL of the
device-under-test. For L = Verilog, we obtain [Verilog]ml, or vlogml
for short. Similar instantiations can be developed for a variety of HDLs.
This is important because it separates in a modular way the language
used for verification purposes from the language used for design.
• semantics-based : That is, not only is the semantics of the parametric
meta-language [L]ml based on the formal system of rewriting logic, but
the HDL L itself is not provided as a standard compiler or simulator
(which would make it in general impossible to be used as a symbolic
execution engine), but as an executable formal specification in rewriting
logic.
The importance of being semantics-based and of directly using a formal
description of the chosen HDL is that much greater confidence can be imparted
in the tool supporting the instantiation of [L]ml when used for functional
verification purposes. This is because what the tool is executing are the formal
definitions of the semantics of the chosen HDL, which can be directly inspected
and criticised at a high level, as opposed to a low-level implementation of
the HDL which may be difficult to understand and debug and may be even
inaccessible due to proprietary reasons.
For these reasons, our research on functional verification fits within the
broader formal framework of the rewriting logic semantics project [77, 78],
where rewriting logic is used to develop formal executable specifications of
programming languages as rewrite theories, and such specifications are then
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used to analyze programs in the given programming language in a variety of
ways, such as through simulation, testing, model checking, static analysis, and
theorem proving. Our [L]ml metalanguage approach specializes this general
idea by: (i) restricting the focus to HDLs, and (ii) focusing on simulation-
based functional verification as opposed to, say, model checking or theorem
proving verification.
For all of the above reasons, a second important contribution of this thesis,
largely derived from [55, 47, 49, 73], is the development of formal semantic
definitions in rewriting logic for several important hardware design paradigms.
7. Verilog. This is one of the most widely used languages today to design
digital circuits, and our formalization is, as far as we know, the most
comprehensive of formalization effort to date, though many language
features are omitted. In its capacity as an executable semantics all
possible program behaviors can be explored and we have used this
feature to give evidence as to the existence of bugs in widely-used
simulators, some of which have since been fixed by the tool authors.
8. Production Rule Sets. This is a language used in the design of asyn-
chronous digital circuits. We have given both a mathematical semantics
and rewriting logic semantics and proved their equivalence through a
strong bisimulation result. Both of the semantics also clarify the concept
of hazardous execution, a crucial correctness property, and have used
the executable semantics to automatically prove/disprove the existence
of hazards, as well as deadlocks.
9. BTRS. This is simplified version of the Bluespec hardware description
language that views hardware design from the perspective of a set of
guarded atomic actions. As a rigorous structural semantics for BTRS
already exists [21], the rewriting logic semantics is almost straightfor-
ward. This speaks however to one of the ideas of the rewriting logic
semantics project, which is the suitability of rewriting logic as a semantic
framework. We also demonstrate how to use the executable semantics
to find deadlocks in BTRS programs.
The dissertation is organized into chapters as follows:
• Chapter 1. Identifies the problem motivating this dissertation and
explains at a high-level the means through which we address it.
7
• (Chapter 3). Discusses related work, defines mathematical notation par-
ticular to this dissertation, and enumerates, via appropriate references,
other needed background material such as in rewriting logic and the
Haskell programming language.
• Chapter 4. This chapter presents the formalization of fvml within
rewriting logic.
• Chapter 5. This chapter describes vlogml, an implementation of fvml
in Haskell and specialized for analyzing Verilog devices.
• Chapter 6. This chapter presents several pedagogical examples of
vlogml programs demonstrating the novel capabilities of our meta-
language. The device that is analyzed is a digital circuit implementing
a sort of maze.
• Chapter 7. This chapter presents two larger case studies, also using the
above vlogml. One, an I2C bus-mastering controller, and the second, a
small microprocessor.
• Chapter 8. This chapter presents a rewriting logic semantics for a
substantial portion of Verilog.
• Chapter 9. This chapter presents a rewriting logic semantics for pro-
duction rule sets, a language used in the design of asynchronous digital
circuits.
• Chapter 10. This chapter presents a rewriting logic semantics for BTRS,
a simplified form of Bluespec.




This chapter presents some basic information that may help orient a reader
unfamiliar with rewriting logic, Maude, or Haskell. It is not meant to be
comprehensive, rather, it simply provides a few of the “basics”.
2.1 Rewriting Logic
This section reviews the basics of rewriting logic, Maude, and the rewriting
logic semantics project.
2.1.1 Syntax, Proof Theory, and Model Theory
To precisely define our meta-language we employ rewriting logic [74]. One
reason is that rewriting logic has been shown to be well-suited to defining the
formal semantics of programming languages, which will be relevant at two
levels: (1) at the level of the functionality provided by our meta-language, and
(2) at the level of the design language. Our meta-language is made generic by
being parameterizable on a formalization of the design language semantics.
Then, using the fact that rewriting logic is reflective [16, 17], we can achieve
the “meta” aspects of the testbench language in an elegant way.
Formally, rewriting logic is defined by its deduction system and model
theory, as with other logics. It is parameterized by a suitable equational logic,
e.g. unsorted, many-sorted, order-sorted, membership, so that a rewriting
logic specification is defined as a triple (Σ, E,R) with (Σ, E) a signature and
set of axioms of the underlying equational logic, and R a set of appropriately
defined rewrite rules.
The structure of the rules can vary slightly with the underlying equational
logic and whether or not one considers conditional rules. The essential idea
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in all cases is that a rewrite rule specifies an ordered pair of patterns (s, s′)
with the intuition that any instance, say θ(s), of s, where θ instantiates
the parameters of the patterns s and s′ and is called a substitution, can be
dynamically transformed into a corresponding instance θ(s′) of s′. A rewrite
rule (s, s′) is typically written more suggestively as
s −→ s′.
Common presentations either define rewrites directly on terms formed
from the symbols of Σ and a set of variables, or else on E-equivalence classes
of terms formed by deduction in the underlying equational theory. In the case
of the Maude rewriting logic language and tool [15], the underlying equational
logic is membership equational logic [76] and rewrite rules are defined at the
term level with conditions constructed as a conjunction of atomic rewrite,
equation, and membership formulae.
For expository purposes going forward, we will consider only the unsorted,
unconditional case, and define rewriting on equivalence classes of terms. The
presentation we will give largely follows that of [75]. Under these assumptions
we will first define what a rewriting logic specification is and then define the
logic’s deduction system and model theory.
A rewriting logic specification R = (Σ, E,R) is any triple with (Σ, E) an
(unsorted) equational logic specification consisting of an equational signature
Σ and a set of equations, E, of the form t = t′, with t, t′ ∈ TΣ(X), the
set of well-formed terms involving the symbols of Σ and with variables
drawn from some fixed set X; and where the rewrite rules are just any set
R ⊆ TΣ,E(X)2, where TΣ,E(X) denotes the set of E-equivalence classes of
terms defined by equational deduction from E. For a given term t ∈ TΣ(X),
we consider the E-equivalence class of t, [t] ∈ TΣ,E(X), to be defined such
that [t]
def
= {t′ ∈ TΣ(X) | E ` t′ = t}.
Deduction in this variant of rewriting logic establishes sequents of the
form
(Σ, E,R) ` [t] −→ [t′]
from the finite application of the following inference rules:
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1. reflexivity: for each [t] ∈ TΣ,E(X)
·
[t] −→ [t]
2. congruence: for each n ∈ N and f ∈ Σ of arity n
[t1] −→ [t′1] · · · [tn] −→ [t′n]
[f(t1, . . . , tn)] −→ [f(t′1, . . . , t′n)]
3. replacement: for each ([t(x1, . . . , xn)], [t
′(x1, . . . , xn)]) ∈ R
[w1] −→ [w′1] · · · [wn] −→ [w′n]
[t(w1, . . . , wn)] −→ [t′(w′1, . . . , w′n)]
4. transitivity
[t1] −→ [t2] [t2] −→ [t3]
[t1] −→ [t3]
The model theory of rewriting logic is given by the notion of an R-system
(e.g. see [75]). Again, there is some variation depending on the underlying
equational logic and the form of the rewrite rules. Consider an unsorted,
unconditional rewrite specificationR = (Σ, E,R). AnR-system consists of (1)
a category S, (2) for each n ∈ N and f ∈ Σ of arity n, a functor fS : Sn −→ S,
and (3) for each ([t], [t′]) ∈ R a natural transformation rS : tS ⇒ t′S where
tS , t′S are functors defined in the natural, inductive way from the fS functors.
Additionally, the fS functors must satisfy the property that for any equation
t(x1, . . . , xn) = t
′(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ E, tS = t′S . The semantics of Maude system
modules are essentially given by the initial R-system corresponding to the
rewrite specification R given by the module.
Detailed accounts of rewriting logic can be found in [74, 75, 11]. For
membership equational logic, see [76]. Reflection in rewriting logic and
a number of equational logics, including membership equational logic, is
addressed in [16, 17]. For details on the Maude rewriting logic language, see
[15] and the explanations below.
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2.1.2 Maude
Maude [15] is an executable rewriting logic language with an assortment of
built-in automated formal analysis tools, including invariant checking via
breadth-first search [15, Ch. 12] and linear-temporal logic model checking
[15, Ch. 13]. The underlying equational logic used is membership equational
logic [76], and also supported is the use of conditional rewrite rules. The
basic unit of organization within Maude source code is a module, of which
the two main types are functional modules [15, Ch. 4], which correspond to
equational specifications (empty set of rewrite rules), and system modules [15,
Ch. 6], which (typically, though not necessarily) contain a non-empty set of
rules, and therefore correspond to full rewrite theories.
An example functional module that uses quite a few features of Maude




ops a b c d : -> Elem .
sort Set .
subsort Elem < Set .
op empty : -> Set .
op __ : Set Set -> Set [assoc comm id: empty] .
vars X : Elem .
vars XS : Set .
eq X X = X .
endfm
Notice that two sorts have been declared using the keyword sort, Elem,
for elements of the sets that we are defining, and Set, for the sets themselves.
The keyword op or ops introduces new symbols into the signature of the
specification with the number of arguments given and implying appropriately
defined axioms on the domain and co-domain of that symbol to enforce the
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sort constraints.
Subsorting, which is implied by the use of membership equational logic,
is allowed through the subsort keyword. In this case, we use subsorting
to conflate an element and the singleton set containing that element. The
juxtaposition operator __ is annotated with equational attributes [15, §4.4.1],
which Maude can use to perform rewriting modulo. Our set constructor,
corresponding to set union, is above being declared associative, commutative,
and having as its identity element the empty set, empty. Lastly, we define an
equation corresponding to the idempotency property of sets; equations are
introduced with the keyword eq.
As a result, when the above module is loaded into Maude, it can correctly
deduce that the set {a, d, a, b, a, c} is the same as {a, b, c, d}. To see this, we
can execute the reduce command [15, §4.9] at the interactive prompt:
Maude> reduce a d a b a c .
reduce in SET : a d a b a c .
rewrites: 2 in 0ms cpu (0ms real) (~ rewrites/second)
result Set: a b c d
System modules, unlike functional modules, allow one to use the keyword
rl to introduce rewrite rules. For example, we can extend the above module
in such a way that we allow b to be rewritten to a.
mod GOODBYE-B is
including SET .
rl b => a .
endm
Now, when we reduce the earlier set, we still get the same result, as
reduce does not apply rules.
Maude> reduce a d a b a c .
reduce in GOODBYE-B : a d a b a c .
rewrites: 2 in 0ms cpu (0ms real) (~ rewrites/second)
result Set: a b c d
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However, using the command rewrite, our newly added rules is applied and
we get the expected result.
rewrite in GOODBYE-B : a d a b a c .
rewrites: 4 in 0ms cpu (0ms real) (~ rewrites/second)
result Set: a c d
Modules, therefore, define rewriting logic specifications, perhaps with an
empty set of rules, which for functional modules, is of course always the case.
These modules are expected to satisfy certain properties in order to guarantee
that they are sufficiently executable within the Maude interpreter and that
soundness is guaranteed from the analyses performed by some of Maude’s
built-in tools. These properties are called admissibility requirements in the
context of Maude. In particular, the equational part of a specification is
typically expected to be confluent and terminating modulo the equational
axioms [15, §4.6], and the rewriting rules should be coherent with respect to
the equations [15, §6.3].
There are a number of built-in and add-on tools to perform formal analysis
of rewriting logic specifications written in Maude. In particular, Maude has
built-in support for breadth-first search [15, Ch. 12] and linear-temporal-logic
model checking [15, Ch. 13]. As a very simple application of Maude’s search
command, we can observe that from the set {b, d} we can reach a set through
rewriting that contains a, but we cannot reach a set that contains c. The first
case comes from executing
Maude> search b d =>* a X:Set .
search in GOODBYE-B : b d =>* a X:Set .
Solution 1 (state 1)




states: 2 rewrites: 1 in 0ms cpu (0ms real)
(~ rewrites/second)
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And, the second case simply searches for a set with c as an element,
ultimately finding no solution.
Maude> search b d =>* c X:Set .
search in GOODBYE-B : b d =>* c X:Set .
No solution.
states: 2 rewrites: 1 in 0ms cpu (0ms real)
(~ rewrites/second)
2.1.3 Rewriting Logic as an Executable Semantics Definitional
Framework
The idea of the rewriting logic semantics project [77, 19, 78] is to use rewriting
logic as the mathematical foundation for giving formal semantic definitions
to programming languages. This idea has both practical and conceptual
advantages over other frameworks. For example, it unifies denotational and
operational-style semantics in a useful way, and with executable rewriting
logic languages such as Maude [15], it is possible to get an interpreter from
the semantic definition without any additional work, a very practical benefit.
In addition to execution, there are more traditional formal analysis tools that
apply to any language formalized within rewriting logic, and which may be
available to a user once a language is formalized, for example, reachability
analysis to search for failures of invariants is made available, as is LTL model
checking.
Given a programming language L, the semantics of L is given as a rewriting
logic specification RL = (Σ, E,R) where the signature Σ characterizes the
syntax of L, the equations E characterize the deterministic aspects of L, and
the rewrite rules R characterize the concurrent aspects of L. For example, a
simple concurrent language might use rules for every load or store of a variable,
but equations for all other features, such as the processing of if-statements,
sequential composition, and while loops, all of which would not be observable
between threads. In Maude notation, this could be expressed (roughly) as
follows
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eq eval(if true then S1 else S2, M) = eval(S1, M) .
eq eval(if false then S1 else S2, M) = eval(S2, M) .
eq eval(S1 ; S2, M) = eval(S2, eval(S1, M)) .
rl eval(X := V, M) => M[V / X] .
Conceptually, eval is an evaluation function for a program and a state, where
a state is just a map from variable identifiers to values (M). Note that the first
three lines are equations, i.e. elements of E, whereas the fourth line where we
define what it means to do a variable assignment, is a rule, i.e. an element of
R.
The canonical approach to rewriting logic semantics is given in [77].
Many traditional operational-semantic styles, such as big-step and small-
step structural operational semantics and reduction semantics, can also be
embedded into rewriting logic in an elegant way, as shown in [19]. An extensive
definition of Scheme using the rewriting logic semantics approach can be
found in [20]; many other examples of language definitions are cited in [77].
2.2 Haskell
Haskell is a functional language based on a polymorphic lambda calculus,
noted especially for its non-strict semantics, type classes, purity, and its use
of “monads”. Of course, while it is impossible to provide a comprehensive
overview of the language in this section, we do attempt to impart some of the
syntax as well as a particular aspect of Haskell that vlogml relies on, called
the “state monad”.
In some sense, Haskell is very similar to other contemporary functional
programming languages. A programmer will typically begin by defining some
algebraic data types, for example
data Tree a = LEAF a | BRANCH (Tree a) (Tree a)
defines a polymorphic data type, Tree a, for binary trees. The symbol a is a
type variable, and can be instantiated with any type, for example
BRANCH (LEAF 1) (BRANCH (LEAF 2) (LEAF 3))
represents a value of type Tree Int, since the leaves contain integer values 1
– 3. The tokens LEAF and BRANCH are called constructors.
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Once a data type is defined, a programmer can write functions that expect
arguments with that type, for example we can write a (polymorphic) function
that determines the height of a tree
height (LEAF _) = 0
height (BRANCH x y) = 1 + max (height x) (height y)
This function uses pattern matching on the constructor symbols to distinguish
the two relevant cases. The “ ” acts as a place holder when we do not need
the argument, such as in this case where we simply need to know that we are
at a leaf node. As usual in functional programming, recursion is used heavily.
Haskell is statically typed and the type of the height function can be
automatically inferred, but one can give a type explicitly if desired, for
example to aid in readability.
height :: Tree a -> Int
height (LEAF _) = 0
height (BRANCH x y) = 1 + max (height x) (height y)
Note that the -> symbol is used to construct function types, in this case
a polymorphic function from the (polymorphic) type representing trees to
the integer type. Haskell uses currying notation, so that a function of two
arguments would be given as
f :: a -> b -> c
The above concepts cover only the very basics, demonstrating the syntax
for introducing new types, defining functions, and the syntax for ascribing a
type to a function. Of course, Haskell has a multitude of other features, as
well as many predefined data types and so forth. The goal is just to provide
some basic familiarity so that when we introduce the concepts crucial in the
implementation or use of vlogml, they are somewhat grounded.
One such concept is Haskell’s “state monad”. It consists of a type and a
set of “monadic” and other operations on that type, and is used to simulate
stateful computations. Let us start with just the type, which is defined as
data State s a = STATE (s -> (a,s))
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where (,) is the type constructor for pairs. The State type constructor there-
fore takes two arguments, the first one being the type variable s, intuitively
corresponding to state of the computation, and the second one being a, which
will correspond to the result of the computation. The single constructor,
STATE, simply boxes a function of type
s -> (a,s)
That is, a value of type State s a is essentially just a function taking
some initial state to a resulting value and the updated state.
Using Haskell’s “do”-notation, one can write code that appears much like
imperative code. Consider the type State Int Bool, essentially just
Int -> (Bool,Int)
corresponding to a stateful computation whose backing state is a single integer
and which returns a boolean result. To demonstrate the do-notation, let
us write a simple function that first stores a value into the state, say 11,
second, retrieves the value from the state, and third checks whether the value
retrieved is greater than 10, returning true if it is, and false if not. This is
done as




return (x > 10)
The do construct effectively says to execute the following statements in
order, one after the other, carrying along the state. The functions put and
get are pre-defined with State, they swap-in a new state and retrieve the
current state, respectively. In addition, the do-notation hides the use of the
“monadic” operations pre-defined with State. These operations ensure that the
sequencing of operations occurs in the expected way. stateGreaterThanTen
is therefore a constant function that returns the value (True,11).
In vlogml, the main data type is a “state monad” of a slightly more
complex variety. The particulars of this data type are described in the
following section, which should also help to further clarify how “stateful”
computations are used in Haskell.
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Finally, it is important to emphasize that, unlike some other functional
languages, these stateful computations maintain referential transparency.




Broadly speaking, this dissertation makes contributions in two distinct areas,
the first being the functional verification of digital hardware, and second
being the formal specification of the semantics of hardware design languages.
This chapter correspondingly splits related work across a pair of sections, with
Section 3.1 covering related work on functional verification, paying special
attention to the way in which different kinds of languages may be used to
address the verification burden, and with Section 3.2 addressing related work
concerning the semantics of hardware description languages.
3.1 Functional Verification
Perhaps surprisingly, the use of programming language techniques to address
inefficiencies and issues of quality in the functional verification process has
not been extensively investigated within the academic research community.
However, functional verification of hardware as a whole is a well-established
field. Most academic work on functional verification concerns methodology
and algorithmics, for example addressing scalability of formal verification (e.g.
[12]) or automatically generating assertions (e.g. [97]). Industrial players, on
the other hand, have put substantial effort into the design of programming
languages used for functional verification, especially the hardware verification
languages e [39], OpenVera [91], and SystemVerilog [38].
The lack of a “research community” around language-based approaches to
functional verification means that there is no commonly understood narrative
that explains the state of the art. As such, the narrative we present here
represents a rather unique way of characterizing the effect of programming
languages on contemporary functional verification. It centers around a catego-
rization of relevant programming languages into a set of four categories that
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reflect methodology (simulation versus formal verification), and the extent to
which the language was designed with functional verification as a goal. The
four categories are given according to the primary intended purpose for which
they were designed
1. hardware verification through simulation (e.g. SystemVerilog);
2. hardware verification through formal proof (e.g. reFLect);
3. hardware design (e.g. Verilog);
4. primary usage falls outside the hardware domain (e.g. C++).
Indeed, the lack of a cohesive research community in this area also means
that the language situation is exceptionally complicated with regards to ter-
minology and concepts, and it bears warning that many relevant concepts are
commonly used in an imprecise way; even the notion of language is somewhat
difficult to ascertain exactly. For example, SystemVerilog is discussed below
as a language of class (1) above, while Verilog is discussed as a member of
class (3). At the same time, though, Verilog is a proper sub-language of
SystemVerilog. The distinction we endeavor to make is in the intended use of
the language features that are most closely associated with the language name,
but it should be noted that this intention is based simply on contemporary
usage amongst the loose collection of professional engineers and researchers
who make up the design verification engineering community.
The languages of class (3) predate and led to the development of the
languages of the first two classes, and so we begin with class (3). The two
most most prominent languages that occupy this category are Verilog [36] and
VHDL [37], which are also the two most widely-used design languages. There
are two kinds of effects that design languages have on functional verification:
a direct kind and an indirect kind.
The direct effect is that design languages are often used not only for
design, but also to construct a testbench which will not be synthesized into
hardware. One of the main reasons that design languages are attractive in
this second role is that one avoids any interoperability problems that arise
from having two different languages that need to work together in concert.
A second reason is that designers and verification engineers are often the
same person, and mastering one language is simpler than mastering multiple
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languages. Both of these are valid and understandable advantages of making
dual use of a design language for verification.
The indirect effect is more subtle but widely understood in the context
of software. Higher-level languages lead to more natural designs and fewer
bugs. As an example, one of the reasons modern programmers often prefer
Java over a language such as C is that the language completely removes
the possibility of certain kinds of memory bugs. In the context of hardware
design, a good, modern example of this is the Bluespec language [8], whose
embrace of high-level programming concepts reduces the verification burden;
for example, through promotion of a richer type system that is statically
checked.
Of course, the main downside of using a design language for verification
purposes is that verification-specific language features are often omitted or
added as an afterthought. In addition, when verification-specific features are
included, an unfortunate side-effect often occurs where an ill-defined subset of
the language becomes synthesizable into hardware, and many legal programs
are rejected by synthesis tools. This can cause confusion and may not even be
consistent across synthesis tools. Indeed, one often hears engineers speak of a
“synthesizable subset” of Verilog, which has exactly those problems mentioned.
Let us now return to class (1) and class (2) languages. The need for
verification-specific language features, separate from those used for design,
led to the development of class (1) languages. This class consists primarily of
the hardware verification languages e [39], OpenVera [91], and SystemVerilog
[38].
SystemVerilog was largely based on OpenVera, and so the two languages
share essential language features related to functional verification. In particu-
lar, the two languages add support for general-purpose programming concepts
which, unlike design-oriented languages, are not meant to be synthesized and
only run during simulation. The most apparent example is object-oriented
programming, which is seen to increase productivity and correctness when de-
veloping verification code. In addition, these languages add several important
features highly tailored for functional verification, including built-in support
for constrained-randoms, functional coverage, and assertions.
The other hardware verification language mentioned, e, has a reputation
as a very thoughtfully developed language for verification purposes, and
is especially noted for its inclusion of aspect-oriented programming [58] to
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allow for different testing scenarios to be pieced together easily. Indeed,
OpenVera subsequently was extended with aspects, due to their success in e.
e also supports object-oriented programming, constrained-randoms, functional
coverage, and assertions.
Compared to fvml, the language for functional verification developed in
this dissertation, the existing class (1) languages just described are markedly
different. Conceptually, all treat a testbench as an environment in which the
device under test operates, rather than as a programmatic way of orchestrating
multiple simulations; that is, none consider simulation as a first-class concept.
In addition, none allows for the use of symbolic simulation during testing.
As far as we are aware, the only language whose primary intended purpose
falls into class (2) is one used internally by Intel and based around the reFLect
language described in [32]. reFLect augments the λ-calculus with a quote/anti-
quote mechanism to get, as its name suggests, reflection capabilities. The
emphasis on reflection in the language suggests the possibility of simulation
as a first-class notion, and so at first glance may appear to duplicate our
offering.
The two languages are, however, entirely different, with the difference being
in intended use. The intended use of reFLect has always been formal verification
of hardware using theorem proving techniques, and mostly uses reflection to get
a first-class representation of the device for reasoning purposes. Our language,
on the other hand, looks to investigate the usefulness of combining a first-class
notion of simulation (which is not the same as the device being simulated)
with declarative programming and automated constraint solving as a way to
enhance contemporary simulation-based methodology, as opposed to targeting
a formal verification regime. Therefore, we do not claim that our contribution
is the first to think of employing meta-level ideas in the context of hardware
verification. What we do claim is that it is the first to conceptualize and
investigate the utility of the idea of providing simulation as a first-class notion
at the language-level, a meta-level idea, as a way to improve the productivity
and quality of simulation-based functional verification engineering efforts.
That said, it is worth noting that reFLect could have been used as a
framework for testing the ideas we have set forth. We could have embedded
vlogml into reFLect instead of Haskell, for example, or given our formal
definition of fvml within the framework described in [32], instead of as we
did, using rewriting logic. These would have been legitimate choices, and [32]
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does indeed provide an elegant framework, but would have been subject of
course to some trade-offs. In particular, the semantic framework capabilities
of rewriting logic are crucial to the parametric character of our language
formalization (see Chapter 4).
As a final note regarding class (2) languages, we should mention ACL2
[54], although it does not fit into this class especially well because it was not
designed with the express purpose of being used for hardware verification.
As we noted above, though, the situation with related work in the area does
not lend itself well to rigid interpretation. Be that as it may, ACL2 has been
used extensively to prove parts of microprocessors correct, most notably at
AMD [89]. Again, this is quite different from our offering, which emphasizes
simulation-based verification.
Class (4) languages commonly include C++ [40] and Python [87], among
other general-purpose programming languages. The use of these languages is
sensible for a variety of reasons, especially in the development of checking pro-
grams that are specialized to assess the correctness of a device’s output, which
varies wildly from from device to device and is often most easily expressed
in general-purpose programming languages. Of course, these languages are
less useful for generating stimuli and monitoring coverage than the hardware
verification languages, and compared to fvml they do not provide any specific
help in the orchestration of multiple simulations.
The above languages are the most relevant work related to fvml. Of course,
a vast array of additional work related to many different aspects of functional
verification has also been done, and is relevant insofar as these works endeavor
toward the same high-level goal: to ease the burden of functional verification
and produce devices with fewer bugs. They are different from our work in
that they address some aspect of functional verification other than the general
problem of designing a language for simulation-based testbench development;
although, in some cases there are interesting implications pertaining to our
particular problem. We mention a few in the remainder of this section, just
to give a flavor of some of the areas that have been researched.
Intel has developed their own formal verification environment [44, 32]
that is used as part of the overall functional verification process. AMD does
something similar using ACL2 [89]. Synopsys sells an automatic property
checking (and stimuli generation) tool called Magellan [34, 93, 92], whose
underlying ideas are also used in non-hardware contexts [63]. Private com-
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panies such as Jasper Design Automation sell formal verification tools, and
formal-methods-based tools, although detailed information about such pro-
prietary tools is obviously quite limited. Substantial work on the generation
of random stimuli (e.g. [61, 1]), equivalence checking (e.g. [86, 13]), coverage
metrics (e.g. [14]), automatic assertion generation (e.g. [97]), and reuse exist.
We also mention the work of [59, 60] which was an early debugging tool that
allowed user control over symbolic simulation, though it was not designed
for use in hardware verification and was interactive, rather than controlled
through the use of a meta-level programming interface.
3.2 Rewriting Logic Semantics
The rewriting logic semantics project, including its goals, ideas, and accom-
plishments, is reviewed in detail in three papers [77, 19, 78]. The essential
idea of the project is to define programming languages, process calculi, and
the like in a mathematically rigorous and unambiguous way, and to develop
language-agnostic analysis tools. These ideas come out in various ways in
this dissertation; for example, to check deadlock of BTRS programs. The re-
mainder of this subsection reviews related work regarding the three hardware
description languages that we have formalized as part of this dissertation.
Regarding Verilog, in [28], Michael Gordon presents a formal semantics
for a simplified version of Verilog called V. V does not deal with many
of the features of Verilog that our definition does (such as value sizing).
Additionally, it uses new terminology rather than that of the standard. While
the syntax described in the paper is formal, the semantics, as presented, is
primarily in English language form. Additionally, the semantics presented is
not executable, making it more difficult to ask questions about what output
a given program should produce.
Gordon Pace and Jifeng He present a brief formal semantics of Verilog
in [84]. While completely formal, the definition they present does not cover
several major features of Verilog, such as non-blocking assignments or handling
the intricacies of bitvectors. Additionally, their semantics is not executable.
In [90], Hisashi Sasaki presents a semantics for Verilog in terms of abstract
state machines. Executability of the definition is not discussed, and it does
not capture the inherent nondeterminism of Verilog, which we feel is one of
25
the most important issues to understanding Verilog.
In [105], Huibiao Zhu, Jifeng He, and Jonathan Bowen present an algebraic
semantics of Verilog, which they use to derive a denotational semantics. Their
semantics cover a smaller subset of the language than He’s earlier work in [84]:
not even net assignments are covered.
Of the definitions that we have found, ours covers the largest number
of constructs in the Verilog language, including importantly its inherent
nondeterminism. Our definition is also far from complete; for example we do
not define the semantics of tasks. However, we believe that our semantics is
the most complete to-date and covers many of the most widely used language
features. Additionally, to the best of our knowledge only our semantics is
executable, allowing for experimentation with Verilog programs.
The work on production rule sets covers two somewhat separate topics
and therefore the related work falls into two distinct categories: the semantics
of production rule sets, as a topic of interest in its own right, and the formal
verification of asynchronous digital circuits, specifically hazard freedom.
The first topic is the semantics of production rule sets. Of course, the
current work improves upon our own earlier efforts in [55, 47]. The current
efforts, including both the mathematical and the rewriting logic styles, provide
a cleaner and simpler presentation of the delay-insensitive case. To the best
of our knowledge, no other works have presented semantic issues as an end
in and of themselves, but rather simply in support of some other goal, such
as Martin’s synthesis method [65, 67]. However, we believe that a clear and
rigorous semantic reference is itself an important goal, and ultimately can
reduce fragmentation and misunderstanding when undertaking problems that
rely on having a semantics.
Martin has also used his semantics in an auxiliary way to prove that the
scope of possible circuits under delay-insensitivity is limited [66] and that
quasi delay-insensitive circuits are Turing-complete [64]. The semantics from
[65, 67] was also examined in [85] in order to clarify the relationship between
production rule sets and corresponding physical circuit implementations. We
have also used an earlier version of the semantics to prove properties about
the relationship of devices under different timing assumptions [55].
The second topic addressed is formal verification of asynchronous circuits,
in particular verifying hazard freedom and deadlock freedom. Our work seems
to be the first that attempts to use the formal executable semantics approach
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(modulo our work in [47], on which the current work is based). It is also
the only work that we know of that provides an extensive formal verification
platform for asynchronous circuits designed using production rule sets, which
we get via Maude’s built in tools, including a full LTL model checker.
Regarding hazard freedom, it is known that (proprietary) tools based
on Monte Carlo methods exist and are used in practice. In addition, we
know of a few other works that attempt to exhaustively prove the absence of
hazards in asynchronous circuits (though not necessarily designed directly for
production rule sets).
The methods developed in [4] use two versions of the circuit; one high-
level and one low-level. Both designs are given as specialized automata,
and while a full enumeration of the reachable state space in the high-level
design is necessary, a careful analysis shows how to avoid doing the same
for the low-level design. This yields a more efficient analysis of hazard free
operation, since the high-level design has a smaller state space than the more
detailed, low-level design. [96] uses the modern program analysis technique
of abstract interpretation to reason about hazards in asynchronous circuits.
[102] uses a standard symbolic model checker to verify hazard free operation
of speed-independent circuits, and an older tool called prlint [18] purports
to exhaustively check hazard free operation of a production rule set. prlint
is no longer easily available, and we were unable to acquire a version capable
of running on a modern Linux workstation.
A class of Petri nets, called signal transition graphs (STGs), can be used
to model certain aspects of asynchronous circuits [57], and a number of works,
e.g. [80, 12, 88, 103, 104] propose methods of model checking these Petri net
specifications. Certain high-level properties such as liveness and fairness can
be verified in this way, but the STG specification does not expose low-level
circuit properties like the timing of forks.
Regarding the Bluespec semantics, our work is based on a previous,




This chapter presents a formalization of two things: a problem, the high-
level problem addressed in this dissertation, and a proposed solution to that
problem, which constitutes the main contribution of this dissertation. More
specifically, we formalize two notions:
1. verification closure, expressed here in a simplified fashion as the problem
of generating a set of simulation traces satisfying a collection of coverage
goals.
2. meta-language for functional verification, fvml, which we see as an
effective mechanism for attaining verification closure.
Both of the above items will be formalized within the mathematical framework
of rewriting logic [74, 75, 10], which provides two important benefits. First,
it will allow the meta-language to be parameterized over a hardware design
language, and thereby made generic with respect to the language chosen to
implement the device-under-test. Second, it allows us to structure our meta-
language as an embedded domain-specific language, where general purpose
programming features are had through rewriting logic itself.
4.1 Overview
Our formalization effort involves four separate rewriting logic specifications,
(1) RHDL (2) RMETA (3) RIR (4) RSTRAT
organized according to the relationships depicted in Figure 4.1, wherein R¯HDL






Figure 4.1: Structure of RHDL, RMETA, RIR, and RSTRAT .
described in detail below in Section 4.6. The first three specifications
(1) RHDL (2) RMETA (3) RIR
are provided to the user and together comprise the domain-specific part of
fvml. The new language features, which consist of four “inference rules”, are
exported through RIR. RHDL and RMETA are mostly hidden from the user,
but are essential to formalize the semantics of the operations provided by RIR.
RHDL is a rewriting logic semantics for the hardware description language
used to implement the device-under-test, and RMETA is used to represent
rewriting logic proofs, a meta-level concept, at the object level. Together
RHDL and RMETA allow us to consider and manipulate an appropriate notion
of device simulation as a first-class concept in our meta-language.
The fourth specification
(4) RSTRAT
is created by the user and constitutes a program that has been written in our
meta-language, fvml. RSTRAT employs the domain-specific features of RIR,
as well as the general-purpose programming facilities of rewriting logic, to
construct a program, or “strategy”, in the fvml language that exercises the
device-under-test.
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The essential point to understand is that the general-purpose programming
facilities of rewriting logic are added to the domain-specific operations provided
by RIR, including RHDL and RMETA, to form our embedded domain-specific
language fvml. That is, roughly speaking:
fvml
def
= [ [ (1) RHDL (2) RMETA (3) RIR ] + [ rewriting logic ] ]
And, additionally, it is crucial to note that RSTRAT is just a program written
in fvml. Each of the four specifications, RHDL, RMETA, RIR, and RSTRAT ,
as well as their respective purpose and structure, is detailed in subsequent
sections.
4.2 Parameterization
A crucial assumption we make in our formalization is the existence of a suit-
able RHDL, which is taken to be a rewriting logic semantics of a programming
language used to implement digital hardware, also called a hardware descrip-
tion language. The advantage of structuring our meta-language formalization
this way is that RHDL becomes a parameter of it, and thereby fvml is made
applicable to any digital circuit designed in a programming language that
can be formalized within rewriting logic. If we are interested in using our
meta-language to exercise, for example, an Ethernet MAC designed in Verilog,
then the assumption is that we possess an RHDL formalizing the semantics of
Verilog; fvml itself does not need to be changed to accommodate Verilog.
Substantial evidence exists which validates this RHDL assumption. This
dissertation, in particular, provides rewriting logic semantics for three lan-
guages used to design digital hardware in Chapters 8 – 10. Many other
programming languages, covering a range of paradigms, have been formalized
in this way, including substantial portions of Java [26], Scheme [71], and
C [24], just to name three. [77, 19, 78] provide comprehensive accounts of




An analogy with theorem proving is helpful to understand the meta-language
and the arrangement of the rewriting logic specifications depicted in Figure
4.1. The source of the analogy is the combination of ML+LCF [29]. ML was
originally conceived as a meta-language for orchestrating proof-construction in
LCF while searching for a particular proof of interest. It acknowledged a very
similar problem to what we view as a serious hindrance to simulation-based
verification: that to effectively investigate the search space, in one case proofs
and in the other simulations, one needs a programmatic way to generate and
interrogate the items in that search space as first-class objects. The various
relationships with our meta-language are summarized in Table 4.2; D denotes
a device, and Q denotes a set of coverage goals. For readers not intimately
familiar with the construction of that theorem proving system, it may be best
to quickly read through the LCF analogy and then return to it for a second
reading after going through the content in the remainder of this chapter.
ML+LCF fvml
LCF ⇐⇒ RIR (and RMETA) (1)
ML ⇐⇒ rewriting logic (2)
Γ ` ϕ ⇐⇒ RHDL and D,Q (3)
Γ ⇐⇒ RHDL (4)
ϕ ⇐⇒ D,Q (5)
Tactic ⇐⇒ RSTRAT (6)
...
...
. . . ...
Γ ` ϕ
⇐⇒ {RHDL ` sD,0 −→ s′j}j<m (7)
Figure 4.2: Analogy between ML+LCF and fvml.
The following describes the relationships, as marked in the above table,
in more detail:
1. the core inference rules provided by LCF are analogous to the simulation-
generating rules of RIR;
2. as an embedded language, the general-purpose programming facilities
of ML are analogous to those inherited from rewriting logic in fvml;
3. the target judgment for theorem proving is best considered, for the
purposes of the analogy, in terms of its components;
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4. RHDL can be seen as a set of axioms from which reasoning takes place;
5. The goal of the reasoning in fvml is to witness to a particular set of
coverage goals, Q, with respect to a device, D;
6. in order to attain this goal, a user writes a program, or tactic;
7. the eventual result of the enterprise, upon success, is a witness of the
goal: a proof in the case of ML+LCF, and a set of simulation traces
covering Q in the case of fvml (sD,0 denotes the initial state of the
device, and s′j some future state).
Consider wanting to prove a theorem about group theory in LCF for
example, that
ΓGROUP ` x · 1 = x
The first thing that we need is ΓGROUP , an axiomatization of group theory.
This set of axioms naturally corresponds to RHDL; it is just that the theorems
that follow from RHDL can be viewed as simulations. LCF must ensure that
any deductions used to arrive at x · 1 = x are sound, which is accomplished
by only allowing proofs to be generated through the core set of inference rules
provided by the LCF prover interface; in fvml the corresponding deduction
rules are given byRIR. Finally, RSTRAT corresponds to the user’s ML program,
which is simply an attempt by the user to program a strategy to find a proof
of ΓGROUP ` x · 1 = x. RMETA does not have a particularly natural analogue
within the theorem proving context, though it roughly corresponds to the
data-types used to represent proofs.
In the remainder of this chapter, we first formalize the verification closure
problem using concepts from rewriting logic. With this formalization in
mind, our meta-language for functional verification is developed in such
a way that it clearly addresses verification problems of that type. The
formalization of the meta-language is split into subsections, one for each of
the four rewriting logic specifications noted above. Finally, we provide a
simple example demonstrating a program in this language and at the rewriting
logic level, using the syntax of Maude.
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4.4 RHDL
RHDL denotes a rewriting logic specification capturing the semantics of a
programming language suitable for digital hardware design. The main purpose
of it within our meta-language formalization is to provide a straightforward
way to speak about simulation traces. Both of our formalization problems ask
questions about simulation traces: does a particular trace satisfy a coverage
goal? what strategy should be used to generate simulation traces? In the
theorem proving analogy, RHDL is Γ, the set of axioms from which judgments
Γ ` ϕ are established.
The existence of RHDL is a crucial assumption made by our formalization
effort. This assumptions allows the meta-language to be made generic in the
sense that it is applicable to any hardware device, so long as that device is
designed in a language that can be formalized in rewriting logic; and we have
yet to come across one that is not amenable to formalization in rewriting
logic. Some familiar examples of languages that have been given (sometimes
partial) semantics using rewriting logic include Verilog, Production Rule Sets,
and Bluespec. Chapters 8 – 10 develop corresponding RHDL’s for portions of
these three hardware description languages.
A small set of concrete capabilities are assumed to be provided by RHDL.
These capabilities are needed for the formalization of the meta-language as
well as the formalization of the simulation-based verification problem we aim
to help address with it, and are specified in this section.
Definition 4.4.1 (RHDL). In addition to being a rewriting logic semantics
for an appropriate hardware design language, we assume that RHDL comes
endowed with the following:
• Config : a sort used to denote terms capturing an entire program con-
figuration, everything needed to continue with simulation.
• Input : a sort used to denote terms that capture the notion of an input
stimulus.
• inputOf : Config −→ Input : an equationally-defined operator assumed
to yield the remaining pool of input stimuli from a given configuration.
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We will often speak of a device, which is simply used to mean a program
given in the language formalized by RHDL. Additionally, we will assume
that to each device we can associate an initial configuration. This initial
configuration serves as the term from which RHDL judgments are derived;
and, through these judgments, we obtain a suitable notion of simulation, as
detailed in Section 4.5 below.
Definition 4.4.2 (cD,0). Let D be a device and X a set of variables, denu-
merable for each sort in RHDL. By
cD,0 ∈ TRHDL,Config(X),
we denote a symbolic term with variables in X giving the initial configuration
of D. If we want to distinguish the remaining input pool of cD,0, we write
cD,0[i], where i ∈ TRHDL,Input(X) is the result of applying inputOf to cD,0. If
D is understood, it can be omitted, as in c0 or c0[i].
4.5 Problem
Utilizing a rewriting logic specification RHDL of the kind described above in
Section 4.4, this section defines a precise, albeit oversimplified, notion of the
verification closure problem, the problem that our meta-language, fvml, aims
to address. The purpose is simply to provide a suitable frame of reference
to understand the kind of goal that programs in our meta-language strive to
attain.
To begin with, we require a formal definition of single-step rewriting,
from which we obtain our definition of simulation. This notion is the central
concept our meta-language is concerned with.
Definition 4.5.1 (−→1R). LetR be a rewriting logic specification. Associated
to R is a binary relation, the single-step rewrite relation
−→1R⊆ TR(X)2,
defined such that for any t, t′ ∈ TR(X), (t, t′) ∈−→1R if and only if there
exists a derivation of R ` t −→ t′ with exactly one use of the inference rule
“replacement” [74]. It is well-known that a general derivation of a rewrite
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proof can always be represented as a sequential composition of single-step
rewrites [74]. To denote that (t, t′) ∈−→1R, we often write
t −→1R t′.
Definition 4.5.2 (Simulation). Let D be a device. A simulation, or simu-
lation trace, of D is a finite sequence of configurations (cD,0[i], . . . , cm−1) ∈
TRHDL,Config(X) such that for all 0 ≤ j < m− 1, cj −→1RHDL cj+1.
Our notion of verification closure requires that a set of simulations be
generated covering a set of predicates on simulations. These predicates are
considered only in the abstract and are taken to be “coverage goals”. Standard
notions of functional coverage, such as state and transition coverage, will
usually be easy to formulate. Coverage metrics that are more syntax-oriented,
such as statement coverage, could be more difficult.
Definition 4.5.3. Let D be a device. A coverage goal of D is a predicate on
the set of simulations of D.
Definition 4.5.4. Let D be a device and Q a set of coverage goals of D. A
finite set, S, of simulations, where each simulation s ∈ S is of the form:
cD,0[i], . . . , cm−1
with i an input stimulus and m ≥ 0 the length of the simulation, is a D,Q-
cover if and only if for each goal Q ∈ Q, there exists a s ∈ S such that Q(s)
holds.
4.6 RMETA
RMETA provides the basic capabilities needed to generate, as object-level terms,
simulation traces. As was described above in Section 4.5, simulation of a
hardware device can be viewed as a sequence of single-step rewrites, defined
according to the relation −→1RHDL . And this relation is, in turn, defined
in terms of the proofs derivable from RHDL. A potential problem arises in
that a suitable formal framework in which we can manipulate −→1RHDL , a
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meta-logical notion of rewriting logic, is needed at the object level ; RMETA
provides a solution to that problem.
RMETA effectively captures parts of the meta-theory of rewriting logic
through reflection to the object level [16, 17]. It may be suitably defined in a
variety of ways, and we do not fix one here; any reasonable definition should
provide enough functionality to satisfy our needs. As a concrete example, we
consider taking Maude’s META-LEVEL module [15, §14], which contains a rich
collection of meta-level functions for rewriting logic, as our RMETA.
In particular, META-LEVEL provides enough functionality so that −→1RHDL
can easily be used to generate simulation traces. A sort Module is included
that may be used to meta-represent RHDL as an object-level term denoted
R¯RTL, and similarly a sort Term is available that may be used to meta-
represent, for a device D, cD,0 as object-level term, ¯cD,0. META-LEVEL also
provides an operation
metaRewrite : Module Term Bound ~> ResultPair
such that the term metaRewrite(R¯RTL, ¯cD,0,1), when the partial operation
is successful, is equal to a pair (c¯′, ·) whose first component is the meta-
representation of a term, c′, of sort Config that is reachable in one step of
rewriting from cD,0; that is, which is guaranteed to satisfy
cD,0 −→1RHDL c′
4.7 RIR
RIR provides a small set of simple operations from which complex testing
programs in our meta-language, fvml, are created. Our running analogy
equates RIR to LCF, both of which provide a small set of “inference rules”
from which their respective artifacts of interest are generated. In the case of
LCF, these are formal proofs, whereas in RIR the rules are used to manage
the generation of simulations; though, within our formalization, rewriting
logic proofs and simulation are of course one and the same.
RIR is parameterized by a rewriting logic semantics, RHDL, of a program-
ming language used to design hardware and which is of the form specified in
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Section 4.4. RHDL and RMETA are then included as part of RIR, and R¯RTL is
an object-level term defined equal to a constant. Together, these are used to
define a set of terms corresponding to simulations.
Definition 4.7.1. RIR defines a sort Simulation. A term of sort Simulation
is a non-empty list of terms of sort Config , axiomatized in the usual way with
an associative binary append constructor (e.g. see [15, §9.12.1]). The inference
rules of RIR, defined below, generate terms of sort Simulation, where it is
guaranteed that each adjacent pair of elements is related by −→1RHDL ; this may
also be enforced at the sort level, through membership axioms, if desired.
A term of sort Simulation is variously denoted in the following ways:
• As an indexed list of configurations, for example,
c0, . . . , cm−1
where for all 0 ≤ j < m, cj ∈ TRHDL,Config(X). Although not explicitly
enforced at the sort level, it will always be the case that cj −→1RHDL cj+1
in the simulations we construct.
• A more stylized version with an arrow,  , which is indicative of change.
This arrow distinguishes only configurations of interest, as in
c0  cm−1 or c0  c′  cm−1,
so that, unlike the first notation, no ellipsis is used;
• A second stylized version, similar to the above version, but where both
the endpoints and input stimulus are distinguished; as in
c0
i cm−1
with i ∈ TRHDL,Input(X) and c0 assumed to be of the form c0[i].
Each of the core operations provided through RIR’s interface yields a
term of sort Simulation. Four operators are provided: identity, substitution,
advance simulation, and transitivity. Below, each operation is given an
associated “inference rule”, which it operates in accordance with. For the
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most part, premises correspond with inputs, and conclusions correspond with
the operation’s output.
The “substitution” rule requires a sort, which will be denoted Subst , for
terms that will represent substitutions. We assume that this sort characterizes
mappings from (sorted) variables to terms of an appropriate sort; or rather,
an appropriate object-level meta-representation of these concepts. The pa-
rameterized MAP module in Maude [15, §9.13] can be used for this purpose,
for example.
Definition 4.7.2. RIR provides an interface defined by the following opera-
tions:
1. ruleI : Config −→ Simulation: given a configuration, ruleI produces an
identity simulation according to the following rule:
·
c c
2. ruleS : Simulation × Subst −→ Simulation: given a simulation and a
substitution, produces a new substituted simulation, with variables
instantiated according to the substitution:
c
i c′ ρ : X −→ TRHDL(X)
ρ(c)
ρ(i) ρ(c′)
3. ruleA : Simulation −→ Simulation: given a simulation, extends it by
one simulation “step” through rewriting (the implementation of ruleA
requires the use of RMETA, the second premise, which, in this case, does
not correspond to an argument of ruleA):
c c′ c′ −→1RHDL c′′
c c′′
4. ruleT : Simulation × Simulation ⇀ Simulation: given two compatible
simulations, the two are composed by transitivity:




RSTRAT differs from the above rewriting logic specifications in that it is not
really part of the meta-language itself. It is analogous to an ML program that
programmatically works through some portion of the space of proofs searching
for one establishing, for example, the group theory theorem x · 1 = x. In
the case of RSTRAT , instead of using the inference rules of LCF to generate a
proof, the rules of RIR are used to coordinate the generation of simulation
traces toward verification closure; that is, toward covering a set of coverage
goals.
4.9 Example
1 fmod CHECK-GOAL is
2 protecting R-IR .
3 --- auxiliary sorts, ops, meta-variables, etc. omitted
4
5 sort Goal .
6
7 op check-goal : Goal Simulation -> Bool .
8 eq check-goal(GOAL, SIM) = ...
9
10 endfm
Figure 4.3: Some Auxiliary Infrastructure for the Example in Figure 4.4.
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate what is essentially the most
basic program one can construct using fvml, a sort of “Hello World!”. In
the context of functional verification, perhaps the most simple program one
would want to construct is a program that performs directed testing, where
a device, a concrete input stimulus, and testing goal are given and used to
generate a simulation that is then checked against the testing goal.
One implementation of directed testing in fvml is shown in Figure 4.4, with
some auxiliary functionality provided by another module shown in Figure 4.3,
both of which use the syntax of Maude. In order to emphasize the essential
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1 fmod R-STRAT is
2 protecting R-IR .
3 protecting CHECK-GOAL .
4
5 --- auxiliary sorts, ops, meta-variables, etc. omitted
6
7 op directed-test : Config Input Goal -> Bool .
8 eq directed-test(C0, INPUT, GOAL) =
9 check-goal(GOAL, full-simulation(C0[INPUT])) .
10
11 op full-simulation : Simulation -> Simulation
12 eq full-simulation(SIM :: C) =
13 if inputOf(C) == nil
14 then SIM :: C
15 else full-simulation(ruleA(SIM :: C)) fi .
16
17 endfm
Figure 4.4: A Directed Testing Strategy.
ideas, some sorts, operators, meta-variables and so forth are not spelled out
in detail; however, any construct whose intent is not immediately clear from
context is explained.
Directed testing essentially requires that we have two pieces of functionality:
(1) the ability to generate a simulation from a given device implementation and
input stimulus, and (2) some means through which the simulation is assessed
within the overall verification plan, such as its contribution to functional
coverage goals or success or failure against assertions. fvml does not take a
position regarding (2) and leaves it to the user to construct using the general-
purpose programming facilities provided by our embedded language. However,
as a language whose intent is to orchestrate the generation of simulations, it
makes (1) straightforward.
Figure 4.3 indicates the functionality corresponding to (2) above. We
assume in this example that the user has provided an appropriate set of
terms (the sort Goal) corresponding to criteria against which simulations are
assessed, as well as a function, check-goal, that is able ascertain whether
or not a simulation satisfies some property from this space. Of course, more
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complex mechanisms of assessing simulations might be more appropriate in
practice, for example, ones that return more elaborate results than simple
booleans.
Figure 4.4 implements the functionality corresponding to (1) above, namely
the part that generates a simulation from a device and an input stimulus.
The exact structure of a configuration and an input stimulus is, as described
above in Section 4.4, defined by RHDL. The equationally-defined function
full-simulation simply takes the initial configuration and input stimulus
and recursively applies the fvml operation ruleA (here denoted ruleA), until
the input stimulus is exhausted. To do this, we assume that the list constructor
for simulations is the Maude operator _::_, that Config is a sub-sort of
Simulation, and that the formalization RHDL of the hardware description
language in which the device was built has an operator, nil, representing
an empty stimulus. nil is used as the terminating case for the recursion
and marks that the simulation should end. Finally, the top-level function
directed-test aggregates the two parts, first generating a simulation and
then using the functionality of the CHECK-GOAL module to summarize the
result.
In addition to demonstrating the construction of the most basic fvml
program possible, the example in this section emphasizes that while fvml
takes a clear position on the conception of simulation-based verification as an
activity that revolves around the orchestrated generation of simulations, it
takes no position on the exact manner in which the generated simulations are
assessed during the verification process. Appropriately, therefore, it provides
for that aspect of the process the general-purpose programming language




This chapter describes the architecture of an embedded domain-specfic lan-
guage in Haskell for a concrete realization of our meta-language, fvml, defined
in the previous chapter. This architecture is, in addition, specialized for the
Verilog hardware description language, though many of the pieces would
apply to other design languages. Our current implementation, vlogml, which
largely follows this architecture, is open source and available at [46].
By using the term “architecture”, our intention is to make a distinction
between what is presented here and the source code that comprises our
current implementation and which can actually be compiled and executed on
a computer [46]; though, we refer to both using the name vlogml. The reason
for this is to be able to focus on the more interesting conceptual aspects of an
implementation without becoming mired in ancillary implementation detail,
and also to take some other liberties where appropriate so that ideas can be
conveyed as clearly as possible. Without this distinction, we find it easy to
miss the forest for the trees, so to speak. Of course, the reader is invited to
consult the source code at any time [46].
vlogml is defined as an embedded domain-specific language in Haskell.
This means that the domain-specific functionality of our meta-language
formalized in Chapter 4 is implemented within Haskell as a set of data types
and functions, and that as a result we also gain seamless use of Haskell’s
general-purpose programming facilities, which together yield the full-fledged
language. As for any programming language, our expectation regarding
vlogml is that it will provide a strong foundation upon which additional, rich
functionality can be built and distributed. For example, one might envision
a library targeting constrained-random simulation, providing functionality
to support that paradigm; for example, providing a language of constraints,
the necessary solver technology to generate random values that respect the
constraint language, and so forth. Note that distributing such functionality
42
as a library, as opposed to becoming directly part of the language syntax and
semantics, is a substantial difference between our language and a language
such as SystemVerilog.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.
• Section 5.1 outlines the main components of the topmost vlogml module,
called VlogMetaLang, which must be imported to create a vlogml
testbench program.
• Section 5.2 defines a “skeleton” testbench program that we will assume
thought the vlogml examples given in this dissertation and which
imports VlogMetaLang.
• Sections 5.3 – 5.6 provide additional details about the vlogml architec-
ture, broken down into a set of Haskell modules that capture different
conceptual pieces of vlogml. The correspondence of these modules with
fvml is emphasized.
• Sections 5.7 and 5.8 describe two modules that are outside of the vlogml
core, yet build on it to provide a richer experience. Section 5.7 adds
monadic “strategy” functionality and Section 5.8 integrates an SMT
solver.
• Section 5.9 provides a concrete example testbench in vlogml which
relies on the functionality made availabel by our architecture.
The complete source code of vlogml is freely available [46] and distributed
under the terms of the GNU General Public License, version 3 (GPLv3). As
we noted above, liberties have been taken in this chapter to aid in conveying
the essential concepts and ideas of an implementation, leading to some
mismatching between what is presented here and that source code.
5.1 VlogMetaLang
VlogMetaLang exports a core set of data types and functions, essentially cor-
responding to the functionality provided by the RIR part of the formalization
(see Section 4.7), and the necessary parts of RHDL and RMETA (sections 4.4






Figure 5.1: VlogMetaLang Interface.
type representing simulation of Verilog devices is provided, as are functions
to manipulate values of this type by advancing (symbolic) simulation, or
querying the waveform history of the simulation, and so forth. From these
core operations and data types, we expect that users will build-out richer func-
tionality, such as adding the ability to resolve symbolic contexts to concrete
values (see Section 5.8).
The functionality of VlogMetaLang is partitioned across four sub-modules,
as shown in Figure 5.1, the details of which are described in Sections 5.4 – 5.3
next; VlogMetaLang simply does aggregation. Briefly, the purpose of each
module is as follows.
• VlogMetaLang.Syntax: This module contains data types representing
various aspects of Verilog syntax, such as expressions and statements,
and provides helpful functions aiding in the construction of these values.
• VlogMetaLang.Data: This module exports additional data type dec-
larations that are essential for vlogml, in particular its (first-class)
notion of simulation, but also other important data types, such as those
repsenting input stimuli.
• VlogMetaLang.Util: This module exports useful utility functions op-
erating on the data types defined in VlogMetaLang.Data. For example,
one function that is provided yields the waveform history from a simu-
lation.
• VlogMetaLang.Core: This module exports three functions, representing
the core vlogml language features and are used to generate simulations.






3 main :: IO ()
4 main = reportResult =<< strategy =<< start dutrc
Figure 5.2: Skeleton Testbench.
This section describes a vlogml program “skeleton” that will provide
appropriate scaffolding for future vlogml example programs. It imports the
module VlogMetaLang from the previous section to gain access to the core
vlogml data types and functions. Assuming this skeleton program will be
useful because it captures the portion of a vlogml program that will remain
constant throughout our examples. It is displayed in Figure 5.2.
As shown in the figure, the skeleton program includes VlogMetaLang
and is constructed as the monadic composition of three operations. The
compositionality is made apparent by considering the types of each of these
operations, which are
start :: DeviceRC -> IO Simulation
strategy :: Simulation -> IO a
reportResult :: a -> IO ()
strategy and reportResult contain a type variable a that may be in-
stantiated with any concrete type, but must be instantiated to the same
type for both functions so that the composition produces a result that is
well-typed.
The intended purpose of each of the composed functions is as follows:
• start: takes as an argument a value of type DeviceRC that contains
essential configuration information needed for bootstrapping and essen-
tially returns a value of type Simulation representing the initial state
of the device, which is an “empty” simulation. This operation requires
the use of I/O.
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• strategy: takes the empty simulation as an argument and uses it as
a starting point for its testing regime, which represents the body of
the program. It contains the logic for orchestrating and driving the
generation of device simulation runs, all of which stem from this initial
simulation.
• reportResult: accepts the result of strategy and generates a report
to the terminal, or saved to disk, or whatever is convenient, explaining
the result of having run the program.
The skeleton program assumes, in addition, that we are in possession
of a data value named dutrc that is of type DeviceRC. This value specifies
necessary configuration information for the device-under-test, as described
above, and again later in Section 5.3.
5.3 VlogMetaLang.Core
start :: DeviceRC -> IO Simulation
concretize :: Substitution -> Simulation -> Simulation
simulate :: (Input a) => a -> Simulation -> Simulation
Figure 5.3: VlogMetaLang.Core Interface.
Let us begin with VlogMetaLang.Core and then return to some of the
other modules in VlogMetaLang upon which it relies. VlogMetaLang.Core
provides the essential operations of our meta-language, those used to construct
simulation values and which are crucial to constructing the strategy function
from our skeleton program. Three operations are provided in total, as shown
in Figure 5.3; they correspond to the operations ruleI ,ruleS, and ruleA from
RIR, respectively.
In the subsequent sections 5.4 – 5.6, we provide some additional details
about the vlogml data types noted in Figure 5.3. At a high-level, however,
the purpose of the data types should be clear: Simulation is the type that
respresents our first-class notion of Verilog simulation, the type Substitution
is used to represent mappings from symbolic variables to values, and the type
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class (Input a) represents things that can be used as input stimulus. Device
configuration information that is used needed for bootstrapping are provided
by values of type DeviceRC.
start :: DeviceRC -> IO Simulation
The function start corresponds to ruleI from RIR and is the mechanism
through which a value of type Simulation is initially obtained. The argument
to the function must be a value of type DeviceRC, which contains essential
configuration information about the device-under-test. It includes, for exam-
ple, the locations of files containg the Verilog source code for the device, as
well as additional information needed during parsing and elaboration. start
returns an initial, “empty”, simulation of the device. I/O is required to read
the files containing the device source code.
concretize :: Substitution -> Simulation -> Simulation
The function concretize corresponds to ruleS from RIR. Its first argu-
ment is a substitution, a mapping from symbolic variables (see Section 5.4)
to Verilog expressions, and its second argument is a (symbolic, presumably;
though not necessarily) simulation. The result of applying the function is
a new (possibly symbolic) simulation where symbolic variables have been
substituted for according to the mapping given by the first argument.
simulate :: (Input a) => a -> Simulation -> Simulation
The function simulate corresponds to ruleA fromRIR. The type signature
for the function is slightly complicated by the use of a typeclass making it
polymorphic in the first argument, which is used to represent an input stimulus
(see Section 5.4). Essentially, the function takes as arguments a value of some
type that can be converted to an input stimulus and a (possibly symbolic)
simulation, and returns a new (possibly symbolic) simulation that is the result












Figure 5.4: (Partial) VlogMetaLang.Syntax Interface.
VlogMetaLang.Syntax exports data types for parts of the Verilog syntax,
as well as utilities to aid in the construction of values of these types. For
example, they are used to construct queries about simulations. A partial
listing of the VlogMetaLang.Syntax interface, exporting several data types,
is shown in Figure 5.4.
• Literal, Identifier etc.: The intended purpose of each data type is
for the most part clear from the name of the data type; for example,
Literal is used to represent Verilog-style literals such as 4’b1010.
• Variable: One exception is the Variable data type. It is used to
represent symbolic variables created by the user during testing. Symbolic
variables do not have a direct counterpart in the syntax of Verilog, which
is why it is a special case. The reason vlogml includes symbolic variables
alongside Verilog syntax is that the context in which these variables are
used is essentially the same as that of regular identifiers.
Construction via Quasi-Quoting: As described at the outset of this sec-
tion, VlogMetaLang.Syntax also exports functions to aid in the construction
of values of the above types. For the purposes of this dissertation, we will use
“quasi-quoting” to construct values of the above types. For example, consider
the following expression in the syntax of Verilog
x + 1 >> 2
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where x is assumed to be an identifier that is declared in the Verilog source code
and is in scope. The corresponding value of type Expression is constructed
in vlogml as
[expr| x + 1 >> 2 |]
In general in vlogml, by surrounding a Verilog expression with [expr|...|],
a corresponding value of type Expression is create. This particular syntax
is in accordance with the current incarnation of Haskell’s quasi-quote library
[62].
Symbolic variables are created by allowing a slightly extended syntax
within [expr|...|]. An identifier that is surrounded with <...> and prefixed
by an explicit bit-width, as in:
[expr| <32’y> + 1 >> 2 |]
which creates a symbolic variable, y, that is 32-bits wide.
Similarly to the construction of expressions, quasi-quoting syntax is used to
construct other elements of Verilog syntax. Statements are constructed with
[stmt|...|], processes with [proc|...|], identifiers with [iden|...|],





Figure 5.5: VlogMetaLang.Data Interface (Part 1).
VlogMetaLang.Data is responsible for providing all of the core data types
that are not closely associated with Verilog syntax, as those are provided by
VlogMetaLang.Syntax. The relevant portion of the interface is split across
Figures 5.5 – 5.7 for explanatory purposes.
Figure 5.5 shows the exportation of two especially important data types:
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• Simulation: This is the data type representing a simulation. It contains
enough information to continue simulation, such as the state of the
stratified event queue described in the Verilog Standard [36], as well
as a waveform history and a few additional pieces of information. To
construct a simulation in vlogml, one must use the functions given in
Section 5.3; the data type constructors are not exported.
• Waveform: This data type represents a full waveform history for a device.
Essentially, it provides a simulation-time-indexed map of the value of
every node in the device. VlogMetaLang.Util provides a utility to
obtain the waveforms associated with a simulation (see Section 5.6).
data DeviceRC = DeviceRC {
sources :: [FilePath]
, top :: Identifier
, ... -- additional fields
}
newtype Substitution
= Substitution (Map Variable Expression)
Figure 5.6: VlogMetaLang.Data Interface (Part 2).
Figure 5.6 shows the exportation of two data types, one that is used for
basic device configuration, and the second a representation of the concept of
substitution, which is used in various contexts in vlogml.
• DeviceRC: This is a record type containing basic device configuration
information. It has fields for the list of Verilog source files and an
identifier noting the top-level module name, among other items.
• Substitution: This is a data type representing substitutions. Specif-
ically, it is used to map variables to values of type Expression. The
declaration uses newtype instead of data, which is usual practice in
Haskell for renamed types [23].
Figure 5.7 shows the exportation of a data type and a type class that are
used in vlogml to construct input stimuli.
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data Input =
CycleBased [Map Identifier Expression]
| ... -- additional constructors
class Input a where
toInput :: a -> Input
Figure 5.7: VlogMetaLang.Data Interface (Part 3).
• Input: This is the data type that vlogml uses internally to represent
input stimulus and drive simulation. For the purposes of this dissertation,
we show just one kind of input that is supported, cycle-based. A list of
maps from identifiers to expressions are given, one for each clock cycle,
assigning values to the device inputs.
• (Input a): This is a type class allowing users to create specialized
input stimuli tailored for their device and then use it for simulation;
any algebraic data type may be used. See Section 5.9 for an example.
5.6 VlogMetaLang.Util
waves :: Simulation -> Waveforms
clock :: Simulation -> Int
Figure 5.8: (Partial) VlogMetaLang.Util Interface.
Since the user is not provided the constructors for Simulation, some
functions are needed to retrieve needed information from values of this type.
• waves: This function returns an entire waveform history for the current
simulation.
• clock: This function returns the current simulation time, as an integer.
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type (Strategy a)
startM :: DeviceRC -> Strategy ()
simulateM :: (Input a) => a -> Strategy ()
simulateRandM :: (Input a) => a -> Strategy ()
queryM :: Expression -> Strategy Bool
concretizeM :: Substitution -> Strategy ()
runStrat :: (Strategy a) -> Simulation -> IO (a,Simulation)
evalStrat :: (Strategy a) -> Simulation -> IO a
execStrat :: (Strategy a) -> Simulation -> IO Simulation
Figure 5.9: VlogMetaLang.Strategy Interface.
5.7 VlogMetaLang.Strategy
The VlogMetaLang.Strategy library is used as the basis for almost all of
the vlogml examples presented throughout this dissertation. It exports a
polymorphic type
type Strategy a = StateT Simulation IO a
that is an instance of Haskell’s state-transformer monad, StateT (see [23]).
Intuitively, (Strategy a) is intended to represent stateful computations
where the backing state is a simulation, and which furthermore allows the
use of I/O. For example, I/O can be used for random number generation or
to invoke an SMT solver, as we do in Section 5.8. The main benefit of the
(Strategy a) type is that it removes the need to explicitly pass simulations
between functions. Indeed, this is the usual reason to employ a state monad.
VlogMetaLang.Strategy then provides a set of functions from which
these strategies may be constructed. In particular, monadic versions of the
functions from VlogMetaLang.Core:
startM :: DeviceRC -> Strategy ()
simulateM :: (Input a) => a -> Strategy ()
concretizeM :: Substitution -> Strategy ()
Figure 5.9 notes two additional functions that are exported by the
VlogMetaLang.Strategy library and are used in examples presented later.
The first is a modified version of simulateM that performs random simulation.
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simulateRandM :: (Input a) => a -> Strategy ()
This function works by substituting random values for any variables that
occur in the input. simulateM, on the other hand, keeps the variables and
performs symbolic simulation.
The second function that will be used accepts as its first argument a
Verilog expression, which must be of scalar (boolean) type, and returns a
Bool.
queryM :: Expression -> Strategy Bool
This function evaluates the argument expression according to the current
state of the simulation, if it evaluates to a single-bit value equal to one, then
the value True is returned; if it evaluates to any other value, concrete or
symbolic, then the value False is returned.
In order to finish a strategy computation, some method is required to get
out of the monad. State monads are usually unravelled as functions of the
form
s -> (a,s)
where s denotes the type of the backing state, and a is the result of the
computation. The function runStrat unravels values of type (Strategy a)
to return a function of this type, but which is also capable of doing I/O, for
the reasons described at the outset of the section:
runStrat :: (Strategy a) -> Simulation -> IO (a,Simulation)
If just the result of the computation is desired, or just the modified Simulation
is desired, the specialized functions
evalStrat :: (Strategy a) -> Simulation -> IO a
execStrat :: (Strategy a) -> Simulation -> IO Simulation
may be used. These correspond to the functions runStateT, evalStateT,
and execStateT which are part of the standard Haskell distribution [23].
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smt :: (Maybe Int) -> Expression -> IO (Maybe Substitution)
Figure 5.10: VlogMetaLang.SMT Interface.
5.8 VlogMetaLang.SMT
This section describes a library currently provided by vlogml and used in
some later examples that allows a user to interface with an SMT solver. A
user can take advantage of this library to automatically resolve symbolic
simulations to interesting concrete ones. The underlying solving is done by
STP [27], an SMT solver for bit-vectors and arrays which is well suited to
Verilog.
The library currently just exports one function, smt, which essentially
accepts as input a Verilog expression with scalar type and then attempts
to find a satisfying assignment to the symbolic variables contained in that
expression. The exact signature of the function is
smt :: (Maybe Int) -> Expression -> IO (Maybe Substitution)
The first argument specifies an optional timeout value, in seconds, after
which STP aborts. If the expression is satisfiable and the solver is able to
determine a satisfying assignment before the timeout is reached, a substitution
for that satisfying assignment is returned; otherwise, if no such satisfying
assignment exists or the search is aborted due to a timeout, the value Nothing
is returned.
5.9 Example
This section employs the above functionality to construct an example vlogml
program, exemplifying one of the most simple verification paradigms: directed
testing. However simple, directed testing should, if the meta-language is ac-
complishing all of the goals we have set for it, be supported in a straightforward
and simple way; this section demonstrates that this is so for vlogml.
The device-under-test is the Verilog module presented in Figure 5.11,
which is meant to be indicative of a maze: at each clock cycle, the device
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5 reg [2:0] loc;
6
7 initial loc = 0;
8
9 always @(posedge clk)
10 case (loc)
11 0 : loc <= i ? 1 : 0;
12 1 : loc <= i ? 0 : 2;
13 2 : loc <= i ? 3 : 0;
14 3 : loc <= i ? 0 : 4;
15 4 : loc <= i ? 5 : 0;
16 5 : loc <= i ? 6 : 7;
17 6 : $display("FAILURE");
18 7 : $display("SUCCESS");
19 endcase
20 endmodule
Figure 5.11: Example Verilog Module: “Maze”.
“moves” from the current location to some new location based on the single-bit
input i. The goal is to “walk” from the initial location, represented by the
value 0, to the location represented by the value 7, a successful exit; the
location given by the value 6 represents an inescapable dead-end.
Three separate tasks need to be covered by the program: specification
of the directed stimulus, use of the stimulus to generate a simulation, and
checking that the simulation successfully navigates the maze. Ideally, for a
directed test of the maze device, a stimulus will be given as a list of 1’s and
0’s, as in
[1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0]
where each element of the list represents the intended value of i during the
clock cycle corresponding to its position in the list.
Specialized stimuli are implemented within vlogml by first creating an
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1 data MazeInput =
2 Concrete [Int]
3
4 instance Input MazeInput where
5 toInput (Concrete xs) = CycleBased (map mkSubst xs)
6 where mkSubst x = ... -- i maps to x
Figure 5.12: Specialized Input for the Maze.
appropriate data type, and then creating a corresponding instance of the type
class Input, described above in Section 5.5. In the case of the maze and the
kind of directed stimuli described above, the most straightforward implementa-
tion is by creating an algebraic data type, say MazeInput, with a constructor
taking a list of integers as an argument. As a concrete implementation, we
assume the code presented in Figure 5.12:
• (lines 1 – 2): Declare a data type, MazeInput, representing input stimuli
for the maze. The constructor Concrete captures the stimuli as lists of
integers, representing cycle-by-cycle values for the input i.
• (lines 4 – 5): Add an appropriate instance of toInput to convert maze
input into the internal format supported for simulation. The exact
specification of the conversion is omitted for reasons described above in
Section 5.5 (see [46]).
Having the MazeInput data type and assuming the skeleton program from
Section 5.2, the main vlogml program can be implemented straightforwardly,
as shown in Figure 5.13. The first part, stimulus (line 2), specifies the
particular stimulus we will use to generate a simulation:
• (line 2): A concrete stimulus that will successfully navigate the maze.
The second part of the program, the function strategy (lines 5 – 7), simply
runs simulation with the defined stimulus and subsequently calls a function to
assess the result; it is implemented using the Strategy combinators described
above in Section 5.7.
• (line 6): Run simulation using the concrete stimulus defined by stimulus.
• (line 7): Check condition for a successful exit from the maze.
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1 --- directed stimulus
2 stimulus = Concrete [1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0]
3
4 --- strategy logic




9 --- determine result of strategy
10 checkResult = do
11 out <- queryM [expr| loc == 7 |]
12 sim <- get
13 if out
14 then return (Just sim)
15 else return Nothing
Figure 5.13: Directed Testing in vlogml.
The third part of the program checks the resulting simulation to determine if
a successful exit from the maze has occurred. This is specified by the function
checkResult (lines 10 – 15).
• (line 11): Check condition for a successful exit from the maze;
• (line 12): Bind the resulting simulation to the variable sim;
• (lines 13 – 15): Upon successful exit from the maze, return the simula-
tion trace, otherwise return Nothing, indicating failure.
Note that in the particular case of this example, the concrete type correspond-
ing to the variable a above in Section 5.2 is (Maybe Simulation).
Let us consider now directed stimulus within a broader context via a
pair of examples that are more realistic than the maze. First, consider a
microprocessor, where a directed test would typically take the form of an
assembly program; for example, see Section 7.2. Just as in the above example,
to support assembly programs in vlogml one would first create a data type
for them and then an appropriate instance of the Input type class. This
allows for assembly programs that can be simulated to be built directly via
the data-type’s constructors.
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However, building an assembly program directly out of the constructors
for an algebraic data type, while relatively natural, can also be improved
upon. For example, one can provide other means of generating values of
this data type that are closer to the usual syntax of assembly programs; for
example, though quasi-quoting, or through parsing assembly files directly and
converting them into the internal representation.
As a second example, the I2C bus-mastering case study (Section 7.1) will
operate at a granularity of “Wishbone transactions”, which are defined ac-
cording to the Wishbone Interface [25]. Again, one starts by constructing and
appropriate data type and an instance of the Input type class for Wishbone





This chapter seeks to demonstrate, with concrete vlogml examples, a variety
of novel capabilities of our meta-language. By novel, we mean verification
strategies that are easy to effect in our meta-language but not with existing
functional verification tools and that, in addition, operate over the coverage
closure feedback loop described at the outset of the dissertation in Chap-
ter 1 and allow for its automation in unique ways. Therefore, the examples
presented are a significant part of justifying the meta-language’s existence.
Each of the examples presented applies a strategy aimed at solving, in the
way described above in Section 5.9, the maze device from that same section,
which is reprinted in this chapter for convenience; see Figure 6.1. The examples
operate over this small device so that they may be presented completely to
emphasize the capabilities of the meta-language, rather than becoming buried
in the complexity of the device being analyzed. Case studies applying vlogml
to more substantial devices, specifically a bus-master controller and a small
microprocessor, are described in Chapter 7.
Aside from Section 6.1, which contains some maze-specific vlogml utility
functions, each of the sections of this chapter describes a specific maze-solving
strategy and an implementation of that strategy in vlogml. In addition,
we attempt to draw broader conclusions from the strategy about the meta-
language’s capabilities. All of the examples are distributed along with vlogml
and may be independently verified [46]; however, for the same reasons of
clarity that we described at the beginning of Chapter 5, some of the details
differ between what is presented here and what is given as executable code in
[46], though all are functionally the same.
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5 reg [2:0] loc;
6
7 initial loc = 0;
8
9 always @(posedge clk)
10 case (loc)
11 0 : loc <= i ? 1 : 0;
12 1 : loc <= i ? 0 : 2;
13 2 : loc <= i ? 3 : 0;
14 3 : loc <= i ? 0 : 4;
15 4 : loc <= i ? 5 : 0;
16 5 : loc <= i ? 6 : 7;
17 6 : $display("FAILURE");
18 7 : $display("SUCCESS");
19 endcase
20 endmodule
Figure 6.1: Example Verilog Module: “Maze” (Re-Printed).
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6.1 Some Utilities
This section defines a small set of maze-specific utilities that will be used
throughout the following examples. As just one example, the MazeInput type
from Section 5.9 is here extended to allow for symbolic input stimuli. The
various utilities are set out in Figures 6.2 – 6.5.
1 data MazeInput =
2 Concrete [Int]
3 | Symbolic Int
4
5 instance Input MazeInput where
6 toInput (Concrete xs) = ...
7 toInput (Symbolic j) = ...
Figure 6.2: Specialized Input for the Maze (Symbolic and Concrete).
Figure 6.2: MazeInput. The data type representing maze stimuli is ex-
tended to account for symbolic stimuli as follows:
• (line 3): The constructor Symbolic is used to represent input stimuli
where, for the number of clock cycles given by the argument, a fresh
symbolic variable is generated and assigned to the maze input.
• (line 7): The (Input a) instance is extended to account for the addi-
tional constructor.
1 instance (Input a) => Input [a] where
2 where toInput xs = ...
Figure 6.3:
Figure 6.3: (Input [a]). In one situation, we will want to generate
stimuli that are composed partially from concrete stimuli and partially from
symbolic stimuli. This instance allows us to do so simply by giving a list
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of values of type MazeInput. For example, with the (Input a) declaration
shown in the figure, the following list may be used as a valid input stimulus
representing two cycles of concrete simulation followed by eight cycles of
symbolic stimulus.
xs :: [MazeInput]
xs = [Concrete [0,1], Symbolic 8]
1 checkOutOfMaze :: Strategy Bool
2 checkOutOfMaze = queryM [expr| loc == 7 |]
Figure 6.4:
Figure 6.4: checkOutOfMaze. This function returns a boolean indicating,
with respect to the current simulation context, whether it has successfully
navigated the maze; a successful exit being characterized by the expression
(loc == 7).
checkOutOfMazeSMT :: Strategy (Maybe Substitution)
checkOutOfMazeSMT = do
exp <- evalM [expr| loc == 7 |]
lift (smt timeout exp)
timeout = Just 10
Figure 6.5:
Figure 6.5: checkOutOfMazeSMT. This function attempts to resolve a
symbolic simulation context to a concrete simulation that successfully exits
the maze. If the solver succeeds, a substitution is returned that maps the
simulation’s symbolic variables accordingly. The function lift is a standard
Haskell function, that is here used to take a value of type (IO a) to a value
of type (Strategy a). A timeout of ten seconds is imposed for the SMT
solver to complete its work, which, in the case of the maze device and our
examples, is more than sufficient.
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6.2 Coordination of Multiple Simulations
This section demonstrates by example the essential novelty of our meta-
language over a traditional tool set, which is its ability to easily orchestrate
multiple simulations, and the feedback obtained from those simulations, to-
gether as a single testing strategy. The particular strategy under consideration
is as follows: one hundred trials of purely random simulation are executed
serially, with each trial running for ten clock cycles. After each trial, the
resulting simulation is analyzed to determine if the maze was successfully nav-
igated, and if so, the effort is halted and overall success is reported, otherwise
the next trial is then started.
Section 6.2.1 first demonstrates an implementation of this strategy using
existing tools, followed by the vlogml implementation in Section 6.2.2, and,
finally, concluding with a comparative analysis of the two in Section 6.2.3.
6.2.1 Solution 1: SystemVerilog, VCS, and bash
A straightforward way to accomplish the stated strategy with traditional
tools is by constructing two programs and employing the functionality of a
simulator. The role of the first program is to generate stimulus for a single
simulation run; this program is then compiled with a simulator and used by
the second program, whose role is to coordinate the one hundred separate
trials.
The first program is written in SystemVerilog as shown in Figure 6.6, which
has strong support for constrained-random stimulus generation. This program
can be compiled with a simulator such as VCS to produce an executable, say
simv, which is then called by the second program. This second program is
the shell script presented in Figure 6.7.
Program 1: SystemVerilog. The essential code of the program in Figure
6.6 are lines 17 – 22, which have the following meaning:
• (line 17): Execute the following block statement ten times. The block
drives the maze input for a single clock cycle each time it is executed.





3 reg clk, i;
4 Bit x = new;
5
6 // device-under-test
7 maze m(clk, i);
8
9 // clock generation
10 always #5 clk = ~clk;
11
12 // stimulus generation
13 initial
14 begin
15 clk = 0;










• (line 20): Generate a new, single-bit random value. This depends on
the definition of a data type, Bit, not shown in the figure, that allows









3 for j in {1..100} ; do
4 ./simv +ntb_random_seed=$j | grep -q SUCCESS
5 if [ $? -eq 0 ] ; then
6 echo "succeeded at $j."
7 exit
8 fi
9 done ; echo "failed all 100."
Figure 6.7:
Program 2: Bash Script. The coordination of the one hundred separate
trials is left to the second program, the bash script presented in Figure 6.7;
it assumes that the first program has been compiled with VCS and that the
resulting executable is named simv.
• (line 3): Establish a loop that will execute one hundred iterations of the
body, given in lines 4 – 8. The loop counter is assigned to the variable
j.
• (line 4): Run a single trial of random simulation by calling simv with
an new random seed, in this case, j. The output is matched, using the
standard utility grep, for a successful exit.
• (lines 5 – 8): Check the output of analyzing the trial. If the maze was
navigated successfully, report this fact to the terminal and exit.
• (lines 9): Upon failing all one hundred trials, report failure the terminal
and exit.
6.2.2 Solution 2: vlogml
The benefit of our meta-language is that the entire strategy can be effected
as a single program that is much clearer, simpler, and more manageable.
Along with the scaffolding assumed to be provided by the skeleton program
of Section 5.2 and the utilities defined in Section 6.1, the vlogml program
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effecting our high-level strategy is implemented as shown in Figures 6.8 – 6.10.
As per the skeleton, two functions must be defined to complete a working
vlogml program: strategy and reportResult. A third function, trial,
upon which strategy relies, is described separately for the sake of clarity.
1 trial = do
2 simulateRandM (Symbolic 10)
3 checkOutOfMazeCond
Figure 6.8: Single Random Simulation Trial.
Figure 6.8: trial. The first part of the program defines a function, trial,
that mimics the SystemVerilog part of the traditional testbench above in
Section 6.2.1.
• (line 2): Run random simulation for ten clock cycles. Recall that
simulateRandM converts symbolic values in the input into concrete
random values and then performs simulation.
• (line 3): Check the condition that we have successfully navigated out
of the maze, returning a boolean.
1 strategy sim = aux 0 (evalStrat trial sim)
2
3 aux 100 simv = return Nothing
4 aux j simv = do
5 result <- simv
6 if result
7 then return (Just j)
8 else aux (j+1) simv
Figure 6.9: Management of One Hundred Random Trials.
Figure 6.9: strategy. The meta-level logic that was earlier captured in
the bash script is captured in our vlogml program with the function strategy,
and an auxiliary function, shown in 6.9.
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• (line 1): Call the auxiliary function, aux, with the first argument, rep-
resenting the trial number, initialized to zero, and the second argument
a function that uses trial and the initial simulation provided by the
skeleton to produce a random simulation of the device each time it is
called.
• (line 3): All one hundred trials have failed, return Nothing, which
indicates failure.
• (line 4): Start trial j, where the current trial index is less than one
hundred.
• (line 5): Run the random trial, binding the result of the call to
checkOutOfMazeCond, which is called as part of executing simv, to
the variable result.
• (lines 6 – 8): If the maze was successfully navigated, return that fact
along with the current trial number; otherwise, increase the trial counter
and perform the next trial.
1 reportResult (Nothing) = putStrLn "failed all 100"
2 reportResult (Just j) = putStrLn ("succeeded at " ++ show j)
Figure 6.10: Print Result of the Test.
Figure 6.10: reportResult. The overall success or failure of the strategy
is reported to the terminal via the function reportResult.
• (line 1): Nothing is returned by strategy when the test failed; report
this fact to the user.
• (line 2): (Just j) is returned by strategy when the test succeeds at
the iteration indicated by j; report this fact to the user.
67
6.2.3 Comparison
Consider again the coverage closure feedback loop depicted in Chapter 1 as
Figure 1.1. There we asserted that existing tools treat each of the three
components, stimuli generation, simulation, and coverage analysis, as dis-
tinct pieces that are largely decoupled. Section 6.2.1 demonstrates this fact
concretely, and is suggestive of the limitations imposed by this decoupling.
Indeed, the mapping between the components of Figure 1.1 and the
pieces described in Section 6.2.1 is straightforward: stimuli generation is
accomplished with the SystemVerilog program from Figure 6.6; simulation is
accomplished through the compilation of SystemVerilog source code, together
with the device-under-test, with VCS; and coverage analysis is accomplished
with the utility grep. These pieces are more aptly described as being “cobbled
together”, than as being strongly coupled and mutually reinforcing.
There are many reasons for this; we provide just two examples. One
important observation is that the result of previous simulation runs cannot
affect the stimulus generation mechanism, as SystemVerilog provides no
straightforward way of receiving or analyzing information about previous
simulation runs. This is crucial. As both the result of analysis and stimulus
construction are available together withing vlogml, incorporating feedback
to drive stimuli generation from previous simulation results is easy. This
capability is used to striking effect in the following section.
A second deficiency made apparent is simply the lack of availability of
good tools that engineers may use to programmatically analyze coverage.
The bash script used to coordinate the strategy relied on grep, a woefully
inadequate tool for the task. In vlogml on the other hand, with a full
waveform history and the general purpose programming facilities of Haskell
at one’s disposal, many possibilities are opened up. However, it should be
noted that some deficiencies still remain in vlogml in this regard; for example,
syntactic coverage metrics are not necessarily apparent from waveforms.
6.3 Feedback
The vlogml program presented in this section demonstrates how feedback
from previous simulations can be used directly to calculate what stimuli should
be generated in future runs. It is a modification of the program presented in
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the previous section where the trial function takes an additional argument,
namely, feedback from the previous simulation, which it then used as part of
calculating the stimulus to be used during the next simulation. Specifically,
instead of ten clock cycles of random simulation, the first two cycles of
simulation are determined by the following algorithm:
• If the final location in the maze at the end of the previous simulation
was greater than 3, then the first two clock cycles use the stimulus
(Concrete [0,0]).
• If the final location in the maze at the end of the previous simulation
was less than or equal to 3, then the first two clock cycles use the
stimulus (Concrete [1,0]).
Afterward, the trial is completed by executing eight clock cycles of random
simulation.
6.3.1 vlogml
The program is structured similarly to the one above in Section 6.2. The main
difference is that a new function is substituted in the place of the function
checkOutOfMazeCond that instead checks two conditions: successful exit from
the maze, and whether the final location is greater than 3. This function is
called checkConditions.
1 checkConditions = do
2 x <- checkOutOfMazeCond
3 y <- checkGT3Cond
4 return (x,y)
5
6 checkGT3Cond = queryM [expr| loc > 3 |]
Figure 6.11:
Figure 6.11: checkConditions. This function operates on the current
simulation and checks two conditions, returning the result of these checks as
a pair of boolean values.
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• (line 2): Check the condition for the simulation having successfully
navigated the maze. Bind the result to x, a boolean.
• (line 3): Check the condition for the simulation being such that its
current location is greater than 3. Bind the result to y, a boolean.
• (line 4): Return the result of the checks.
1 trial gt3Cond = do
2 if gt3Cond
3 then simulateM [0,0]
4 else simulateM [1,0]
5 simulateRandM (Symbolic 8)
6 checkConditions
Figure 6.12:
Figure 6.12: trial. This function generates the next simulation trial.
Unlike the corresponding function from Section 6.2 above, this function accepts
a single argument. This argument is calculated by the checkConditions
function with respect to the previously executed simulation.
• (line 2): Consider the final location in the maze obtained during the
previous simulation, which is calculated by checkConditions, and
passed to this function by the aux function (see below).
• (line 3): If the final location of the previous simulation was greater than
3, perform simulation for two clock cycles with the stimulus [0,0].
• (line 4): If the final location of the previous simulation was less than or
equal to 3, perform simulation for two clock cycles with the stimulus
[1,0].
• (line 5): Perform random simulation for the remaining eight clock
cycles.
• (line 4): Call checkConditions, which is used in aux (see below).
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1 strategy sim = aux 0 (\x -> evalStrat (trial x) sim) False
2
3 aux 100 simv gt3 = return Nothing
4 aux j simv gt3 = do
5 (oom,gt3’) <- simv gt3
6 if oom
7 then return (Just j)
8 else aux (j+1) simv gt3’
Figure 6.13:
Figure 6.13: strategy. This is the function, part of the skeleton program,
that runs one hundred iterations of the trial simulation and handles the
propagation of the feedback condition being used to partially determine the
stimulus used during the immediately subsequent simulation.
• (line 1): Call aux with appropriately initialized values, including wrap-
ping trial in such a way that the feedback condition may be conveyed
as an argument.
• (line 3): All one hundred trials have failed, return Nothing, which
indicates failure.
• (line 4): Start trial j, where the current trial index is less than one
hundred.
• (line 5): Run one trial, providing the “greater-than-3” condition from
the previous trial as an argument. The result, the pair of conditions from
checkConditions, are bound to the variables oom, for “out-of-maze”,
and gt3’, the greater-than-3 condition for the new trial.
• (lines 6 – 8): If the maze was successfully navigated, return that fact
along with the current trial number; otherwise, increase the trial counter
and perform the next trial.
6.3.2 Comparison
The condition that the final state of the previous simulation is greater than
three, and the concrete stimuli choices, are of course contrived, as is the entire
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maze device. However, the program demonstrates concisely one of the most
important advantages of our meta-language: the ability to programmatically,
in a completely general and user-specified way, use information from previous
simulation runs as feedback that affects the calculation of future stimuli.
Doing something similar with existing tools would be extremely awkward; for
example, in a SystemVerilog-oriented methodology, one would probably have
to write external functions in C that are then called.
6.4 Backtracking
The example presented in this section is interesting because it solves the maze
problem in a very straightforward way, and yet would be extremely awkward
to effect with other existing tools, either alone or in combination. The vlogml
code is presented across Figures 6.14 – 6.16 and efficiently solves the maze
using a simple backtracking strategy that coordinates multiple simulations,
and uses feedback obtained from those simulations, all at once.
The program performs a systematic search of the reachable state space. At
any given location in the maze, the program first checks if the current location
is the target location representing a successful exit from the maze, in which
case the search abruptly ends and success is signaled. Second, the program
determines the current location and triggers a backtracking operation if it has
been visited previously. If the current location has not been visited previously
and is not the exit of the maze, it causes the program to walk systematically
in all possible directions and repeat.
6.4.1 vlogml
Figure 6.14: btSearch. This function performs the basic backtracking
logic described above. Its first argument is a list of previously visited locations
and its second argument an escape continuation (more on this below). In
addition, it is implemented within Haskell’s continuation monad [23] as this
is needed to elegantly handle escaping the search; it also requires lifting
functions such as evalM.
• (line 2): Evaluate the current location in the maze, binding the result,
a value of type Expression, to the variable x.
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1 btSearch prevs exit = do
2 x <- evalMM [expr| loc |]
3 when (x == [expr| 7 |]) (exit (x:xs))
4 if x ‘elem‘ prevs
5 then return prevs
6 else do
7 prevs’ <- branch (x:prevs ) exit 1
8 prevs’’ <- branch ( prevs’) exit 0
9 return prevs’’
10
11 evalMM = lift . evalM
Figure 6.14:
• (line 3): Check the current location in the maze against the location indi-
cating a successful exit, [expr| 7 |]. If the maze has been successfully
navigated, use the escape continuation to immediately exit.
• (line 4): If the exit condition is not met, then check if the current
location has been visited previously.
• (line 5): If the current location has been visited, return. As we will see
below with the branch function, this triggers backtracking.
• (lines 6 – 9): If the current location has not been visited previously,
systematically search both possible branches from the current simulation
by calling branch, detailed next.
1 branch prevs exit i = do
2 backtrackSim <- get
3 simulateMM (Concrete [i])
4 btSearch prevs exit
5 put backtrackSim
6
7 simulateMM = lift . simulateM
Figure 6.15:
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Figure 6.15: branch. This function performs the operation corresponding
to the third case described above, where the current location is both newly
seen and not the exit of the maze. It advances simulation one step, moving
in the “direction” given as the third argument; the first two arguments are
just as for btSearch.
• (line 2): Save the current simulation context for the purposes of back-
tracking.
• (line 3): Advance simulation according to the given input.
• (line 4): Recursively call btSearch on the newly generated branch. If
this branch provides a successful exit from the maze, the control flow
will be modified using the escape continuation.
• (line 5): This statement is executed only when the branch fails to find
a way out of the maze. In such an event, it simply backtracks.
1 testbench = do
2 seen <- runContT (callCC aux) return
3 sim <- get
4 if [expr| 7 |] ‘elem‘ seen
5 then return (Just sim)
6 else return Nothing
7
8 aux exit = btSearch [] exit
Figure 6.16:
Figure 6.16: strategy. This function is part of the skeleton and is con-
structed in two parts. The first binds an escape continuation so that the
search for a simulation out of the maze can be ended as soon as one is found.
The second checks the result of the search.
• (line 2): Call btSearch, with the arguments appropriately initialized.
aux initializes the list of previously seen states to the empty list, and
callCC provides the escape continuation.
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• (line 3): Bind the simulation resulting from the backtracking search to
the variable sim.
• (lines 4 – 6): Check for success and return an appropriate result.
6.4.2 Comparison
One of the things that our meta-language excels at, and which we mean to
emphasize with the above example, is as an alternative to traditional directed
testing. Directed testing is an extremely labor-intensive process typically
reserved for when more automated means of testing, usually constrained
randoms, fail to attain some needed coverage goal. It is a reality of contem-
porary verification practice and its impact on verification and design cycle is
significant, as the following quote, recalled from the Chapter 1, notes:
Today it is not uncommon to go from 0% to 80% coverage in
just a few days after the [constrained-random] testbench is up &
running.
What about the remaining 20%?
Today, one of the long poles in verification is coverage convergence
– the process where verification engineers analyze the coverage
generated by constrained-random tests, identify gaps or “coverage
holes”, and adjust the verification environment to try to fill the
gaps. If you think this sounds laborious, repetitive and time-
consuming you’d be correct. I’ve spoken to chip designers who
say a third of their overall chip development schedule is spent
in this iterative, largely manual, coverage convergence phase of
verification.
[9, July 6, 2010]
Roughly speaking, traditional directed testing is an iterative process that
repeatedly cycles through the following tasks until, for example, the target
coverage goal has been discharged: create/modify stimulus, run simulation to
generate waveforms, analyze waveforms. The process is inefficient because,
even when the dependence between iterations of this loop can be described
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in an algorithmic way, the limitations of existing tools force the first and
third steps to be done manually and undertaken directly by an engineer. It
is a result of the current decoupling of stimulus generation, simulation, and
analysis.
Of course, the main purpose of our meta-language and vlogml is to enable
a verification engineer to, in a straightforward way, write a program that
orchestrates the entire feedback loop. Depending on the task at hand, different
strategies will be called for. In the case of directed testing, the strategies will
be highly-targeted and specialized searches for a simulation that satisfies, for
example, a particular coverage goal. This is exactly what the backtracking
strategy demonstrates.
6.5 Breadth-First
This section presents a vlogml program where a set of random simulation
traces are generated and analyzed “breadth-first”. Starting with one hundred
copies of the initial state of the device, as a value of type Simulation, we
iterate over each copy extending simulation one cycle with a random stimulus
and checking to see if we have successfully exited from the maze. If any of
the one hundred simulations has exited, the program returns successfully;
otherwise, the simulations are extended one more cycle of random simulation.
At a depth of ten clock cycles, the program aborts and reports failure.
6.5.1 vlogml
The program is presented piece-wise as three functions, singleStep, depth,
and strategy, which are given as Figures 6.17 – 6.19, respectively. singleStep
extends a given simulation one clock cycle, depth manages the application
of the single step of simulation over the one hundred individual simulation
instances, and strategy simply initializes depth and wraps it appropriately
to account for the assumed skeleton program.
Figure 6.17: singleStep. This function extends a given simulation one
clock cycle, using random simulation.
• (line 2): Perform one cycle of random simulation.
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1 singleStep = do
2 simulateRandM (Symbolic 1)
3 checkOutOfMaze
Figure 6.17: One Randomized Simulation Step.
• (line 3): Determine if the additional cycle of simulation has resulted in
a successful exit from the maze.
1 depth :: Int -> [Simulation] -> Strategy (Maybe Simulation)
2 depth 10 sims = return Nothing
3 depth j sims = do
4 xs <- mapM (runStrat singleStep) sims
5 case find fst xs of
6 Just (_,sim) -> return (Just sim)
7 Nothing -> do
8 let snds = snd . unzip
9 depth (j+1) (snds xs)
Figure 6.18: Breadth-First Logic
Figure 6.18: depth. The main logic controlling the breadth-first strategy is
implemented according to this function.The function’s first argument denotes
the current depth and the second is the list of one hundred simulations being
operated on. The function returns either a simulation that has successfully
navigated the maze, or Nothing.
• (line 2): A depth of ten has been reached without finding a successful
simulation trace. In this case we return Nothing, signaling that the
strategy has failed.
• (line 3): Start a new iteration where the simulation depth is increased
by one clock cycle.
• (line 4): Extend the one hundred simulations by a single step, recording
for each simulation a pair containing the result of the success check
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and the resulting simulation. Therefore, the type of the variable xs is
deduced to be
xs :: [(Bool,Simulation)]
• (line 5): Search the resulting list for a simulation that successfully
exited the maze, as indicated by the first component of the elements of
xs.
• (line 6): One of the simulations succeeded, return it and end the search.
• (lines 7 – 9): None of the simulations succeeded, gather all of them
using the function snds and call depth recursively.
Figure 6.19: strategy. This function initializes depth and wraps its
execution so as to fit within the framework provided by the skeleton program
in Section 5.2. Its single argument is the initial simulation provided by the
call to start in the skeleton program.
strategy sim = evalStrat $ depth 0 (replicate 100 sim)
Figure 6.19: Breadth-First Logic
• (line 1): Finally, strategy is defined simply by calling depth with
appropriate Call depth with an initial depth of zero and one hundred
copies of the initial simulation, which are constructed using the standard
Haskell function replicate. 6.19.
6.5.2 Comparison
The breadth-first strategy demonstrates the ability in our meta-language to
generate simulations in a fine-grained and incremental manner. Indeed, the
backtracking strategy does the same, but there our intention was to focus
on backtracking, whereas the breadth-first strategy clearly emphasizes the
coordination of multiple simulations, all of which are being generated incre-
mentally. Traditional simulators make stopping and restarting simulations
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cumbersome, and in most cases infeasible; one traditional method, using a
scan-chain, has many well-known drawbacks, and would be horribly inefficient
for fine-grained simulation generation.
6.6 Symbolic Execution
Although not a benefit exclusive to vlogml, its ability to uniformly handle
both concrete and symbolic simulation and, via the VlogMetaLang.SMT library
(see Section 5.8), to query an SMT solver, allows for some very interesting
testing programs to be created. This section simply introduces the symbolic
simulation and SMT capabilities with an extremely simple example: ten clock
cycles of symbolic simulation are executed, and then the SMT solver is called
in an attempt to resolve a concrete simulation that successfully exits the
maze. The following section demonstrates a more interesting example that
combines symbolic simulation and concrete simulation and makes crucial use
of the meta-level features of vlogml.
6.6.1 vlogml
The implementation is split across two functions, strategy and checkResult,
which are given as Figures 6.20 and 6.21, respectively. strategy contains the
high-level logic and checkResult handles applying the result from the SMT
solver.
1 strategy = evalStrat $ do
2 simulateM (Symbolic 10)
3 x <- checkOutOfMazeSMT
4 checkResult x
Figure 6.20: Symbolic Simulation and SMT Call.
Figure 6.20: strategy. This function takes as its only argument the initial
simulation provided by the call to start in the skeleton program from Section
5.2.
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• (line 2): Execute ten cycles of symbolic simulation.
• (line 3): Invoke the SMT solver and bind the result, which is of type
(Maybe Substitution), to the variable x. A substitution being re-
turned successfully then yields a concrete stimulus leading out of the
maze.
• (line 4): Call checkResult to apply the result from the SMT solver
appropriately (see below).
1 checkResult ( Nothing) = return Nothing
2 checkResult (Just subst) = do
3 sim <- get
4 let sim’ = concretize subst sim
5 return (Just sim’)
Figure 6.21: Concretization of a Symbolic Simulation.
Figure 6.21: checkResult. The function takes a single argument, which
is the result from the SMT solver and, if the solver was successful, returns a
concrete simulation that successfully exits the maze.
• (line 1): If the SMT solver fails to find a substitution, return Nothing.
• (line 2): The SMT solver succeeded in finding a substitution, which,
through pattern matching, is bound to the variable subst.
• (line 3): Bind the result of symbolic simulation to a variable sim.
• (lines 4 – 5): Apply subst to the symbolic simulation using concretize
and return the result.
6.6.2 Comparison
No widely available Verilog simulator that we are aware of allows for the
user to apply symbolic simulation directly, let alone resolve the resulting
symbolic context to concrete values using technology such as an SMT solver.
For VHDL, there is a symbolic simulator available [83], but is not built to be
controlled in the same fine-grained manner as in vlogml.
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6.7 Combined Concrete and Symbolic Simulation
This section presents a vlogml program implementing a combined ran-
dom/symbolic strategy. The idea for the strategy comes from [34] and
serves as the foundational idea underlying the popular Magellan tool [93, 92];
it is also known as “hybrid concolic testing” [63]. In addition to combining
random and symbolic simulation, the program also makes crucial use of an
SMT solver and the meta-level features of vlogml.
The core of the strategy operates according to the following four steps:
1. Random simulation is run for some number of cycles, after which the
resulting simulation is checkpointed.
2. Symbolic simulation is run for some number of cycles.
3. An SMT solver is applied to the simulation obtained after the combined
random/symbolic simulation. If the solver succeeds, the algorithm
finishes successfully.
4. If the solver fails, the simulation checkpointed in step (1) is returned to
and, starting from this simulation, the algorithm returns to step (1).
6.7.1 vlogml
The implementation is split across essentially three separate functions named
performHybridSimulation, checkResult, and strategy, which are given
as Figures 6.22 – 6.24, respectively. The first of the three performs steps
(1) and (2) above, returning the checkpointed simulation for backtracking
purposes, if needed. The second, performs steps (3) and (4), except for the
actual call to the SMT solver. The third puts the two pieces together and
performs the SMT call.
Figure 6.22: performHybridSimulation.
• (line 2): Perform random simulation for five clock cycles.
• (line 3): Bind the resulting simulation to the variable failSim, needed
we are required to backtrack.
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1 performHybridSimulation = do
2 simulateRandM (Symbolic 5)
3 failSim <- get
4 simulateM (Symbolic 5)
5 return failSim
Figure 6.22: Combined Concrete and Symbolic Simulation Trial.
• (line 4): Perform symbolic simulation for five clock cycles.
• (line 5): Return failSim.
1 checkResult (Nothing ) failSim = do
2 put failSim
3 aux (j+1)
4 checkResult (Just subst) failSim = do
5 sim <- get
6 let sim’ = concretize subst sim
7 return (Just sim’)
Figure 6.23: End of Trial Logic.
Figure 6.23: checkResult. The second function we define, checkResult,
is assumed to receive the result of the SMT solver as its first argument and
the previous result of random simulation as its second argument.
• (line 1): SMT solving failed.
• (line 2): Restore the previous result of random simulation, before
symbolic simulation was attempted.
• (line 3): Start again. In terms of the algorithm as described above, this
denotes a return to step (1).
• (lines 4 – 7): SMT solving succeeded, get the symbolic simulation and
apply the substitution returned by the SMT solver to it. Return the
result.
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1 strategy = aux 0
2
3 aux 100 = return Nothing
4 aux j = do
5 failSim <- performHybridSimulation
6 x <- checkOutOfMazeSMT
7 checkResult x failSim
Figure 6.24: Algorithm Similar to [34].
Figure 6.24: strategy.
• (line 1): Call auxiliary function with iteration counter initialized to 0.
• (line 3): After one hundred trials, abort and signal failure.
• (line 4): Perform another trial.
• (line 5): Perform steps (1) and (2) above, binding to failSim the
random simulation needed for backtracking.
• (line 6): Invoke the SMT solver to resolve the variables in the symbolic
simulation to values that successfully exit the maze.
• (line 7): Using the result of the SMT solver and the backtracking
strategy, perform step (4) of the algorithm as described above.
6.7.2 Comparison
One very noteworthy feature of this testbench is that it mimics the essential
strategy of Synopsys’ Magellan tool, which is also based on [34]. This is a
powerful result, because not only is Magellan expensive, in monetary terms,
but by virtue of being a separate executable, to the user it is essentially a
black box that is not very customizable. The fact that the core strategy of
Magellan can be mimicked in just a few lines of code in vlogml, for free and
in a way completely customizable by a user, demonstrates in a powerful way
the new opportunities available to a verification engineer by taking up and
using vlogml. Of course, it bears mentioning that Magellan, in addition to
the core strategy, is also thought (it is proprietary, so one cannot say for sure)
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to include many complex heuristics that are not mimicked in the testbench




Whereas the goal of the previous chapter was simply to demonstrate the
capacity of our meta-language, through vlogml, for novel testing programs,
the purpose of this chapter is to show vlogml effectively applied to more
substantial devices. To do so, we selected two devices, each between one
thousand and two thousand lines of Verilog, that we develop testing programs
for in vlogml.
1. The first device [33] is an implementation of a serial bus-master con-
troller for the I2C protocol [82]. It supports advanced features such as
multi-mastering and clock stretching, which we exercise with a vlogml
program, uncovering a potential bug.
2. The second device is a small microprocessor that we developed. Two
vlogml programs are then presented demonstrating, first, a targeted
strategy that is resilient to organizational changes to a memory, and,
second, the use of an SMT solver to automatically resolve partial
assembly programs to interesting stimuli.
7.1 I2C Bus-Master Controller
The I2C-bus protocol is defined by [82]. The particular bus-mastering con-
troller that we worked with is given a brief overview of next, we then go into
some detail on the arbitration and clock stretching mechanisms of I2C, as
these are crucial to understanding the coverage goal that we targeted. Finally,
we detail a vlogml strategy that exposes a potential bug in the controller
that we were working with.
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7.1.1 The Device
Our case study uses an open-source controller with support for multi-mastering
and clock stretching [33]. It is designated as an “OpenCores Certified” project,
meaning that it is relatively mature, having a testbench, documentation, and
in many cases, and indeed in this particular one, proved on FPGA. The
implementation consists of three modules, and is roughly one thousand lines
of Verilog source code.
I2C is a serial bus consisting of two bidirectional open-drain lines, SCL,
used for clocking, and SDA, used for data. The open-drain design means that
any device, master or slave, pulling down a line will override any other device
driving it high. The bus was developed by Philips Electronics and is used to
drive a wide variety of low-speed peripherals, such as cellphone displays.
A mastering device can initiate two types of transactions, read and write.
All transactions begin by sending a “start bit” (negative edge on SDA with
SCL high), then send a sequence of bytes, each separated from the previous
one by an acknowledge bit, and finally a “stop bit” (positive edge on SDA
with SCL high) to end the transaction. The first byte always consists of a
seven bit slave address followed by a read/write bit, indicating the type of





corresponds to a write transaction to slave address 011 0100 = 0x34, sending
a single byte of data, 1010 1010 = 0xAA.
7.1.2 Arbitration and Clock Stretching
As a multi-mastering bus, I2C requires an arbitration process to determine
which master will get control of the bus when two or more want it simultane-
ously. After initiating a transaction, each mastering device monitors the level
of SDA. If while trying to keep SDA high it instead, due to the open-drain design,
finds SDA to be low, then the controller assumes another mastering device is
pulling it down and aborts its transaction, thereby losing the arbitration.
86
The following timing diagram shows an example of the arbitration process,
where one mastering device tries to initiate a transaction to address 011 0100,





The signals SDA0 and SDA1 are what each controller attempts to drive SDA
toward. The device addressing 011 0100 loses arbitration at the third bit,
and stops trying to drive SDA.
Clock stretching works similarly to arbitration, but on the SCL line. Any
slave device taking part in a transaction can essentially force the mastering
device to stop and wait in the middle of a transaction it is directing. It does
this by holding the SCL line low. When the slave releases SCL the master may
resume the transaction.
7.1.3 I2C Stimulus Specification
The case study connects up a simple multi-master system, with two mastering
controllers connected to the bus, denoted m0 and m1. At a high level, the
strategy aims to explore subtle timing variations during arbitration. To
evoke an arbitration, m0 will send data byte 0000 0010 and m1 will send data
bye 0000 0011. Based on the arbitration mechanism described above, one
would expect m0 to win arbitration and the slave to receive the data value
0000 0010.
Before describing the logic of the testbench, we first develop the data types
and associated instance of (Input a) type class that are used to drive the
multi-mastering configuration. The first data type, I2CTransaction yields
transactions on a single master, and the second, I2Cx2, groups two lists of
such transactions together, which are then used to drive the two controllers





| Write Int [Int]
| Delay Int
Figure 7.1:
• (line 2): This constructor is used to initiate a read transaction. The
first argument is the address of the slave device to read from, and the
second argument is a list of addresses within the device to read from.
• (line 3): This constructor is used to initiate a write transaction. The first
argument is the address of the slave device to write to, and the second
argument is a list of values to communicate to the device, typically both
internal addresses and data.
• (line 4): This constructor is used to cause the device to idle. The
argument is the number of clock cycles to idle.





Figure 7.2: I2Cx2. This is a record data type that contains a list of
transactions for each of the two mastering controllers that are part of our
device setup. We label the two controllers ctrlr0 and ctrlr1.
instance Input I2Cx2 where
toInput x = ...
Figure 7.3:
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Figure 7.3: (Input a). The implementation of this type class is quite
involved, but is straightforward in the sense that one must simply conform
to the Wishbone interconnection interface [25], which is used by the I2C-bus
mastering controller that we are testing [33]. Therefore, we omit the definition
from this dissertation, though it is available in full at [46].
7.1.4 vlogml Program
The high-level strategy that we implement to test the multi-mastering ca-
pabilities of the I2C-bus controller [33] is to initiate write transactions on
the devices almost concurrently, with some small amount of delay between
the two. A number of simulation trials are run, each time increasing the
delay an additional clock cycle. The testing program assumes the skeleton
from Section 5.2, and is structured as shown in Figure 7.4, where the trial
function is called repeatedly with different small delays, up to a threshold of
three.
1 strategy sim = aux 0 (\j -> evalStrat (trial j) sim)
2
3 aux 5 f = return Nothing
4 aux j f = do
5 success <- f j
6 if success
7 then return (Just j)
8 else aux (j+1) f
Figure 7.4:
1 trial j = do
2 let c0 = [ Write 777 [0,2]]
3 c1 = [Delay j, Write 777 [0,3]]
4 simulateM (I2Cx2 c0 c1)
5 queryM [| slave.data == 2 || slave.data == 3 |]
Figure 7.5:
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Figure 7.5: trial. This function performs a simulation trial. Its single
argument is the amount of delay that should exist between the initiation of
write transactions between the two mastering controllers.
• (line 2): This is the input stimulus for ctrlr0. It is just a write of the
two bytes, 0 and 2, to a device with identifier 777.
• (line 3): This is the input stimulus for ctrlr1. It consists of a delay,
relative to the argument of trial, and a write of the two bytes, 0 and
3, also to the device identified by the value 777.
• (line 4): Perform simulation using the above stimulus.
• (line 5): Check the result of the slave device, slave, which is identified
by value 777, and ensure that one of the writes successfully completed.
7.1.5 Result
To be correct, the slave should receive either a value of 2 or a value of 3,
though because of how the arbitration process works we would expect it to
get 2. However, for trial 3, the slave gets a value of 0, which seems to be
a bug in the device; for trail 2 or trial 4, a value of 2 gets successfully
transmitted.
The problem seems to stem from the logic controlling a signal called clk en,
which, when asserted, causes the internal state machine of the controller to
go to the next state. The inserted delays typically cause a clock stretching
event to occur, but the logic controlling clk en gives preference to stepping
the state machine instead of the stretching event. By changing this priority,
the device operates correctly.
7.1.6 Discussion
What is interesting about the above vlogml program is that it executes a set
of distinct simulations, systematically testing different amounts of delay in
the start of the write transaction on the second controller. To do this with
existing tools would require either a script along the lines of the one from
Section 6.2, or to write one large test with multiple resets of the device. In
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the first case, we run into the undesirable situation of splitting the test into
two distinct parts, and in the second case it becomes more difficult to debug
errors because one must search through a combined, larger simulation result,
rather than the natural individual simulations that one desires.
7.2 Microprocessor
The second case study that we present operates on a small microprocessor, with
multiple possible configurations of the data memory. Two vlogml programs
are presented, one that aims to demonstrate the writing of a highly-targeted
strategy that is much more resilient to design changes than usual directed
tests, and a second example that demonstrates how an SMT solver can be
used to automatically resolve partially given assembly program stimuli to
concrete assembly programs that effect interesting microprocessor conditions.
7.2.1 Overview
The microprocessor under consideration is a single-cycle design, with eight
architected registers, R0 – R7, and separate instruction and data memories.
It supports eight instructions, including arithmetic, conditional branching,
and load and store from data memory, and each instruction is 32-bits. The
data memory is two-way banked.
To execute a program on the microprocessor, one first asserts reset, followed
by flashing a sequence of instructions, one per clock cycle, on a 32-bit port
connected to the module. As the instructions are being transmitted and
written into the instruction memory, a wire named exec must be held low.
At the point that exec is asserted, it is assumed that program transmission
has ended, and the microprocessor then starts executing the program starting
with the instruction at memory location zero.
7.2.2 Assembly Language
The microprocessor under consideration has a small instruction set consisting
of eight instructions. To construct assembly programs for this microprocessor
within vlogml, we employ the data types shown in Figures 7.6 – 7.9 and
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must, in addition, construct an appropriate instance of the (Input a) type





Figures 7.6 – 7.9.
• Register: This data type is an enumeration of the eight architected
registers supported by the microprocessor instruction set. It is defined
as shown in Figure 7.7.
data Register = R0 | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 | R6 | R7
Figure 7.7:
• Instruction: This data type defines the eight instructions supported
by the microprocessor instruction set, plus a symbolic “wildcard” in-
struction, given by a constructor ANY, which can represent any of the
eight concrete instructions. It is defined as shown in Figure 7.8. The
instructions, in the order given in the figure, represent: moving an fixed
value (immediate) to a register, addition, bit-wise exclusive-or, right-
ward shift, load word, store word, branch on not-zero, halt execution.
• Assembly: This data type defines assembly programs, which in the
case of our simple microprocessor, are essentially just lists of assembly
instructions. Figure 7.9 presents the concrete definition.
Figures 7.10 – 7.11. To convert assembly programs into a value of type
Input, we define a set of “packing” functions that yield bit-accurate repre-
sentations of instructions and then use these functions to generate bit-vectors
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1 data Instruction =
2 -- rdest immediate
3 IMM Register Int
4
5 -- rdest rsrc1 rsrc2
6 ADD Register Register Register
7 | XOR Register Register Register
8 | SFR Register Register Register
9
10 -- rdest raddr
11 | LDW Register Register
12 | STW Register Register






data Assembly = Assembly [Instruction]
Figure 7.9:
that are flashed on the microprocessor’s input ports during the bootstrap
sequence.
Example Programs. Two very simple example assembly programs are
shown in Figures 7.12 and 7.13. They demonstrate how assembly program
stimuli may be specified in a natural way within a vlogml program, similar
to the kind of syntax accepted by many assemblers.
• (Figure 7.12): This first program consists of four assembly instructions.
The first two instructions put the constant one into registers R0 and
R1, respectively; the third instruction adds these two registers, plac-
ing the result in register R2; finally, the fourth instruction halts the
microprocessor.
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registerPack R0 = 0
registerPack R1 = 1
registerPack R2 = ...
assemblyPack (IMM rdest x) =
ors [shiftL opcodePack 9, shiftL rdestPack 6, x]
where opcodePack = 6
rdestPack = registerPack rdest
assemblyPack (ADD rdest rsrc1 rsrc2) = ...
Figure 7.10:
instance (Input Assembly) where
toInput (Assembly xs) = CycleBased (foldr f [] ys)
where ys = zip xs [0..]
f (j,inst) = ...
Figure 7.11:
• (Figure 7.13): The second program is the same as the first, except that
the second instruction is modified to be a symbolic value representing any
instruction. As an example, if simulation was run on this program, we
could query the SMT solver for a concrete instruction (more specifically,
its microprocessor-level representation) such that the value in register
R2 at the end of the program was, say, two. In this case, it could return
the same instruction used in the first program.
7.2.3 vlogml Example 1
As the first demonstration of applying vlogml to our microprocessor, we will
consider a coverage goal that has to do with the organization of the data
memory. Recall from above that the data memory is organized into multiple
banks. Our goal will be to write a program such that two consecutive stores
to the data memory write to different words in the same bank. In addition,
we will develop a vlogml program that attains this coverage goal in such a
way that it is robust with respect to changes in the number of banks and how
94
Assembly
[ IMM R0 1
, IMM R1 1





[ IMM R0 1
, ANY




the banks are organized.
The strategy employed iteratively runs simulation of an assembly program
that performs two stores to the data memory, each time increasing the stride
between the addresses stored up to some threshold. The implementation of
the program assumes the skeleton program from Section 5.2 and is otherwise
constructed from four functions:
• program: This function generates a small assembly program containing
a pair of store instructions at a stride given by the argument.
• checkGoal: This function checks the property corresponding to the
coverage goal. Although its implementation is straightforward, without
a comprehensive vlogml library yet for describing functional coverage
goals, it is somewhat verbose. Therefore, the definition of checkGoal
is omitted here (see [46]).
• trial: This function performs a single simulation trial, using the
function program to generate the stimulus and to maintain a stride
counter, and then checks the coverage goal condition.
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• iterate: This function iteratively calls trial with different strides and
manages the exit conditions.
1 program j = Assembly
2 [ IMM R0 1
3 , IMM R1 (1+j)
4 , IMM R2 63
5 , STW R2 R0




Figure 7.14: program. A call to program j generates an assembly program
whose meaning is determined as follows.
• (line 2): R0 will be used as the first store address.
• (line 3): R1 will be used as the second store address, which is offset from
the first address by the amount given in the argument of the function.
• (line 4): R2 will be used as the source of the value that is stored to data
memory.
• (line 5): Execute the store to the first address.
• (line 6): Execute the store to the second address.
• (line 7): Halt.
1 trial j = do





• (line 2): Run a simulation of the microprocessor using the assembly
program generated through calling program.
• (line 3): Check to see if the simulation successfully effected the coverage
goal, meaning that two consecutive stores to the data memory occurred
at different addresses in the same bank.
1 iterate 10 f = return Nothing
2 iterate j f = do
3 success <- f j
4 if success
5 then return (Just (program j))
6 else iterate (j+1) f
Figure 7.16:
Figure 7.16: iterate. The first argument of iterate is the current stride
value and the second argument is a wrapped version of trial that will be
called (see definition of strategy next).
• (line 2): At a stride of ten, the strategy fails, returning Nothing.
• (line 3): Call trial with the current stride and bind the result of
checkGoal to the variable success.
• (line 5): The current stride was successful, return the associated assem-
bly program.
• (line 6): The current stride failed, increment the stride value and
proceed with the next iteration.
strategy sim = iterate 0 (\j -> evalStrat (trial j) sim)
Figure 7.17:
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Figure 7.17: strategy. This function simply calls iterate with appro-
priately initialized values. Note that the second argument binds a function
that maps strides to simulation trials that return a result with respect to the
initial simulation provided by start in the skeleton program from Section
5.2.
7.2.4 Discussion
What is interesting about the above vlogml program is that it is both highly
targeted and resilient to changes in the organization of the data memory’s
internal banking scheme. A traditional directed test only accomplishes the
first, and upon regression in a changed organization, would need to be
considered directly by an engineer and rewritten.
7.2.5 vlogml Example 2
The second vlogml program we develop for the microprocessor is one that
uses symbolic simulation and an SMT solver to automatically generate part
of an assembly program. In many instruction sets, multiple instructions are
needed to generate certain bit-patterns within a register, encouraging the
use of complicated bit-manipulations that lead to subtle bugs. The vlogml
program that we describe mitigates this problem simply by stating the bit-
pattern desired and invoking an SMT solver. As a result, it generates part of
an assembly program that yields exactly the constant desired in register R2.
1 strategy sim = evalStrat aux sim
2
3 aux = do
4 simulateM program




Figure 7.18: strategy and aux. These functions stage the high-level logic
of the program, which in turn is constructed from three component functions,
program, solveSim, and checkResult, elaborated on below.
• (line 1): Call aux appropriately wrapped and with the initial simulation
obtained from the call to start in the skeleton program.
• (line 4): Perform simulation of the assembly program shown in Figure
7.19. As indicated above, this results in a symbolic simulation as
one of the instructions in the program is left unspecified via the ANY
constructor.
• (line 5): Invoke the SMT solver with an appropriately formed query to
generate the needed instruction.
• (line 6): Consider the result obtained from the SMT solver and provide,
if successful, an appropriate concrete simulation.
1 program = Assembly
2 [ IMM R0 2
3 , ANY





• (line 2): Load the value 2 into register R0.
• (line 3): Leave the second instruction symbolic.
• (line 4): Add registers R0 and R1 and place the result in register R2.
• (line 5): Halt.
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1 solveSim = do
2 x <- evalM [| r2 == 65 |]
3 lift (smt Nothing x)
Figure 7.20:
Figure 7.20: solveSim.
• (line 2): Evaluate the expression that indicates a successful simulation.
The constant that we attempt to put into the register R2 is 65, which
overflows the 6-bit immediate field of IMM and therefore requires multiple
instructions to effect.
• (line 3): Invoke the SMT solver with the above-bound evaluated ex-
pression.
1 checkResult ( Nothing) = return Nothing
2 checkResult (Just subst) = do
3 sim <- get
4 let sim’ = concretize subst sim
5 return (Just sim’)
Figure 7.21:
• (line 1): If the SMT solver fails to find a substitution, return Nothing.
• (line 2): The SMT solver succeeded in finding a substitution, which,
through pattern matching, is bound to the variable subst.
• (line 3): Bind the result of symbolic simulation to a variable sim.
• (lines 4 – 5): Apply subst to the symbolic simulation using concretize
and return the result.
7.2.6 Discussion
What this example demonstrates is an advanced use of symbolic simulation
to generate a more complex data type, namely, assembly programs. It is
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interesting too because it is invokes the solver for a case that one would expect
to succeed, generating a specific constant value in a register, but when done
by hand could be error prone. This kind of situation is what we envision to
be the best use of SMT solving: to discharge tedious constraints, but ones




This chapter addresses the semantics of Verilog [36], perhaps the most widely
used language for digital circuit design since the early 1990s. A formal
executable semantics for a substantial subset of Verilog is developed, and its
utility in exploring the space of executions for small programs is demonstrated.
A rewriting logic semantics not only lends further evidence to the suitability
of rewriting logic as a semantics framework [77], but is also important for
practical reasons: many Verilog-based tools exist, including several formal
verification tools from which users expect strong guarantees about the behavior
of their programs. Having a formal executable semantics provides a standard
by which inconsistencies in specific tools can be uncovered. In fact, this work
has uncovered several such inconsistencies.
8.1 Disclaimer
The purpose of this disclaimer is to state clearly what our semantics is
not, so that the actual contributions made by our effort are not obscured.
First, our semantics is not comprehensive, though we believe it to be more
comprehensive than any other formal semantics of Verilog attempted to
date. Second, our semantics is not definitive, though it is based on careful
readings of the standard [36] – the only definitive characterization of Verilog
–, discussions with long-time developers of Verilog simulators, and experiments
using well-regarded simulators to interpret small Verilog programs.
8.2 Contributions
Verilog is immense; the official standards document [36] is almost 600 pages
long, and our formalization effort presented here is therefore necessarily
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incomplete and selective in its coverage. Our formalization is, however, the
most extensive of any such effort attempted to date, so far as we are aware;
this is the first contribution of our semantics. Both “synthesizable” and
“behavioral” aspects of the language are handled, in a uniform way, so that
the intent of the standard is followed as closely as possible. Our belief is that,
because of this, support for additional constructs not currently covered can
be incorporated in a straightforward way.
The second contribution of our formal semantics is that it is executable,
which of course is one of the main distinguishing features of rewriting logic
semantics [77]. Executability is had via Maude and yields the usual analysis
possibilities, including simulation and state-space search. As Verilog is highly
concurrent and nondeterministic, this latter ability is possibly the most useful
in that it provides the unique possibility, of all tools that we are aware of, to
attempt to answer the question of whether a particular behavior is legal for a
given program; usual simulators will only give you a single (hopefully) legal
execution.
Lengthy discussions about the possible behaviors of small Verilog abound
online, many of which might have been completely settled with a formal
executable semantics as the one presented here. Given that many of these
discussions are had among tool developers, one potential benefit is the devel-
opment of more correct and consistent tools for Verilog, some of which are
expected to provide very strong, formal guarantees about Verilog programs.
Finally, we describe in detail a set of example programs that demonstrate
some of the most important, and commonly misunderstood features of Verilog.
These include aspects of the language having to do with concurrency, bit-
width calculations, and special handling of different kinds of assignments.
Several of the examples exposed bugs in mature, widely-used simulators, and
were subsequently fixed. This is our third contribution.
8.3 Concepts
This section introduces some of the syntactic and semantic concepts that are
crucial for reasoning about Verilog programs and understanding our formal
semantics, which is detailed in Sections 8.4 and 8.5. Figures 8.1 and 8.2
present two small examples that we will reference throughout this section for
103
1 module flipflop(clk, in, out);
2 input clk;
3 input [15:0] in;
4 output [15:0] out;
5 reg [15:0] r;
6
7 assign out = r;
8 always @(posedge clk)
9 r <= in;
10
11 endmodule
Figure 8.1: D-Type Flip-Flop Example
illustration purposes.
Figure 8.1 shows a Verilog module having the functionality of a D-type flip-
flop. A module is a unit of design that allows for code reuse and abstraction.
It is similar in spirit to modules from several software programming languages.
While the example is simple, it illustrates some important features of Verilog.
Verilog has two main classes of nodes: variables and nets. Variables
represent the notion of state, requiring memory of some kind, while nets
abstract the idea of wires that carry information from one area of a design to
another. The input and output keywords declare which variables are inputs
and outputs to the module. Module inputs and outputs are automatically
assumed to be of net type; registered outputs can be explicitly specified by
adding the keyword reg after output. For nodes that are not ports, the
keyword wire specifies a net type, and the keyword reg specifies a variable
type. The nodes clk, in, and out in the flip-flop module are all nets, whereas
r is a variable.
Both nets and variables most often represent scalars or vectors of four-state
logic values, The input clk is a scalar since, unless explicit indices are given
to index into the vector, scalar is assumed. On the other hand, the node in is
declared with an explicit indexing range, specifying it to be of length sixteen.
According to the Verilog standard, variable data types may only be assigned
within procedural blocks, such as the one on lines 8–9 of Figure 8.1, while
net types can only be assigned in continuous assignments such as the one on
line 7.
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Lines 8-9 show a procedural block, in this case an always block, introduced
with the keyword always. An always block denotes a constantly running
computation, essentially an infinite loop. Note that Verilog also has a related
concept called an initial block, which is introduced with the keyword initial
and runs once starting at the beginning of simulation.
An initial block can be seen in the example in Figure 8.2. The term
procedural blocks refers collectively to always and initial blocks, tasks, and
functions. Tasks and functions are not covered in our semantics. An always
block is constructed with a single statement; in the examples presented in
Figures 8.1 and 8.2, and commonly in Verilog designs, this statement has the
structured form @(posedge clk) S’, with S’ also a statement. The effect of
this statement is to delay evaluation of S’ until its event control, (posedge
clk), is triggered. In the case of (posedge clk), the triggering event is a
specific kind of change perceived in the value of clk, namely a change from
any non-1 value to 1, representing a positive edge.
The assignment on line 7 is a continuous net assignment. Perhaps some-
what counterintuitively, this assignment will be the last action of the module
on a given positive edge of clk. A continuous assignment is triggered for
evaluation whenever any value in its right-hand side changes, which, in the
case of the current example, is whenever the value of r changes. This can
be thought of in terms of hardware as attaching a wire to the output of the
register r.
As the example in Figure 8.1 illustrates, there are two basic types of
assignments at the top level, continuous assignments, such as the one on line
7, that allow assignment to net types, and procedural assignments, such as the
one on line 9, that allow assignment to variable types. Procedural assignments
can be broken down further into blocking and non-blocking assignments.
The module in Figure 8.2 shows an initial block and two always blocks,
which look very similar, yet compute very different results. In the initial
block, nb1 is initialized to 0. In the block on lines 9–13, blocking assignments
are used (hence the variable names b1,b2), while lines 15–19 use non-blocking
assignments.
To understand what is going on in this example, let us assume a value for
in. Let in be 1, then, considering the first always block on lines 9–13, the
value of b1 will be 1, while that of b2 will be 2. This is because the assignment
of b1 blocks the statements following it until its completion. The non-blocking
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1 module procedural_assigns(clk, in);
2 input clk;
3 input [15:0] in;
4 reg [15:0] b1, b2;
5 reg [15:0] nb1, nb2;
6
7 initial nb1 = 0;
8
9 always @(posedge clk)
10 begin
11 b1 = in;
12 b2 = b1 + 1;
13 end
14
15 always @(posedge clk)
16 begin
17 nb1 <= in;
18 nb2 <= nb1 + 1;
19 end
20 endmodule
Figure 8.2: Assignment Types Example
assignments in the block on line 15–19 do not block the statements following
them. Following the block, nb1 will contain 1, but nb2 will also contain 1,
because the previous value of nb1, namely 0, is used in the assignment on
line 18.
As a language created to model and design circuits, Verilog is inherently
concurrent. Capturing this concurrency, and the resulting non-determinism
allowed by the standard, is one of the most important tasks of any formal
definition of the language. Many Verilog users, however, learn the language
primarily through simulators, many of which are single-threaded and deter-
ministic; or, even if not single-threaded, certainly not capable of enumerating
all legal behaviors.
To ease understanding and maintain consistency, we adopt several of the
terms used in the Verilog standard. First and foremost is that of the process.
In a Verilog design, a process is anything that can perform computation.
According to the standard [36, §11.2]: “Processes are objects that can be
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evaluated, that may have state, and that can respond to changes on their
inputs to produce outputs”. Going back to our introductory flipflop example
from Figure 8.1, the always block on lines 8–9 is one process, while the
continuous assignment on line 7 is another. The module itself is also a process.
Our formal representation of processes is given in Section 8.4.
While processes are very specific, the terminology of event encompasses
several different concepts. Except where specifically mentioned, we try to
make the event terminology of the standard explicit in the definition, to ease
understanding for those familiar with the standard. Every update of a net
or variable is an update event. The evaluation of a process is an evaluation
event. This is the only type of event that is not explicitly represented in the
definition, which instead merges the concepts of process and evaluation event,
effectively treating processes as events.
While Verilog is used to synthesize circuit designs, it was originally, and
essentially continues to to be, designed for simulation. Because of this, Verilog
is sensitive to simulator time. In fact, in addition to the ability to delay
statements until a particular condition holds, such as on line 8 of Figure 8.1,
it is also possible to delay statements some number of simulator cycles. The
syntax for this consists of preceding a statement, say S, with, say, #5, which
means that S will be delayed 5 time units.
The most important concept regarding the Verilog semantics is the strati-
fied event queue [36, §11.3]. Events are divided into five prioritized categories
that determine when they are scheduled for execution with respect to simula-
tion time: active events, inactive events, non-blocking assign update events,
monitor events, and future events. We further add the category of listening
events, which does not exist in the standard but help clarify the execution of
Verilog designs.
Active events are all events that are currently running, i.e., they are not
waiting for any specific trigger, and they have not been delayed. Inactive
events are curious, in that as far as we know they only occur when a statement
has been delayed by exactly 0 time units, for example, through a statement
such as (r = #0 1;). Non-blocking assign update events are generated by
executing a non-blocking assignment. Monitor events are related the Verilog
monitor statement, which is essentially a print statement that occurs at the
end of every simulator cycle in which its arguments change. Future events are
processes that have been delayed by some non-zero amount, which must still
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1 module value_size;
2 reg [ 3:0] r1, r2;




7 r1 = 15;
8 r2 = 15;
9 out = r1 + r2;
10 end
11 endmodule
Figure 8.3: Value Sizing Example
eventually execute. Listening events are those events that are waiting for a
particular trigger to occur; they will be promoted to active events/processes
as soon as that trigger occurs.
Each type of event, as listed, is promoted to an active event or process
only when there are no events before it in the list, except for listening events,
which may be promoted as soon as the trigger that they are listening for
occurs. For example, inactive events are all, at the same time, promoted
to active events when there are no more active events or processes to be
executed. Similarly, non-blocking assign update events are all simultaneously
promoted to active events when there are no more active or inactive events in
the given simulation cycle. When all events, except for listening events and
future events, have been exhausted, time is advanced to that of the earliest
future event. If there are no pending future events the program completes
execution.
Verilog has interesting rules for the size of operands. Figure 8.3 shows a
simple, but by no means exhaustive, example of this. Despite the fact that
both r1 and r2 are only four bits wide, the variable out is still assigned the
value 30 at line 9. For the purposes of the addition, r1 and r2 are treated as
sixteen bit quantities, because out is a sixteen bit quantity. There are many
different rules for the sizing of values; the above example only covers one
of them (sizing to the left hand side of an expression). All of the rules are
covered in our definition. Due to the fact that the standard specifies these
rules very clearly, we refer the interested reader to the standard or the full
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specification of our definition available at [72].
8.4 Semantics: Configuration
This section, together with the one following, provide an annotated account
of our formal semantics. We follow a common convention of rewriting logic
semantics: the syntax of terms, called configurations, is first defined by
means of sorts and operator declarations to represent the entire state of the
program, and subsequently semantic equations and rules are added that act
on configurations to advance the state of the computation. This section
defines configurations, using the program in Figure 8.1 as an example, and
Section 8.5 defines the essential equations and rules that act on configurations.
The specification is available in its entirety [72].
Configurations are represented as terms of sort Configuration, defined
as sets of configuration items. The most important aspect of a configuration
is that it represents the state of Verilog’s event queue. Each stratum of the
queue is associated with its own configuration item.
op updateEvents : Set{Event} -> ConfigurationItem .
op incativeEvents : Set{Event} -> ConfigurationItem .
op nonBlockingAssignUpdateEvents
: List{Event} -> ConfigurationItem .
op monitorEvents : Set{Event} -> ConfigurationItem .
op futureEvents : List{Event} -> ConfigurationItem .
In addition to the above strata, which are exactly the ones dictated by
the standard [36, §11.3], we add a new stratum that holds events sensitive to
updates to nodes.
op listeningEvents : Set{Event} -> ConfigurationItem .
There are various kinds of events that are formalized, including update
events, events that are sensitive to update events and execute only once, and
events that are sensitive to update events and execute continuously. Terms of
sort TriggerSet below are just sets of node names.
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op updateEvent : Exp BitVector -> Event .
op listeningEvent : TriggerSet Computation
-> Event .
op continuousListeningEvent : TriggerSet Name Computation
-> Event .
The second argument to continuousListeningEvent is a net driven by a
continuous assignment. Continuous listening events are, within our semantics,
always associated with continuous assignments, and need to be handled
specially; the standard dictates that they cannot generate exactly the same
kind of update event as procedural blocking assignments.
In addition, the update events that are held using the updateEvents
operator will include just pending updates to variables, as opposed to both
pending updates and active processes. Instead, we introduce one additional
stratum to hold active processes.
op activeProcesses : Set{Process} -> ConfigurationItem .
Processes are terms created from something we call “computations”,
which are used to stage the execution of different classes of constructs, such
as expressions, statements, and top-level process designators such as initial
and always blocks. Procedural and continuous assignments get separate
process constructors.
op k : Computation -> Process .
op continuousk : Name Computation -> Process .
And, the operators holding the different kinds of computations are given as
follows.
op top : Top -> Computation .
op exp : Nat+ Exp -> Computation .
op stmt : Statement -> Computation .
op stmt : Name Statement -> Computation .
As an example of a partial configuration, just giving the state of the event
queue, the following term specifies the initial state of the event queue for the
flipflop module presented in Figure 8.1.
110







continuousListeningEvent(r, out, exp(16, r)))
The current value of all nodes in the circuit, called the environment in
our semantics, as well as the current simulation time, are the other two
components that are part of a configuration.
op env : Env -> ConfigurationItem .
op time : Nat -> ConfigurationItem .
The operator env is used to hold the environment of the system. It
contains a mapping from variable or net names to bitvectors. In the initial
state of the flipflop module, the environment is given by the following term.
env( clk |-> [0 # 1]
, in |-> [0 # 16]
, out |-> [0 # 16]
, r |-> [0 # 16])
A bitvector is a pair consisting of a value and a bitwidth, separated with a #;
e.g., out is a 16-bit node assigned value 0 above. The operator time is used
to hold the current simulator time. It always starts at 0.
To summarize, the term given below specifies the initial configuration for
the flipflop module presented in Figure 8.1. Note that we have omitted some
additional configuration items that are useful in practice, but not usually
considered part of the Verilog simulation state. For example, we omit a
configuration item to hold the output buffer.
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continuousListeningEvent(r, out, exp(16, r)))
time(0)
env( clk |-> [0 # 1]
, in |-> [0 # 16]
, out |-> [0 # 16]
, r |-> [0 # 16]
)
8.5 Semantics: Equations and Rules
The semantics for initial blocks is very simple. The statements of an initial
block must run exactly once. The equation below simply strips off the keyword
initial, forcing the statements represented by the variable S to evaluate.
Note that the operator k is not mentioned in the equation; in fact, no subterms
are mentioned except those we explicitly require. In addition, throughout the
remainder of the chapter, all Maude-level variables will be assumed to have
the sort of argument of the operator in which it appears in a term, unless
explicitly noted otherwise.
top(initial S) = stmt(S)
The semantics of always blocks is very similar, except that the statements
of the body of the block must be repeated indefinitely, thus the equation
forces the statements S to be run, but also schedules another copy of the
always block to run after S completes. In this case the equation must match
the k operator to keep the always block from infinitely unrolling rather than
executing the statements of the body before unrolling another step.
k(top(always S)) = k(stmt(S) -> top(always S))
Procedural assignments generate update events, which go into the strati-
fied event queue. The update events themselves are responsible for actually
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updating the environment of the system and waking up any listening processes.
The semantics of blocking assignments is such that trailing statements are
barred from being executed until after the generated update event completes.
The first step is to calculate the value of the right-hand side of the assign-
ment. In the equation displayed next, the right-hand side of the assignment,
designated with the variable Ex, is pulled out and placed at the top of the
computation stack; the size of the expression is also calculated.
eq activeProcesses(k(stmt(QEx = Ex ;) -> K) PS) env(Env)
= activeProcesses(k(exp(expSize(QEx, Env, Ex), Ex)
-> blockingAssign(QEx) -> K) PS) env(Env) .
The rules for evaluating expressions is straightforward and are omitted
(see [72] for details). Once the right-hand side is fully evaluated to a value,
that is, to something of sort BitVector, the actual assignment takes place
and sensitive listening events are added to the set of active processes for later
evaluation.




In the equation above, the variable PS denotes the other processes, ES
denotes the current set of events, X denotes the node name being assigned to,
and K denotes the rest of the computation. The important thing to note is
that the term represented by K gets placed in the update event list that is
added to updateEvents. It contains all remaining statements in the given
procedural block. As we will see below, this computation will be run as an
active process once the update event gets reflected in the environment; for
the time being, however, it is removed from the active processes. The term
rooted at updateEventList allows us to group any number of update events
that must be executed in order. This is useful both for assignments with
concatenations on the left-hand side (see [72]), and for scheduling non-blocking
assign update events; here, with a blocking assignments, the full power of
having a list is not needed.
While very similar in form, we use a rule to define non-blocking assignments.












Figure 8.4: Net Assignment Example
contained within the term rooted at the nonBlockingAssignUpdateEvents
symbol are eventually scheduled to execute in one updateEventList. This
is to facilitate the standard’s mandate that non-blocking assignments in one
procedural block complete in order. If an equation were used, non-blocking
assignments in different procedural blocks would only be allowed to interleave
in one order. With a rule, we ensure that non-blocking assignments may
be ordered non-deterministically, while still keeping the ordering within one
block.




The variable EL above denotes a list of events. A list differs from a set in
that the elements are ordered. Note that the term K is allowed to continue
as k(K) appears in the activeProccesses on the right hand side of the rule.
This is exactly the desired semantics of a non-blocking assignment: the rest of
the block is allowed to complete before the update event from the assignment
is allowed to make any change to the environment.
There are two equations for governing the semantics of continuous assign-
ment. Note that only one outstanding update event exists for a given driver
at any one time. This is the reason for having “continuous” versions of many
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constructs. We do not address the case of a net having multiple drivers.
eq activeProcesses( continuousk(X, BV1) PS)
updateEvents(continuousUpdateEvent(X, BV2) ES)
= activeProcesses( PS)
updateEvents(continuousUpdateEvent(X, BV1) ES) .





The variables BV1 and BV in the first and second equations, respectively,
are the results of assignment computations. By the time a bitvector becomes
the sole remaining argument, the computation has been completely evaluated.
The first equation will replace any pending update event to the same net
with an update containing the current value of the assignment right-hand
side computation. This case is handled with the first equation. Gordon [31]
refers to this idea as cancelling.
The second equation is an “otherwise” equation [15, §4.5.4] that is only
applied if the first equation does not match because there is not already
a pending continuousUpdateEvent to the node represented by X in the
equation.
Net and variable lookup and updating is performed through rules in
rewriting logic. The reason for this is that the Verilog standard states that
it is legal for a simulator to execute any outstanding active update event.
The value of a given net or variable, when referenced, is simply found in
the environment. Note that we must mention the activeProcesses term
because the environment exists at the top level of the configuration. The rules
for other kinds of operands, specifically bit and part selections, are similar
(see [72]). In addition, we have simplified the rule slightly here, removing the
part that handles bit-width calculations. This was done for readability.
rl activeProcesses(k(exp(N, X) -> K) PS) env(X |-> BV, M)
=> activeProcesses( BV -> K) PS) env(X |-> BV, M) .
Net and variable updating occurs when an update event executes. Update
events are generated by the assignments as explained above. Update events
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must modify the environment, wake up any process that is currently waiting
as a listening event, and alert any monitor event that the value has changed.
rl updateEvents(updateEventList(updateEvent(X, BV1) ; EL, K) ES1)
env(X |-> BV2, ENV)
listeningEvents(ES2)
=> updateEvents(updateEventList(EL, K) ES1)
env(X |-> BV1, ENV)
listeningEvents(sense(X, BV2, BV1, ES2))
Here the various ES’s represent sets of events. The term rooted at
updateEventList groups several update events as a list. This allows us
to ensure that non-blocking assignments occur in program text order within
a procedural block, as well as allowing for an easy and clear representation of
concatenation-form assignments (see [72]). The operator sense is responsible
for waking up the proper listening events and deciding if any monitor event
need execute in the current simulator cycle. It uses the previous and current
value of the variable or net that is updated to make its determinations.
The last equation here schedules the term bound to K from the update
event list to execute when all update events in the update event list have
been exhausted. For non-blocking assignments, the term bound to K will be
empty, meaning that nothing is scheduled.
eq activeProcesses(PS)
updateEvents(updateEventList(empty, K) ES)
= activeProcesses( k(K) PS)
updateEvents(ES) .
The semantics for delays and triggers is fairly straightforward. Delays
simply move the current active process to the future event set with a simulator
time equal to the current time added to the time of the delay, if the delay
is non-zero. If the delay is zero, the rest of the active processes are moved
to the set of inactive events set. Triggers add the rest of the current active




activeProcesses( k(stmt(# NzN S) -> K) PS)




activeProcesses( k(stmt(# 0 S) -> K) PS)
= inactiveEvents(inactiveEvent(stmt(S) -> K) ES)
activeProcesses(PS) .
Here, in the equation for non-zero delays, NzN is a non-zero natural number,
while N is any natural number. N is the current time, while NzN is the delay.
As expected, the rest of the current process, K, is added to the future event set,
as well as the delayed statement S. The first argument to the futureEvent
operator is the simulator cycle in which the event should be scheduled to run
as an active process.
For wait statements, the process associated with the wait is added to the
listening events set. Here, SL is the sensitivity list; it is maintained as the
first argument to listeningEvent so that the equationally defined function
sense can decide which listening events must be scheduled when an update
event executes.
eq listeningEvents(EL)
activeProcesses( k(stmt(@(SL) S) -> K) PS)
= listeningEvents(listeningEvent(SL, stmt(S) -> K) ; EL)
activeProcesses(PS) .
Lastly, we present the rules for scheduling the main simulator loop. The
general idea is to continue with the next set of events in the list when all the
previous sets are empty.
Active processes and update events are allowed to run at any time, and
do so via the equations and rules detailed above. The first set of events
activated when active processes and update events are exhausted is the set of
inactive events. The operator activate schedules each individual inactive
event as an active process by wrapping the associated computation with the k









When there are no active processes, update events, or inactive events, the
non-blocking assign update events are activated simultaneously by moving









The variable NEL denotes a non-empty list of events. The events in the
non-blocking assign update event set are added to one update event list.
The continuation argument is empty, as there is nothing to continue after
a non-blocking assignment changes the state of the program, as mentioned
above
A similar rule exists for waking up monitor events. Note that the monitor







monitorEvents(monitorEvent(TrS, B, Format, ExL) ES1)
futureMonitorEvents(ES2)
=> activeProcesses(if B







monitorEvent(TrS, false, Format, ExL)) .
Finally, if no monitor events are present, the future events set to execute
earliest are made active. The equationally defined operator awaken queues
up all other events that were delayed until time associated with the variable

















Races. The first example is taken directly from the IEEE Standard [36], and
demonstrates the essential source of non-determinism in Verilog; it is shown




















Figure 8.5: Race Condition Example from the IEEE Standard ([36, §11.5]).
between the continuous assignment, which needs to update the value of p,
and the display of p. It is correct for a simulator to output either 0, if the
display is executed first, or 1, if the continuous assignment is executed first;
both iverilog and vcs happen to output 0.
The second example is shown in Figure 8.6 and, like the first example,
comes from the IEEE Standard. The purpose of the example is to expose
the apparent vagaries of bit-width determinations, and the effect of this
determination on the evaluation of expressions.
In the example, the question that arises is about the correct bit-width
of the expression (a + b). The IEEE Standard dictates that for addition,
the expression is calculated using a bit-width equal to the maximum of the
bit-widths of its operands; the same is true for subtraction, but not for
shift-right, where the operands are self-determined.
Therefore, the first display must print 0 because the addition is calculated
using 4-bits and the overflow is lost. The second display must print 8 because
the bit-width of unsized integer literals while implementation-dependent, is
required to be at least 32 bits [36, §4.8], and therefore the overflow is not lost
because the entire expression (a + b - 0) is calculated using 32 bits.
Indeed, the determination of bit-widths is quite complex, as even the
declared bit-width of an identifier may involve compound expressions whose
bit-widths must be determined. Consider the program shown in Figure 8.7,









x = (a + b) >> 1;
$display(x);








Figure 8.6: Expression Bit-Width Sizing Example ([36, §5.4.2]).
module m;
reg [4’b1111 + 4’b0001 >> 1:0] x;





$display("x = %b", x);
$display("y = %b", y);
end
endmodule






























where the most and least-significant bits are compound expressions and not
simple unsized literals. The displays will print a sequence of 1s for each
identifier, the length of which indicates the identifier’s bit-width.
As the example from Figure 8.6 demonstrated, the bit-width of the expres-
sions (4’b1111 + 4’b0001) and (4’b1111 + 1) are different, with the ex-
pression (4’b1111 + 4’b0001) discarding the overflow, in particular. There-




meaning that x should be 1-bit and y should be 9-bits. As a result, this
example exposes a bug in iverilog, which mistakenly determines that x
should be 9 bits wide.
One possible way of exposing nondeterminism using a traditional Verilog
simulator is by shuﬄing processes around to different locations in the source
code; for example, consider the programs presented in Figures 8.8 and 8.9.
According to the semantics of Verilog, the two programs are equivalent, and
may legally display either 0 or 1.





















Figure 8.9: Nondeterminism in Verilog
order, it is possible to coerce iverilog and vcs to display different results.
However, attempting to glean the entirety of a Verilog program’s meaning this
way, essentially by tricking the compiler, leaves much to be desired. A fast
simulator is an invaluable tool, but this example demonstrates the inadequacy
of such tools when answers to fundamental questions are needed.
Consider what occurs starting at the point during simulation when x
is assigned 4’b1010 and simulation time is 2. If we were to evaluate the
event condition @(x == 4’b1010) at this point, the event would be triggered.
However, that does not necessarily happen, we simply put the process with
the event-control back into the queue of runnable processes. If the simulator
then chooses to execute the assignment of x to 1’b1111 before executing
the process with the event control, then when the process is subsequently
run, it will see that the event it is waiting on has not yet happened and be
de-scheduled, waiting for other changes to x.
The other interesting aspect of the program is the continuous assignment.
When the assignment of x to 4’b1010 occurs, an update is scheduled for y at 1
time unit in the future, however, when the assignment of x to 4’b1111 occurs
subsequently, the earlier scheduled update is cancelled. This is noteworthy











$display("x = %d", x);
end
endmodule







is one of very few occasions where a pending event is removed.
Therefore, while at time 2 it is legal for a simulator to trigger the first
always construct, the one displaying ding!, it is not legal for a simulator to
trigger the other always construct displaying ding! ding! at time 3. This
is the behavior seen with iverilog; of course, it is also legal for the always
construct to not be tiggered at time 2, which is the behavior had through
running vcs; therefore, both iverilog and vcs produce correct, although
different, results.
The final example, presented as Figure 8.10, demonstrates a common
misconception about Verilog, namely, that an always construct such as
always @(x[0])
x = x+1;
is continually sensing changes to x. In fact, sensitivity to changes in x only
occurs after the assignment to x on the following line, when control reaches the
@(x[0]) again. Therefore, it is not correct for a simulator to loop infinitely
in the above example.
The exact nature of the error exhibited by iverilog is somewhat subtle.
It effectively makes the following program transformation.




The transformed program can loop infinitely, and so in some sense the problem
exhibited by iverilog is that this transformation is not semantics-preserving.
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CHAPTER 9
SEMANTICS: PRODUCTION RULE SETS
9.1 Introduction
Asynchronous digital circuits have been employed to design low-power, high-
performance microprocessors, e.g. [69], as well as in emerging applications
such as systems-on-chip (SOCs), e.g. [68], soft-error-tolerant systems, e.g. [42],
and nano-electronics, e.g. [70]. The critical property that makes asynchronous
circuits advantageous in these applications is enormous immunity to both
intrinsic and extrinsic timing variation. At present, the major difficulty in
designing asynchronous circuits is that very few commercially supported
asynchronous electronic design automation (EDA) tools or standard cell
libraries exist, making design and implementation of asynchronous circuits
more challenging than for synchronous ones.
The present work concerns the language of production rule sets, which
was introduced as part of a correct-by-construction synthesis method for
asynchronous digital circuits [65]. According to this methodology, designs
are first given in a high-level hardware description language called Communi-
cating Hardware Processes (CHP). The CHP description is synthesized into
a semantically equivalent hierarchical network of gates and digital switches
called a production rule set. From a given production rule set, one can then
straightforwardly generate an equivalent representation in a variety of circuit
technologies, including CMOS.
This paper addresses two issues concerning production rule sets. The
first is the fundamental question of what does a production rule set mean?
To that end, we treat production rule sets as a formal language and assign
to that language a semantics. There are numerous practical benefits to
having defined a precise formal semantics. In particular, a formal semantics
helps facilitate a common understanding of what circuits designed using
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production rule sets are, and it affords newcomers to the field of asynchronous
design an unambiguous framework in which to understand existing work.
Additionally, it provides a set of mathematical tools for proving properties
about asynchronous circuits.
The second issue that this paper addresses is the problem of automatically
proving properties about production rule sets, much like one might prove
properties about a software program. Specifically, we consider a notion of
deadlock freedom that is appropriate for production rule sets, as well as a
property called hazard freedom. Both of these properties are necessary condi-
tions for a circuit to be considered correct. As we will demonstrate, another
benefit of having a precise formal semantics is that, when that semantics is
given in an executable way, some analyses, including checks for deadlock and
hazard freedom, can be made completely automatic. Executability is had in
this paper through a semantic formalization in rewriting logic [74, 77] which,
through the rewriting logic engine Maude [15], offers various automated and
semi-automated analysis possibilities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 9.2 defines
MPRS , the “mathematical” formal semantics of production rule sets, which
improves upon an earlier effort [56] through the use of a more familiar opera-
tional style. Section 9.3 defines RPRS , an executable semantics of production
rule sets in rewriting logic, improving upon [48] through its extremely close,
almost identical, matching with the mathematical semantics. Section 9.4
establishes the relative correctness of MPRS and RPRS . Specifically, a strong
bisimulation between transition systems induced by the semantics is proved.
As corollaries to strong bisimulation, we get relative correctness with respect
to deadlocks and hazards as well. Section 9.5 demonstrates how to use the
Maude tool to check deadlock and hazard freedom automatically, and applies
this analysis to several small circuits. A pair of optimizations are devel-
oped, and their efficacy examined. Section 9.6 looks briefly at two timing
assumptions other than delay-insensitivity, namely speed-independence and
quasi-delay-insensitivity.
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9.2 Mathematical Semantics: MPRS
This section revisits our work in [56], providing a revised “mathematical”
semantics for production rule sets for the delay-insensitive case. We refer
generally to the formalization given in this section as MPRS . Compared
to [56], MPRS applies only to the delay-insensitive case, but gains a more
familiar operational formalization and, as a result of the more limited scope,
a treatment which is substantially clearer and more concise. The term
“mathematical” is used to distinguish the semantics presented in this section,
which uses just standard notions from mathematics, such as sets, functions,
and relations, from the executable semantics which follows in Section 9.3.
The mathematical semantics is useful in various ways. It is suitable as
a basis for formal proofs about production rule sets, an extensive example
of which is developed in [55]. A clear formal semantics is also crucial to
facilitating communication between, and a common understanding amongst,
practitioners, as well as for helping newcomers to the field understand essential
concepts.
Section 9.2.1 deals with the syntax of production rule sets. Section 9.2.2
introduces the semantics informally and works through a small example. For
simplicity, hazards are omitted from the discussion in that section. Section
9.2.3 formalizes the semantics in detail, including hazards, and Section 9.2.4
returns to the example circuit and works through an execution that generates
a hazard. Section 9.2.5 contains a discussion about production rule sets in
the context of two somewhat similar formalisms for concurrency, guarded
commands and communicating sequential processes.
9.2.1 Syntax
The “syntax” of production rule sets consists of a mathematical construct
defining a single production rule, and then a mechanism for gathering together
finite sets of these constructions; hence the name production rule sets. There
is also a stylized way of writing production rule sets that we review below.
The choice of which notation to use is just a matter of convenience.
Definition 9.2.1 (Syntax of Production Rule Sets). Let Y denote a denumer-










Figure 9.1: Gate-level and CMOS-level Specification of a 3-Inverter Ring
Oscillator.
(g, x, d), with g, the guard, being a boolean expression involving variables
from Y , x ∈ Y is the transition variable, and d ∈ {↑, ↓} is the transition
direction. A production rule set is a finite set of production rules.
A production rule (g, x, d) is often written in the following, stylized manner
g 7→ x d
and a set of production rules {(g1, x1, d1), . . . , (gm, xm, dm)} is often written





The purpose of this section is to give, by way of an example, an informal
introduction to the dynamic behavior of production rule sets; that is, their
semantics. The example circuit we consider is shown in Figure 9.1. It is
known as a 3-inverter ring oscillator.
Digital ring oscillators are typically amongst the first circuits designed and
tested in new process technologies, and they can be used as timing elements
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and clock generators. The simplest ring-oscillator consists of an odd number
of inverters connected sequentially to form a loop. Since the number of
inverters is odd, the output of each inverter will change value in sequence
perpetually; as such, the ring of inverters is said to oscillate. For electrical
reasons, a single inverter ring does not oscillate, so the simplest ring oscillator
contains three inverters.
Figure 9.1 depicts a 3-inverter ring oscillator consisting of two simple
inverters and one modified inverter. In order to simplify the presentation of
certain undesired circuit behaviors, we have made it so that the transistors
governing the inverter with output x2 may switch independently. It should
be noted that in modern CMOS technologies (65nm and smaller), transistor
parameters vary significantly from their nominal values due to process-induced
variation and random dopant fluctuation. Considering a large circuit with
say billions of transistors, there will exist a few gates, e.g. inverters, with
extreme parameter variation where, for example, the PFET is several orders
of magnitude slower than the NFET. It then becomes reasonable to model
such a gate with independently-controlled transistors. The production rule
set corresponding to the 3-inverter ring oscillator depicted in Figure 9.1 is
¬x3 7→ x1 ↑ x1 7→ x1,1 ↑ x1 7→ x1,2 ↑ ¬x1,1 7→ x2 ↑ ¬x2 7→ x3 ↑
x3 7→ x1 ↓ ¬x1 7→ x1,1 ↓ ¬x1 7→ x1,2 ↓ x1,2 7→ x2 ↓ x2 7→ x3 ↓
Let us assume that the oscillator begins in a state where the nodes take
values according to a function σ : {x1, x1,1, x1,2, x2, x3} −→ {0, 1} defined by
x1, x1,1, x1,2, x3 7→ 0
x2 7→ 1
For the moment we will think of the semantics of production rule sets as
essentially specifying all possible σ′s reachable from σ in a single computation
step.
Informally, the σ′s reachable from σ are had by considering all rules with
a true guard, choosing any subset of them, and then executing the right-hand
sides of the rules in this set. In our example, all of the following rules have
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guards that are true
¬x3 7→ x1 ↑ ¬x1,1 7→ x2 ↑
¬x1 7→ x1,1 ↓ ¬x1 7→ x1,2 ↓ x2 7→ x3 ↓
However, note that while all of these production rules have guards that
evaluate to true in the current state, only the rule ¬x3 7→ x1 ↑ can effect an
observable change in the state of the circuit nodes (x1 rises from 0 to 1); this
is a notion we call enablement ; the rule ¬x3 7→ x1 ↑ is said to be enabled,
whereas, for example, the rule x2 7→ x3 ↓ is not enabled.
As there is only a single enabled rule, and because the semantics allows
for selecting no rules during a step, there are only two possible σ′s reachable
from σ; namely σ′ = σ and the σ′ defined by
x1, x2 7→ 1
x1,1, x1,2, x3 7→ 0
From the above σ′, where x1 has switched, there are four σ′′s subsequently
reachable, one for each subset of {x1,1, x1,2}. Both of these nodes are enabled
to switch to 1, and in a single step either node may, independently, “choose”
to switch or not switch.
The semantics as just described omits one major issue that will be handled
in the formal semantics: hazards. The concept of a hazard corresponds to a
circuit failure and will manifest itself by a node in the circuit taking a value
X which is distinct from the usual 0 or 1. We will return to the 3-inverter
ring oscillator in Section 9.2.4 to expand the example execution steps so that
hazards are accounted for according to the semantics.
9.2.3 Mathematical Semantics
At a high level, our goal is to define a binary relation between program states,
denoted −→P , that corresponds to one step of concurrent execution, relative
to a production rule set P . s −→P s′ means that it is possible to reach state
s′ from state s in one computation step. The space of executions is then given
131
by the infinite −→P -chains
s1 −→P s2 −→P s3 −→P · · ·
subject to a form of fairness, described later.
Fix a production rule set P . VariableP ⊆ Y denotes the set of all variables
occurring in P . A state (with respect to P ) is a pair
(σ : VariableP −→ Level , H ⊆ VariableP )
where Level
def
= {0, X, 1}. The set of all states (with respect to P ) is denoted
StateP .
The σ component of a state (σ,H) serves the familiar purpose of specifying
values for all nodes in the circuit, with the X value meaning that a hazard
has been expressed at that node. This direct expression of hazards was first
introduced in [56]. Hazards come in two basic varieties, interference and
instability. The purpose of the set H is to record the origination of potential
hazards, which is only expressed when a node ultimately takes on the value
X; this expression can happen an arbitrary number of computation steps in
the future.
An interference hazard occurs when a node is simultaneously being pulled
both up and down in the current state, roughly corresponding to a short
circuit. For a given valuation σ : VariableP −→ Level , we define a set
InterferenceP,σ ⊆ VariableP
such that y ∈ InterferenceP,σ iff there exists g1 7→ y ↑, g2 7→ y ↓∈ P such that
σ(g1) = σ(g2) = 1.
The evaluation of a boolean expression in the three-valued mapping, such
as σ(g1) above, extends the usual meaning of ¬,∧,∨ on {0, 1} according to
the following equivalences:
¬X = X X ∧ 0 = 0 X ∧ 1 = X X ∨ 1 = 1 X ∨ 0 = X X ∧ X = X X ∨ X = X.
Instability hazards occur when a gate starts pulling toward a new output
level, but before reaching a stable voltage level, the gate stops pulling. This
is a property of a computation step, (σ,H) −→P (σ′, H ′), and is captured by
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a set
InstabilityP,σ,σ′ ⊆ VariableP .
To define this set, we first need an auxiliary notion, called enablement. Given
a valuation σ, EnabledP,σ ⊆ VariableP is defined so that y ∈ EnabledP,σ if
and only if
• σ(y) 6= 0 and there exists a g 7→ y ↓ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1, or
• σ(y) 6= 1 and there exists a g 7→ y ↑ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1.
Given enablement, y ∈ InstabilityP,σ,σ′ iff y ∈ EnabledP,σ, y /∈ EnabledP,σ′ ,
and σ(y) = σ′(y).
For convenience, we define a third predicate which captures both of the
above hazards, as well as the propagation of hazards that have been expressed
previously.
HazardP,σ,σ′ ⊆ VariableP
is defined such that y ∈ HazardP,σ,σ′ iff any of the following conditions are
met:
• y ∈ InterferenceP,σ′ ;
• y ∈ InstabilityP,σ,σ′ ;
• there exists a g 7→ yd ∈ P such that σ′(g) = X.
A set of actions, namely variable assignments and skip (with respect to
P ), is defined as
ActionP
def
= {skip} ∪ {x := v | x ∈ VariableP , v ∈ Level}
Given a set of actions A ⊆ ActionP and a variable x ∈ VariableP , we denote
the subset of x-actions of A as
A|x def= {y := v ∈ A | y = x}
Definition 9.2.2 (Mathematical Semantics of Production Rule Sets). Let
P = {r1, . . . , rm}
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be a production rule set. The evaluation relation
−→⊆ (P × StateP )× ActionP
is defined inductively according to the following five inference rules, the first
four governing the evaluation of the action of individual rules:
· σ(g) = 1〈g 7→ x ↑, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 1
· σ(g) = 1〈g 7→ x ↓, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 0
·
x ∈ H〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := X
·
〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉 −→ skip
Then, the relation −→P is defined by the following fifth rule, which
combines the evaluation results of all of the rules r1, . . . , rm, and, additionally,
specifies the updated H set.
〈r1, (σ,H)〉 −→ a1 . . . 〈rm, (σ,H)〉 −→ am
(σ,H) −→P (σ[a1, . . . , am], H[σ, a1, . . . , am])
where, letting A = {a1, . . . , am}, the node valuation function σ is updated to
σ[a1, . . . , am](x) =

1 if A|x = {x := 1}
0 if A|x = {x := 0}
X if A|x = {x := X} or |A|x| > 1
σ(x) if A|x = ∅
and the set H of possible hazards is updated to the set H[σ, a1, . . . , am] such
that for all y ∈ VariableP , y ∈ H[σ, a1, . . . , am] iff
• y ∈ HazardP,σ,σ[a1,...,am], or
• y ∈ H and σ(y) = σ[a1, . . . , am](y).
Note the fact that a pair 〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉 can evaluate to skip. skip
has no effect on the state, which means that the semantics supports true
concurrency, wherein a subset of the set P of production rules actually
contributes to a state transition (σ,H) −→P (σ′, H ′).
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An execution is a mapping ξ : N −→ StateP such that for all j ∈ N,
ξ(j) −→P ξ(j + 1) and such that for all y ∈ VariableP , it is not the case that
there exists a j ∈ N where for all i > j, y ∈ EnabledP,σi or y ∈ Hi, but y
never switches; that is, σi(y) = σj(y). This condition is the aforementioned
fairness constraint.
9.2.4 Example, with Hazards
Let us return to the example of Section 9.2.2 and work through a simple set
of execution steps that result in a hazard. The hazard that will be manifested
is an interference hazard at the inverter whose output is x2. We will make
crucial use of the independent control of that gate’s component transistors.
We begin again at the same place we did in Section 9.2.2, with the obvious
exception that we now account for hazards. So, our initial state s0 = (σ0, H0)
has σ0 defined by
x1, x1,1, x1,2, x3 7→ 0
x2 7→ 1
and H0 = ∅.
Going to s1 = (σ1, H1), we let x1 switch. Therefore, σ1 is given by
x1, x2 7→ 1
x1,1, x1,2, x3 7→ 0
and H1 = ∅.
The inference rules governing the action of individual rules always allow
for a skip action to be generated and thus s −→P s is always a legal
computation step, for any production rule set P and any state s. Informally,
this corresponds to choosing the empty set of rules with true guards. Along
such lines, let us say that s2 = s1.
In going from s2 = s1 to s3 = (σ3, H3), we will create the basic condition
for the hazard to become expressed. Let σ3 be such that x1,2 switches, but
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x1,1 does not; these are the only two currently enabled rules. That is, σ3 is
x1, x1,2, x2 7→ 1
x1,1, x3 7→ 0
The interesting aspect of this state change is that H3 becomes non-empty.
It is straightforward to check that x2 ∈ HazardP,σ2,σ3 , and therefore that
x2 ∈ H3. Since there are production rules ¬x1,1 7→ x2 ↑, x1,2 7→ x2 ↓ ∈ P ,
both with guards that are true in σ3, then x2 is witnessing an interference
hazard in s2; and one can show that H3 = {x2}.
Finally, an X can become expressed in going to s4 = (σ4, H4) with
x1, x1,2 7→ 1
x1,1, x3 7→ 0
x2 7→ X
and H4 = {x3}.
9.2.5 Concurrency in Production Rule Sets
Although the language of production rule sets shares certain features with
both guarded commands [22] and communicating sequential processes (CSP)
[35], it is nevertheless quite different from both of the above formalisms. In
particular, it is tempting to view production rule sets via similar constructs
from guarded commands or CSP, but this is incorrect. As a simple, somewhat
contrived example, consider the following production rule set, which describes
how, depending on the current value of nodes x and y in the circuit, nodes z
and w could be concurrently pulled up toward logical 1 (↑) or pulled down
toward logical 0 (↓)
x 7→ z ↓
y 7→ w ↓
¬y 7→ w ↑,
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A reasonable candidate translation into the language of guarded commands
would be the statement
do x→ z := 0
[ ] y → w := 0
[ ] ¬y → w := 1,
od
Similarly, one might reasonably attempt to view the above production rule
set as the following CSP parallel command
∗[ x→ z := 0 ] ||
∗[ y → w := 0 ] ||
∗[ ¬y → w := 1 ]
All three formalizations are, in fact, semantically different; most importantly,
the production rule set exhibits both the possibility of only some of the
production rules being fired, as well as a form of “true concurrency” which is
different from the standard one-at-a-time semantics of the guarded command
statement, or the interleaving semantics of CSP’s parallel command operator.
If x = y = z = w = 1, then, for the above production rule set, the
following are all possible next states of z, w according to the production rule
set semantics:
z = 1, w = 1;
z = 1, w = 0;
z = 0, w = 1;
z = 0, w = 0.
In a single step of computation, neither the guarded command statement nor
the parallel command can change both z and w to 0. The guarded command
statement and the CSP parallel command are even different from each other,
since performing an action requires peeling off different sets of syntactic
constructs by the operational rules.
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9.3 Rewriting Logic Semantics: RPRS
The purpose of this section is to translate the mathematical semantics of
Section 9.2 into an executable one using rewriting logic [74], a formalism which
has been shown [77] to be well suited for exactly this task. The particular
notation used is that of the rewriting logic tool Maude [15]. As we will see,
the rewriting logic semantics mimics closely the mathematical semantics. The
rewriting logic theory described in this section will be referred to as RPRS .
Using the concrete notation of the Maude tool gives us executability
directly. It allows us to simulate circuits as well as exhaustively check that a
circuit satisfies desirable correctness properties, such as hazard freedom and
deadlock freedom, for example. Exploiting the execution and formal analysis
capabilities gained from the Maude specification is the subject of Section 9.5
(the entire Maude specification is available at [50]).
The syntax of production rule sets is defined first. Recall that a pro-
duction rule is a triple g 7→ xd with g a Boolean expression, x a variable,
and d the transition direction. What is needed in rewriting logic are new
sorts corresponding to these concepts and populated with appropriate terms.
Maude’s QID module [15, §9.2] provides our variables: strings of characters
preceded by a single quote.
fmod AUX-SYNTAX is pr QID * (sort Qid to Variable) .
sorts Guard Direction ProductionRule .
subsort Variable < Guard .
op not_ : Guard -> Guard .
op _and_ : Guard Guard -> Guard .
op _or_ : Guard Guard -> Guard .
ops + - : -> Direction .
op [_->__] : Guard Variable Direction -> ProductionRule .
endfm
Compared to the syntax from Section 9.2, the corresponding terms using
Maude notation are very similar. The production rule ¬y 7→ w ↑ becomes the
term [not ’y -> ’w +] of sort ProductionRule in Maude, for example.
Obtaining an appropriate rewriting logic definition of sets of production
rules is most easily accomplished by instantiating Maude’s parameterized
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SET module ([15, §9.12.2]) with a view expressing the fact that elements of
the set will be terms of sort ProductionRule. The module given next does
exactly that; additionally, it renames the default sort and union operator
to a more convenient syntax. The details of parameterized programming in
Maude (theories, views, etc.) can be found in [15, §8.3].
view ProductionRule from TRIV to AUX-SYNTAX is
sort Elt to ProductionRule .
endv
fmod SYNTAX is pr SET{ProductionRule} *
( sort Set{ProductionRule} to ProductionRuleSet
, op _,_ to __
) .
endfm
Therefore, in the notation of the SYNTAX module, the production rule set
x 7→ z ↓
y 7→ w ↓
¬y 7→ w ↑,
becomes a term of sort ProductionRuleSet, written in the notation of Maude
as
[ ’x -> ’z -]
[ ’y -> ’w -]
[not ’y -> ’w +]
Continuing from the start of Section 9.2.3, we define an operator which
takes a production rule set P as an argument and returns the set of Variable
terms corresponding to the set VariableP defined in Section 9.2.3. Recall that
VariableP was defined to be the set containing all of the variables occurring
in P . Variables can be embedded into the guard g of a rule g 7→ xd, and also
include all transition variables (x in g 7→ xd).
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view Variable from TRIV to SYNTAX is
sort Elt to Variable .
endv
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-1 is
pr SET{Variable} * (sort Set{Variable} to 2^Variable) .
--- meta-variable declarations omitted
op Variable-{_} : ProductionRuleSet -> 2^Variable .
eq Variable-{ empty} = empty .
eq Variable-{[G -> Y D] P} =
varsOf(G), Y, Variable-{P} .
op varsOf : Guard -> 2^Variable .
eq varsOf(Y) = Y .
eq varsOf(not G) = varsOf(G) .
eq varsOf(G1 and G2) = varsOf(G1) , varsOf(G2) .
eq varsOf(G1 or G2) = varsOf(G1) , varsOf(G2) .
endfm
Notice that we have omitted the meta-variable declarations used in the
equations of the above module, something we will continue to do in subsequent
modules. Each used variable is given a sort equal to the one declared for the
operator argument in which it is positioned (see [50] for details).
Unlike the set VariableP , which was specified according to an equationally
defined function, the sets Level and StateP will be given entirely new sorts.
Recall that Level = {0, X, 1} and that for a production rule set P a state
is a pair (σ,H) with σ : VariableP −→ Level and H ⊆ VariableP . The σ
component is defined using Maude’s MAP module [15, §9.13.1].
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fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-2 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-1 .
sorts Level .
ops 0 1 X : -> Level .
endfm
view Level from TRIV to AUX-SEMANTICS-2 is
sort Elt to Level .
endv
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-3 is
pr MAP{Variable,Level} * (op _[_] to _(_)) .
sort State .
op (_,_) : Map{Variable,Level} 2^Variable -> State .
endfm
Note that the parameter P of StateP is effectively ignored in our rewriting
logic specification. The implication of this is that, in principle, one could
introduce a state which has or lacks a valuation for any variable, regardless of
whether or not that variable is in a production rule set P under consideration.
This could be be fixed through the use of memberships [15, §4], but the
specification would continue to be unsatisfactory for efficiency and other
reasons. Furthermore, if we begin with a correct state, the rules in the
rewriting semantics will never lead to an inconsistent state; therefore, ignoring
the parameter P in StateP is harmless.
As an example of what AUX-SEMANTICS-3 provides, suppose that we have





and H = {y, z}; the representation of (σ,H) as a term of sort State is written
in the Maude notation as
((’x |-> 0, ’y |-> 0, ’z |-> 1, ’w |-> X), (’y , ’z))
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Moving on to the definition of the various hazard-related concepts, we will
require the ability to evaluate guards according to a three-valued valuation.
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-4 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-3 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op _(_) : Map{Variable,Level} Guard -> Level .
eq Sigma(not G1) = not3 Sigma(G1) .
eq Sigma(G1 and G2) = Sigma(G1) and3 Sigma(G2) .
eq Sigma(G1 or G2) = Sigma(G1) or3 Sigma(G2) .
op not3_ : Level -> Level [prec 24] .
eq not3 0 = 1 .
eq not3 1 = 0 .
eq not3 X = X .
op _and3_ : Level Level -> Level [assoc comm id: 1] .
eq X and3 0 = 0 .
eq 0 and3 0 = 0 .
eq X and3 X = X .
op _or3_ : Level Level -> Level [assoc comm id: 0] .
eq X or3 1 = 1 .
eq 1 or3 1 = 1 .
eq X or3 X = X .
endfm
We are now in a position to handle the primary definitions having to
do with hazards: InterferenceP,σ, InstabilityP,σ,σ′ , and HazardP,σ,σ′ ; all of
which are predicates on VariableP . Consider InterferenceP,σ. We declare
an equationally defined function that takes two arguments, one a term of
sort ProductionRuleSet corresponding to P , and the second a term of
sort Map{Variable,Level} corresponding to σ, and returns a term of sort
2^Variable corresponding to InterferenceP,σ.
Recall how InterferenceP,σ ⊆ VariableP was defined: for all y ∈ VariableP ,
y ∈ InterferenceP,σ if and only if there exists g1 7→ y ↑, g2 7→ y ↓∈ P such that
σ(g1) = σ(g2) = 1. We accomplish this in Maude with two auxiliary functions.
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InterfPred determines if a variable satisfies the interference property and
InterfFilter filters the set VariableP by applying InterfPred to every
variable in P one-by-one.
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-5 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-4 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op InterfPred :
Variable ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level} -> Bool .
ceq InterfPred(Y, P, Sigma) = true
if [G+ -> Y +] [G- -> Y -] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G+) == 1 and Sigma(G-) == 1 .
eq InterfPred(Y, P, Sigma) = false [owise] .
op Interference-{_,_} :
ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level} -> 2^Variable .
eq Interference-{P,Sigma} =
InterfFilter(Variable-{P}, P, Sigma) .
op InterfFilter :
2^Variable ProductionRuleSet
Map{Variable,Level} -> 2^Variable .
eq InterfFilter(empty , P, Sigma) = empty .
eq InterfFilter((Y,YS), P, Sigma) =
if InterfPred(Y, P, Sigma) then Y else empty fi ,
InterfFilter(YS, P, Sigma) .
endfm
InstabilityP,σ,σ′ ⊆ VariableP was defined in Section 9.2 so that for all y ∈
VariableP , y ∈ InstabilityP,σ,σ′ if and only if y ∈ EnabledP,σ, y /∈ EnabledP,σ′ ,
and σ(y) = σ(y′). Recall that EnabledP,σ ⊆ VariableP was defined so that
for all y ∈ VariableP , y ∈ EnabledP,σ if and only if:
• σ(y) 6= 0 and there exists a g 7→ y ↓ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1, or
• σ(y) 6= 1 and there exists a g 7→ y ↑ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1.
The corresponding definitions in Maude are very similar, and use again the
Pred and Filter pair idea from the definition of Interference. InstFilter
is omitted because it is not substantively different from InterfPred (see [50]).
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fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-6 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-5 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op EnabledPred :
Variable ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level} -> Bool .
ceq EnabledPred(Y, P, Sigma) = true
if Sigma(Y) =/= 1
/\ [G+ -> Y +] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G+) == 1 .
ceq EnabledPred(Y, P, Sigma) = true
if Sigma(Y) =/= 0
/\ [G- -> Y -] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G-) == 1 .
eq EnabledPred(Y, P, Sigma) = false [owise] .
op InstPred :
Variable ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level}
Map{Variable,Level} -> Bool .
ceq InstPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = true
if EnabledPred(Y, P, Sigma )
/\ not EnabledPred(Y, P, Sigma’)
/\ Sigma(Y) == Sigma’(Y) .
eq InstPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = false [owise] .
op Instability-{_,_,_} :
ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level}
Map{Variable,Level} -> 2^Variable .
eq Instability {P, Sigma, Sigma’} =
InstFilter(Variable-{P}, P, Sigma, Sigma’) .
... InstFilter omitted
endfm
HazardP,σ,σ′ is transcribed directly. Recall that HazardP,σ,σ′ is just the
union of InterferenceP,σ′ and InstabilityP,σ,σ′ , plus the propagation of any X
values.
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fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-7 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-6 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op HazardPred :
Variable ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level}
Map{Variable,Level} -> Bool .
ceq HazardPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = true
if InterfPred(Y, P, Sigma’) .
ceq HazardPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = true
if InstPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) .
ceq HazardPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = true
if [G -> Y D] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G) == X .
eq HazardPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma’) = false [owise] .
op Hazard-{_,_,_} :
ProductionRuleSet Map{Variable,Level}
Map{Variable,Level} -> 2^Variable .
eq Hazard-{P, Sigma, Sigma’} =
HazardFilter(Variable-{P}, P, Sigma, Sigma’) .
... HazardFilter omitted
endfm
Subsequent to HazardP,σ,σ′ we defined ActionP and A|y, where A ⊆
ActionP and y ∈ VariableP . Recall that actions are either pairs contain-
ing a variable and a level, or the special action skip. The restriction operator
on a set of actions picks those non-skip actions with a particular variable
given as the first component.
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fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-8 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-7 .
sort Action .
op _:=_ : Variable Level -> Action .
op skip : -> Action .
endfm
view Action from TRIV to AUX-SEMANTICS-8 is
sort Elt to Action .
endv
fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-9 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-8 .
pr SET{Action} * (sort Set{Action} to 2^Action) .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op _|_ : 2^Action Variable -> 2^Action .
eq (Y := V , A) | Y = Y := V , (A | Y) .
eq A | Y = empty [owise] .
endfm
Rewrite rules are used to mimic the effect of the four inference rules
· σ(g) = 1〈g 7→ x ↑, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 1
· σ(g) = 1〈g 7→ x ↓, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 0
·
x ∈ H〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := X
·
〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉 −→ skip
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mod AUX-SEMANTICS-10 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-9 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op <_,_> : ProductionRule State -> [Action] .
crl < [G -> Y +], (Sigma,H) > => (Y := 1)
if Sigma(G) == 1 .
crl < [G -> Y -], (Sigma,H) > => (Y := 0)
if Sigma(G) == 1 .
crl < [G -> Y D], (Sigma,H) > => (Y := X)
if Y in H .
rl < [G -> Y D], (Sigma,H) > => skip .
endm
Notice that the <_,_> constructor yields a term of kind [Action] (see
[15, §3.5]), but without a proper sort. This will be crucial when we define the
rewrite rule corresponding to −→P to ensure that all of the 〈rj, (σ,H)〉 get
rewritten according to the above rules into actions aj; that is, terms of sort
Action.
The top-level rewrite rule that ultimately gives us −→P relies on rewrit-
ing logic equivalents for σ[a1, . . . , am] and H[σ, a1, . . . , am]. We start with
σ[a1, . . . , am], which was defined in Section 9.2 according to
σ[a1, . . . , am](x) =

1 if A|x = {x := 1}
0 if A|x = {x := 0}
X if A|x = {x := X} or |A|x| > 1
σ(x) if A|x = ∅
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fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-11 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-9 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op _[_] :
Map{Variable,Level} 2^Action -> Map{Variable,Level} .
eq empty [A] = empty .
eq (Y |-> V , Sigma) [A] = sigma’(Y, V, A) , (Sigma[A]) .
op sigma’ : Variable Level 2^Action -> Entry{Variable,Level} .
ceq sigma’(Y, V, A) = Y |-> 1
if (Y := 1) == A | Y .
ceq sigma’(Y, V, A) = Y |-> 0
if (Y := 0) == A | Y .
ceq sigma’(Y, V, A) = Y |-> X
if (Y := X) == (A | Y) or | (A | Y) | > 1 .
eq sigma’(Y, V, A) = Y |-> V [owise] .
endfm
H[σ, a1, . . . , am] is similarly straightforward. Following the definition from
Section 9.2, H[σ, a1, . . . , am] ⊆ VariableP such that for all y ∈ VariableP ,
y ∈ H[σ, a1, . . . , am] iff
• y ∈ HazardP,σ,σ[a1,...,am], or
• y ∈ H and σ(y) = σ[a1, . . . , am](y).
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fmod AUX-SEMANTICS-12 is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-11 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
op HPred : Variable ProductionRuleSet State 2^Action -> Bool .
ceq HPred(Y, P, (Sigma,H), A) = true
if HazardPred(Y, P, Sigma, Sigma[A]) .
ceq HPred(Y, P, (Sigma,H), A) = true
if Y in H
/\ Sigma(Y) == (Sigma[A])(Y) .
eq HPred(Y, P, (Sigma,H), A) = false [owise] .
op _[_,_]‘{_} :
2^Variable Map{Variable,Level} 2^Action
ProductionRuleSet -> 2^Variable .
eq H [Sigma, A] {P} = HFilter(Variable-{P}, P, (Sigma,H), A) .
op HFilter :
2^Variable ProductionRuleSet State
2^Action -> 2^Variable .
eq HFilter(empty , P, (Sigma,H), A) = empty .
eq HFilter((Y,YS), P, (Sigma,H), A) =
if HPred(Y, P, (Sigma,H), A) then Y else empty fi ,
HFilter(YS, P, (Sigma,H), A) .
endfm
Finally, we give a conditional rewrite rule that captures the earlier top-level
inference rule
〈r1, (σ,H)〉 −→ a1 . . . 〈rm, (σ,H)〉 −→ am
(σ,H) −→P (σ[a1, . . . , am], H[σ, a1, . . . , am])
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mod SEMANTICS is pr AUX-SEMANTICS-12 .
pr AUX-SEMANTICS-10 .
... --- meta-variable declarations omitted
vars A : 2^Action .
sort Configuration .
op _{_} : State ProductionRuleSet -> Configuration .
op mkActs : ProductionRuleSet State -> [2^Action] .
eq mkActs(empty, (Sigma,H)) = empty .
eq mkActs(R P , (Sigma,H)) =
< R, (Sigma,H) > , mkActs(P, (Sigma,H)) .
crl (Sigma,H) {P} => (Sigma[A],H[Sigma,A] {P}) {P}
if mkActs(P, (Sigma,H)) => A .
endm
There are a couple of ways in which the rewriting logic definition appears
different from the corresponding inference rule. First, note that since we are
using the logical symbol −→ (from rewriting logic) to define −→P (from our
static semantics), the production rule set parameter must be encoded in the
terms being rewritten. This is the purpose of the _{_} constructor.
The second difference is that the single condition of the rewrite rule above
mkActs(P, (Sigma,H)) => A
serves the purpose of the multiple premises of the inference rule
〈r1, (σ,H)〉 −→ a1 . . . 〈rm, (σ,H)〉 −→ am
(σ,H) −→P (σ[a1, . . . , am], H[σ, a1, . . . , am])
The reason for this difference is that the number of premises, m, is not fixed,
but rather scales dynamically with the size of the production rule set; in
rewriting logic, however, the number of conditions in a rewrite rule is fixed.
Finally, it is important to note that while mkActs is only kinded, the vari-
able A has sort 2^Action. This ensures that all of the individual production
rules are rewritten to actions in the condition, before a computation step is
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taken.
9.4 Relative Correctness ofMPRS and RPRS
This section establishes a strong bisimulation between two transition systems:
one induced by the mathematical semantics of production rule sets, MPRS ,
and the other induced by the executable semantics given in rewriting logic,
RPRS . In so doing, confidence is raised in the correctness of the two semantic
formalizations as well is in the use of the executable semantics as an analysis
tool; in particular, in the model checking results presented later in Section
9.5.
The strong bisimulation result is obtained as follows. First, we define a
function, castP , that maps states in the mathematical semantics to corre-
sponding states in the rewriting logic semantics. Subsequent to this, we make
explicit the transition systems associated to both the semantics; and finally
we show that the two are strongly bisimilar via castP . This result yields as
corollaries that hazard freedom and deadlock freedom, which are also defined
formally later in this section, are preserved by the mapping between two
semantics.
We introduce a number of mathematical conventions that are used through-
out this section. First, we assume that RPRS is specified as
RPRS = (ΣPRS, EPRS, RPRS) .
Use of the sort name Configuration is overloaded to stand also for the set
TΣPRS/EPRS ,Configuration
of elements of TΣPRS/EPRS of sort Configuration; the distinction will be clear
from context.
9.4.1 castP
Fix a production rule set P . Our bisimulation relation is defined by a function
castP taking each state (σ,H) ∈ StateP to a corresponding term in the
rewriting logic specification RPRS ; specifically, castP ((σ,H)) will be a term
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of sort Configuration. That is, applying the overloading of Configuration
specified above, castP is a function
castP : StateP −→ Configuration.
castP is defined at the top by calling two functions, one that recurses
over the structure of an element of StateP , yielding a term of sort State, and
a second recursing over the structure of a production rule set and yielding a
term of sort ProductionRuleSet; specifically,
castP (s) = (cast(s)){cast(P )}.
To simplify the presentation note that we have used “cast” in an ad-hoc
polymorphic way to denote both the function that converts the state part, as
well as the function that converts the production rule set. cast will also name
all similar functions converting other types of objects in the mathematical
semantics into terms in the rewriting logic semantics.
The definition of cast functions is largely routine. For most constructs
in the mathematical formalization, there is a corresponding operator in the
rewriting logic semantics with the same arguments and we simply generate
that operator and then recurse. For example, individual production rules are
cast as
cast(g 7→ xd) = [cast(g) -> cast(x) cast(d)]
At the bottom are the atomic elements of the syntax, such as variables and
the transition directions, which are cast as
cast(↑) = + cast(↓) = -
Casting sets of things highlights an interesting point. The following
definition is unambiguous and correct in rewriting logic, as well as in Maude,
by asserting that the operator __, juxtaposition, is associative, commutative,
and idempotent. Specifically in Maude, its predefined SET module [15, §9.12.2]
employs equational attributes [15, §4.4.1] and associate-commutative rewriting
for associativity and commutativity, and for idempotency an explicit equation
is used.
cast({r1, . . . , rm}) = cast(r1) · · · cast(rm)
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Similarly, valuation functions of the form σ : VariableP −→ Level can be
viewed as sets of pairs, and are cast accordingly into
cast({(y1, v1), . . . , (ym, vm)}) =
cast(y1) |-> cast(v1) , . . . , cast(ym) |-> cast(vm)
By way of summarizing, consider the production rule set corresponding
to a single nand-gate
P = {x1 ∧ x2 7→ y ↓,¬x1 ∨ ¬x2 7→ y ↑}
and a state s = (σ, ∅) where σ(x1) = σ(x2) = σ(y) = 1. Then castP (s) yields
the following term
(’x1 |-> 1 , ’x2 |-> 1, ’y |-> 1, empty)
{ [ ’x1 and ’x2 -> ’y - ]
[ (not ’x1) or (not ’x2) -> ’y + ] }
The following lemma will be useful to simplify some of the proofs given
later.
Lemma 9.4.1. Let P be a production rule set.




Having defined castP we are now in a position to state our main result
establishing the relative correctness of MPRS and RPRS . For notational
convenience and symmetry, for a given production rule set P , clear from
context, we use −→M to denote the relation −→P defined according to the
mathematical semantics MPRS . Similarly, we use −→R to denote the one
step rewriting relation induced by RPRS on terms of sort Configuration.
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castP , when seen as a relation, is a strong bisimulation between TM and TR.
The following lemma will be useful in the proof of the above theorem,
which is given afterward.
Lemma 9.4.2. Let P be a production rule set. For all g 7→ xd ∈ P , (σ,H) ∈
StateP , and a ∈ ActionP , we have
〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉 −→ a
according to MPRS , if and only if
RPRS ` cast(〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉) −→ cast(a)
Proof. By cases on a:
• (skip): It is enough to show that both 〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉 −→ skip, with
respect to MPRS , and cast(〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉) −→ cast(skip), with
respect to RPRS , hold unconditionally.
That 〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉 −→ skip holds unconditionally with respect to
MPRS is established according to the rule (where the variables used in
the rule are not the same as those above; they are implicitly quantified)
·
〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉 −→ skip
Similarly, with respect to RPRS ,
RPRS ` cast(〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉) =
<[cast(g)->cast(x)cast(d)],(cast(σ),cast(H))>
−→ skip = cast(skip)
due to the rewriting rule
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rl < [G -> Y D], (Sigma,H) > => skip .
• (y := 1): (⇒) Suppose 〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉 −→ y := 1 holds with respect
to MPRS ; we show that also cast(〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉) −→ cast(y := 1)
with respect to RPRS .
Clearly, 〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉 −→ y := 1 may only hold with respect to
MPRS according to the rule
· σ(g) = 1〈g 7→ x ↑, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 1
which implies that σ(g) = 1, and also that d =↑ and y = x. Therefore,
cast(〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉)
= <[cast(g)->cast(x)+],(cast(σ),cast(H))>
and matches the left-hand side of the rewrite rule
crl < [G -> Y +], (Sigma,H) > => (Y := 1)
if Sigma(G) == 1 .
As an exercise, we leave that σ(g) = 1 implies also the condition of the
rewriting rule: cast(σ)(cast(g)) == 1. This yields that cast(〈g 7→
xd, (σ,H)〉) −→ cast(x) := 1 = cast(y := 1), as needed.
(⇐) Suppose RPRS ` cast(〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉) −→ cast(y := 1).
cast(y := 1) = cast(y) := 1, and it is clear that the only way this
rewriting can occur is by application of the rule
crl < [G -> Y +], (Sigma,H) > => (Y := 1)
if Sigma(G) == 1 .
Through pattern matching, we get again that cast(y) = cast(x) and
therefore that y = x; cast(d) = +, which implies that d =↑; and that
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cast(σ)(cast(g)) == 1. Then, assuming that cast(σ)(cast(g)) == 1
implies that σ(g) = 1, which is left as an exercise, the rule
· σ(g) = 1〈g 7→ x ↑, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 1
applies to 〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉 = 〈g 7→ x ↑, (σ,H)〉 which ultimately yields
the desired result that 〈g 7→ xd, (σ,H)〉 −→ (x := 1) = (y := 1).
• The remaining cases are similar.
We are now in a position to give a proof of Theorem 9.4.1.
Proof of Theorem 9.4.1. (TR simulates TM): Let (σ,H), (σ′, H ′) ∈ StateP be
such that
(σ,H) −→M (σ′, H ′)
According to Definition 9.2.2, there exist actions a1, . . . , am such that: (a) for
each aj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, 〈rj, (σ,H)〉 −→ aj, and (b)
(σ′, H ′) = (σ[a1, . . . , am], H[σ, a1, . . . , am])
Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that
castP ((σ,H)) −→R castP ((σ[a1, . . . , am], H[σ, a1, . . . , am]))
In order to show that the above relation holds, we will apply the top-level
rewrite rule defined in RPRS , namely
crl (Sigma,H) {P} => (Sigma[A],H[Sigma,A] {P}) {P}
if mkActs(P, (Sigma,H)) => A .
and Lemma 9.4.2. Expanding castP ((σ,H)) shows that it matches the
left-hand side of this rule:
castP ((σ,H)) = (cast(σ),cast(H)){cast(P )}
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For the condition, we first expand mkActs according to its definition, yielding
mkActs(cast(r1) . . . cast(rm),(cast(σ),cast(H))) =
<cast(r1),(cast(σ),cast(H))>, . . . ,<cast(rm),(cast(σ),cast(H))>
and which, according to Lemma 9.4.2, rewrites to
cast(a1), . . . ,cast(am)
Therefore, by the above rewrite rule, which is part of RPRS , we obtain that
castP ((σ,H)) rewrites to a term (Sigma’,H’){P} with
Sigma’ = cast(σ)[cast(a1), . . . ,cast(am)]
and
H’ = cast(H)[cast(σ),cast(a1), . . . ,cast(am)]{cast(P )}
Expanding castP ((σ[a1, . . . , am], H[σ, a1, . . . , am])), one obtains a term
(cast(σ[a1, . . . , am]),cast(H[σ, a1, . . . , am])){cast(P )}
and so it remains to be proved that H’ = cast(H[σ, a1, . . . , am]), which is left
as an exercise.
(TM simulates TR): Let (σ,H) ∈ StateP and let c′ be a term of sort
Configuration such that
castP ((σ,H)) −→R c′
As there is only a single rewrite rule in RPRS that operates on terms of the
same kind as the sort Configuration, namely
crl (Sigma,H) {P} => (Sigma[A],H[Sigma,A] {P}) {P}
if mkActs(P, (Sigma,H)) => A .
c′ must be of the form
(cast(σ)[A],cast(H)[cast(σ),A]{cast(P )}){cast(P )}
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for some term A of sort 2^Action reachable via rewriting from the term
mkActs(cast(P ),(cast(σ),cast(H)))
Appealing to Lemma 9.4.2, and to Lemma 9.4.1 about the injectivity of cast,
it is enough to show that, letting P = {r1, . . . , rm}, A is of the form
cast(a1), . . . ,cast(am)
with a1, . . . , am ∈ ActionP , such that for each aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, cast(aj) is had
through rewriting a term of the form <cast(rj),(cast(σ),cast(H))>. This
establishes, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m, that
RPRS ` <cast(rj),(cast(σ),cast(H))> −→ cast(aj),
and therefore by Lemma 9.4.2 also that 〈rj, (σ,H)〉 −→ aj. Then applying
the rule
〈r1, (σ,H)〉 −→ a1 . . . 〈rm, (σ,H)〉 −→ am
(σ,H) −→P (σ[a1, . . . , am], H[σ, a1, . . . , am])
we get that (σ,H) −→M (σ[a1, . . . , am], H[σ, a1, . . . , am]). Again, it remains
to be shown that the _[_] operators, for each component of the state, corre-
spond, which follows according to a straightforward induction.
The two correctness properties that we are concerned with, hazard freedom
and deadlock freedom, can both be phrased in terms of simple reachability
queries. For a transition system A = (A,−→⊆ A×A) and an element a ∈ A,
we let ReachA(a) ⊆ A denote the set of reachable states from a; i.e.
{a′ ∈ A | a −→∗ a′}.
The relative correctness ofMPRS and RPRS with respect to these correctness
properties will fall out through instances of the following corollary to Theorem
9.4.1.
Corollary 9.4.1. Let P be a production rule set and s0 ∈ StateP . For any
pair of predicates
QM ⊆ StateP and QR ⊆ Configuration
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such that s ∈ QM if and only if castP (s) ∈ QR, then
ReachTM(s0) ⊆ QM if and only if ReachTR(castP (s0)) ⊆ QR
Proof of Corollary 9.4.1. (⇒): Suppose that ReachTM(s0) ⊆ QM; we demon-
strate by induction on TR reachability derivations (these transition systems
have finite carriers) that also
ReachTR(castP (s0)) ⊆ QR.
The induction hypothesis asserts that, for a reachable configuration
c ∈ ReachTR(castP (s0))
both of the following conditions hold: (1) c ∈ castP (StateP ), and for the
unique s ∈ StateP , guaranteed by Lemma 9.4.1, such that castP (s) = c, (2)
s ∈ ReachTM(s0). This implies that s ∈ QM and therefore that c ∈ QR.
The induction hypothesis clearly holds for c0 = castP (s0). Now, let
castP (s) = c ∈ Configuration
be such that it has both properties of the induction hypothesis and suppose
that c −→R c′ with c′ ∈ Configuration. It follows from Theorem 9.4.1
and the induction hypothesis that there exists a s′ ∈ StateP such that
s −→M s′ and castP (s′) = c′. This implies that c ∈ castP (StateP ) and that
s′ ∈ ReachTM(s0).
(⇐): This direction follows similarly, but without the need of Lemma
9.4.1.
9.4.3 Hazard Freedom
Hazard freedom essentially asserts the impossibility of reaching a state where
any node takes the value X. Let P be a production rule set. We define a
predicate Hazard !P ⊆ StateP such that for all (σ,H) ∈ StateP , (σ,H) ∈
Hazard !P if and only if there exists a y ∈ VariableP with σ(y) = X.
Definition 9.4.1. Let P be a production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level .
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We say that MPRS exhibits hazard freedom with respect to P and σ if and
only if for all
(σ′, H ′) ∈ ReachTM((σ, ∅))
(σ′, H ′) /∈ Hazard !P .
In rewriting logic, we can give an equationally-defined function, Hazard!,
which is essentially the characteristic function of Hazard !P .
op Hazard! : Configuration -> Bool [frozen] .
eq Hazard!(((Y |-> X, SIGMA), H){P}) = true .
eq Hazard!((SIGMA, H){P}) = false [owise] .
Definition 9.4.2. Let P be a production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level .
We say that RPRS exhibits hazard freedom with respect to P and σ if and only
if for all
c′ ∈ ReachTR(castP ((σ, ∅)))
such that we have Hazard!(c′) = false.
Proposition 9.4.1. Let P be a production rule set and σ : VariableP −→
Level . RPRS exhibits hazard freedom with respect to P and σ if and only if
MPRS exhibits hazard freedom with respect to P and σ.
Proof. According to Corollary 9.4.1, it is sufficient to show that for all
s /∈ StateP , s ∈ Hazard !P if and only if Hazard!(castP (s)) = false. This
is straightforward by induction on states.
9.4.4 Deadlock Freedom
As with hazard freedom, deadlock freedom will be characterized with respect
to a production rule set and an initial valuation. It is essentially an assertion
of the impossibility of reaching a state where no rules are enabled. One small
difference from the definition of enablement is needed to account for X values,
however. Equivalently, it asserts the impossibility of reaching a state where
the only transitions that are possible are idle transitions.
Let P be a production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level and recall from
Section 9.2.3 the definition of EnabledP,σ ⊆ VariableP . For all y ∈ VariableP ,
y ∈ EnabledP,σ if and only if either
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• σ(y) 6= 0 and there exists a g 7→ y ↓ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1, or
• σ(y) 6= 1 and there exists a g 7→ y ↑ ∈ P such that σ(g) = 1.
We define a new predicate, SwitchableP,σ,H ⊆ VariableP , similar to EnabledP,σ,
but also with a parameter H ⊆ VariableP . For a variable y ∈ VariableP and a
state (σ,H) ∈ StateP , y ∈ SwitchableP,σ,H if and only if either y ∈ EnabledP,σ
or y 6= X and y ∈ H.
The definition of deadlock freedom is then analogous to the definition
of hazard freedom, with SwitchableP,σ,H 6= ∅ serving the purpose of σ /∈
Hazard !P .
Definition 9.4.3. Let P be a production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level .
We say that MPRS exhibits deadlock freedom with respect to P and σ if and
only if for all
(σ′, H ′) ∈ ReachTM((σ, ∅))
SwitchableP,σ′,H′ 6= ∅.
Above in Section 9.3 we defined the rewriting logic equivalent to the
conditions that define whether a particular variable is in the set of things
that are enabled. This was denoted EnabledPred. We define a similar notion
for SwitchableP,σ,H , called SwitchPred.
op SwitchPred : Variable ProductionRuleSet
Map{Variable,Level} 2^Variable -> Bool .
ceq SwitchPred(Y, P, Sigma, H) = true
if Sigma(Y) =/= 1
/\ [G+ -> Y +] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G+) == 1 .
ceq SwitchPred(Y, P, Sigma, H) = true
if Sigma(Y) =/= 0
/\ [G- -> Y -] P’ := P
/\ Sigma(G-) == 1 .
ceq SwitchPred(Y, P, Sigma, H) = true
if Sigma(Y) =/= X
/\ Y in H .
eq SwitchPred(Y, P, Sigma, H) = false [owise] .
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To get Switchable from SwitchPred, we simply need a function that gets
all of the variables from a production rule set and then filters the result by
SwitchPred. This is entirely routine, and can be had in exactly the same
way as we defined for, for example, InterfFilter.
Definition 9.4.4. Let P be a production rule set and σ : VariableP −→ Level .
We say that P exhibits deadlock freedom with respect to P and σ if and only
if for all
(SIGMA’,H’){P} ∈ ReachTR(castP ((σ, ∅)))
Switchable-{P,SIGMA’,H’} 6= empty.
Proposition 9.4.2. Let P be a production rule set and σ : VariableP −→
Level . RPRS exhibits deadlock freedom with respect to P and σ if and only if
MPRS exhibits deadlock freedom with respect to P and σ.
Proof. Similar to that for preservation of hazard freedom.
9.5 Automated Hazard and Deadlock Freedom
Analysis
This section investigates the feasibility of using our executable semantics and
the formal tools provided by Maude to prove hazard freedom and deadlock
freedom, two properties that every asynchronous circuit must typically satisfy
in order to be considered correct. All of the Maude source code and example
circuits used for experimentation are open source and available at [50].
Section 9.5.1 briefly describes each of the asynchronous circuits we are
subjecting to analysis. Section 9.5.2 describes the commands necessary to
check hazard and deadlock freedom using Maude and the semantics RPRS
presented in Section 9.3. These results demonstrate the need for some
optimizations, which are described in Section 9.5.3, followed in Section 9.5.4
by modified analysis results with the optimizations enabled. Due to the highly
asynchronous nature of production rule sets, there is an enormous state space
explosion even for simple circuits; therefore, the optimizations we present are
essential to model check circuits in practice.
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9.5.1 Circuits Analyzed
Our experiments cover six circuits of size varying from 12 production rules
up to 130 production rules. The complete production rule set for each circuit
can be found in [50].
• 3InverterRing (12 production rules): A ring oscillator is typically
the first circuit used to demonstrate the viability of a new process
technology.
• ClosedBuffer (26 production rules): Simple logical buffer stages are
generally used to balance parallel paths in an asynchronous pipeline.
Closing the buffer requires a source to produce tokens to send into the
buffer and a sink to empty the buffer.
• Toggle (28 production rules): A circuit that alternates between sourcing
a one or a zero token are essential components of most test harnesses.
• PCHBAndFixed (66 production rules): The PCHB (pre-charged half
buffer) is a customized quasi delay-insensitive gate that is electrically
similar to a stage of domino logic. A PCHB can be used in a data-path
to perform computation, it can be used for control, or it can act as a
combination thereof. In this instance the input to the PCHB is a fixed
value.
• 1BitFullAdderFixed (118 production rules): The bit-slice ripple-carry
adder is ubiquitous in digital VLSI design. This variant is implemented
as a quasi delay-insensitive PCHB with the input of the adder tied to a
fixed value source.
• PCHBAndToggle (130 production rules): This instance of a PCHB AND-
gate makes use of the toggle element to alternate the input pattern thus
generating each possible input permutation.
9.5.2 Experiments, without Optimizations
The hazard and deadlock freedom analyses are performed using Maude’s
search command [15, §12]. search does a breadth-first search enumerating
all terms reachable from a given initial term through rewriting. If this set
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of reachable terms is finite and one is interested in checking computable
invariants, as is the case for both hazard and deadlock freedom, then search
acts as a decision procedure for that invariant.
As described above in Section 9.4.3, the invariant we want to check for
hazard freedom is the negation of Hazard!, or alternatively, that no reachable
state satisfies Hazard!. We use this second formulation, which is accomplished
in Maude with the following command,
search [1] initialC =>* C:Configuration such that Hazard!(C) .
The term initialC equals castP ((σ, ∅)) where σ denotes the valuation
of nodes of the device at reset. If no solution is returned, then the device
is considered hazard-free with respect to that reset state. If not, then the
device has a potential hazard.
The situation for deadlock freedom is analogous, except that the invariant
for deadlock freedom is that Switchable-{_,_,_} should never be empty;
again, we use the dual formalization, however. The appropriate command is
(The reason why the search command cannot use the =>! modality is because
empty sets of actions can always produce idle transitions.)
search [1] initialC =>* (SIGMA’,H’){P} such that
Switchable-{P,SIGMA’,H’} == empty .
Applying these checks to each of the circuits described above in Section
9.5.1 we find that none of the checks are able to finish due to exhausting the
system’s available memory resources, which are substantial for a contemporary
system (24GiB). For consistency with the presentation of subsequent results,
this initial experiment is reported in Figure 9.2. Clearly, some form of
simplification/optimization is needed to reduce memory consumption and
gain tractability even for the very small circuits we are considering.
9.5.3 Performance Optimizations
Two optimizations to the rewriting logic semantics, RPRS , are now developed.
These are specifically aimed at addressing excessive memory consumption
and result in tractable analysis of all but our largest circuit, PCHBAndToggle.
In the case of the largest circuit, the analysis is still improved in the sense
that it goes from being memory bound to being computation bound.
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Circuit Name Size Hazard Freedom Deadlock Freedom
3InverterRing 12rl MEM MEM
ClosedBuffer 26rl MEM MEM
Toggle 28rl MEM MEM
PCHBAndFixed 66rl MEM MEM
1BitFullAdderFixed 118rl MEM MEM
PCHBAndToggle 130rl MEM MEM
Figure 9.2: Hazard and Deadlock Freedom Analysis Results, without Opti-
mizations Maude 2.5, Intel Xeon X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MiB L3), 24GiB RAM,
64-bit Linux, kernel version 2.6.18. “TIME” means the experiment timed out
(30 minutes), and “MEM” means it reached a set memory limit (4GiB).
Out-of-control memory usage is primarily due to the condition of the
top-level rewrite rule in RPRS , which, recalling from Section 9.3, is
mkActs(P, (Sigma,I)) => A.
Suppose that we have the production rule set
[ ’x -> ’z -]
[ ’y -> ’w -]
[not ’y -> ’w +]
Applying mkActs to this set yields the following term of kind [2^Action]
< [ ’x -> ’z -], (Sigma,I) > ,
< [ ’y -> ’w -], (Sigma,I) > ,
< [not ’y -> ’w +], (Sigma,I) >
and each of the elements of this set are rewritten one-by-one until a term of
sort 2^Action is obtained, e.g. say
’z := 0 ,
skip ,
’w := X
In deriving this term, Maude is necessarily inefficient, because it cannot
know that the rewriting of each element of the set is independent from the
others; that is, outside of the rule chosen to rewrite each element, the order
in which these rewrites are applied is inconsequential, so rewriting
< [ ’x -> ’z -], (Sigma,I) > ,
skip ,
< [not ’y -> ’w +], (Sigma,I) >
165
and then
’z := 0 ,
skip ,
< [not ’y -> ’w +], (Sigma,I) >
does not need to be considered separately from first rewriting
’z := 0 ,
< [ ’y -> ’w -], (Sigma,I) > ,
< [not ’y -> ’w +], (Sigma,I) >
followed by
’z := 0 ,
skip ,
< [not ’y -> ’w +], (Sigma,I) >
Maude must, however, attempt all 2k possible orderings, where k is the
number of production rules, for what is really just a single possible next state.
The independent nature of the rewriting steps can be communicated to
Maude by, instead of producing a set of terms to rewrite, having mkActs
produce a list with some arbitrary order and then using matching to force
the rewriting to iterate over this list.
The second optimization reduces the possible sets of actions that, at the
condition of the top-most rewrite rule in RPRS , become bound to the variable
A. Accomplishing this reduction is done through a small modification to the
inference rules for −→ in Definition 9.2.2, so that, for example,
· σ(g) = 1〈g 7→ x ↑, (σ,H)〉 −→ x := 1
is modified so that the side condition includes also that σ(x) 6= 1; that is
σ(g) = 1 becomes σ(g) = 1 and σ(x) 6= 1. Of course, this change must
get reflected at the rewriting logic level as well. The correctness of this
optimization, while not proved in detail, follows from the invariance of the
updates to σ and H during a transition when, for example, σ(x) = 1 and one
of the updating actions is x := 1.
9.5.4 Experiments, with Optimizations
The result of applying each optimization in isolation, as well as the aggregate
effect of applying both in tandem, is conveyed in the second table listed in of
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Circuit Name Size list opt switch opt all opts
3InverterRing 12rl
no
– states – 682ms




























– 1, 224, 675
rewrites





1, 552, 737, 662
rewrites
1BitFullAdderFixed 118rl TIME MEM TIME
PCHBAndToggle 130rl TIME MEM TIME
Figure 9.3: Hazard Freedom Analysis Results, with Optimizations. Maude
2.5, Intel Xeon X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MiB L3), 24GiB RAM, 64-bit Linux, kernel
version 2.6.18. “TIME” means the experiment timed out (30 minutes), and
“MEM” means it reached a set memory limit (4GiB).
Figure 9.3 for hazard freedom, and conveyed through Figure 9.4 for deadlock
freedom. With these optimizations, some of our example circuits can be
checked quite quickly. Scalability clearly remains an issue, however, even
after applying the above optimizations, though they accomplish much over
the original semantics; though of course RPRS was designed for conceptual
clarity, above all.
Therefore, more optimizations along the lines of those above, as well as
clever new ideas will be needed in the future to make automatic checks for
hazards and deadlock reliably tractable for modern circuits. Some additional
tractability can be gained by looking at more practical timing assumptions,
described in the next section, which further reduce the amount of concurrency.
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Circuit Name Size list opt switch opt all opts





2, 517, 712, 268
rewrites
ClosedBuffer 26rl MEM MEM TIME




– 177, 563, 797
rewrites





1, 886, 088, 552
rewrites
1BitFullAdderFixed 118rl TIME MEM TIME
PCHBAndToggle 130rl TIME MEM TIME
Figure 9.4: Deadlock Freedom Analysis Results, with Optimizations. Maude
2.5, Intel Xeon X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MiB L3), 24GiB RAM, 64-bit Linux, kernel
version 2.6.18. “TIME” means the experiment timed out (30 minutes), and
“MEM” means it reached a set memory limit (4GiB).
9.6 Speed-Independent and Quasi-Delay-Insensitive
Circuits
The primary objective of this paper is to improve upon our semantics work
in [55, 47] for the unrestricted, or delay-insensitive case. With that said,
it is also worthwhile to look briefly at analysis statistics for asynchronous
circuits under two other timing assumptions, speed-independence [81, 79] and
quasi-delay-insensitivity [65, 68], which are considered practical for developing
large-scale devices. This section presents those results, which are based on an
implementation of these timing assumptions in Maude that was developed in
accordance with [55].
Of course, a very desirable avenue for future work is to give a similar
treatment to these cases that is given in this paper for the delay-insensitive case.
And, as speed-independence and quasi-delay-insensitivity simply constrain
the set of possible behaviors exhibited in the delay-insensitive case, the
infrastructure developed in this paper could be used directly in such an
endeavor. However, this is a very substantial undertaking and outside the
scope of the current work.
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At a high level, both speed-independence and quasi-delay-insensitivity
represent restrictions on relative delay of signals on forks, which occur when
the output of a gate fans out to the input of two or more subsequent gates.
Speed-independence imposes the restriction that if one branch of a fork
switches to a new level, then all branches must switch simultaneously. On the
other hand, quasi-delay-insensitivity allows for some branches of a fork to have
stabilized before others do, but only until a sequence of “acknowledgments”
from the stabilized branch courses through the circuit to the input of the gate
connected to the non-stabilized branch of the original fork (see [55, 70] for
more details).
The behaviors admitted by delay-insensitivity, quasi-delay-insensitivity,
and speed-independence are related as follows: delay-insensitivity admits
strictly more behaviors than quasi-delay-insensitivity, which in turn admits
strictly more behaviors than speed-independence. Both of the more restrictive
timing assumptions reduce the set of possible device behaviors, thereby making
formal analysis easier. The trade-off is that one must analyze the circuit
separately to ensure that the assumptions made about timing are actually
valid given the physics of the device.
In addition, the more restrictive timing assumptions have the added,
although somewhat counter intuitive, advantage of being theoretically more
capable, in the sense that the delay-insensitive timing assumption is so
permissive that the set of useful production rule sets becomes limited because
more of them imply hazardous circuit behaviors. A proof of this fact is
developed in [64]. It is also worth noting that, for hazard freedom, we have
shown previously that speed-independence and quasi-delay-insensitivity are
equivalent, yielding a simpler check for the property relative to the quasi-
delay-insensitivity assumption. The proof of this fact is developed in [55].
Figures 9.5 and 9.6 present the results of analyzing the circuits from
Section 9.5.1 under the more restrictive timing assumptions. Despite the
fact that the number of behaviors is reduced, we found ourselves still unable
to exhaustively prove hazard-freedom and deadlock-freedom for our largest
circuit, PCHBAndToggle.
Finally, we experimented with an optimization specifically tailored for
the speed-independence case, where we simply removed production rules
corresponding to wires. With this optimization we were able to check hazard-
freedom for all of the example circuits listed above, as shown in Figure 9.7.
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Due to the result from [55] cited above, this implies hazard-freedom in the
quasi-delay-insensitive case as well.
9.7 Conclusion
This paper improves upon our earlier work in [55, 47], providing a cleaner for-
mal semantics of production rule sets for the delay-insensitive case, including
both a mathematical semantics and an executable semantics in rewriting logic;
which is, to the best of our knowledge, the first of its kind. The utility of our
work here is, first and foremost, toward promoting a common understanding
of what production rule sets mean, especially to those entering the field of
asynchronous circuit design; and, secondly for the purpose of formal analysis
of such circuits.
Regarding formal analysis, the mathematical semantics is perhaps best
suited as the foundation for proving meta-theorems about production rule
sets, such as we did in [55]. The executable rewriting logic semantics is instead
better suited to establishing the functional correctness of individual circuits,
as certain obligations may be discharged automatically, as we showed above
and in [47].
A number of challenges remain, some rather daunting. Firstly, the speed-
independence and quasi delay-insensitivity cases from [55] should be further
developed along the lines of what we did here for the delay-insensitive case.
Second, there is the issue of scalability; we have been able to automatically
check hazard freedom and deadlock freedom for circuits up to about one
hundred production rules, but modern circuits can easily be four orders of
magnitude larger.
One possibility is to investigate probabilistic methods in more detail,
which are highly parallelizable and scale extremely well. Existing work on
probabilistic rewrite systems and statistical model checking [2, 3] allows for
a rewriting-based approach to continue to be used, and perhaps even build
directly on our work here.
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Circuit Name Size delay-insensitive speed-independence
3InverterRing 12rl
no









– states – 372ms


























– 55, 564, 688
rewrites
1BitFullAdderFixed 118rl – –
PCHBAndToggle 130rl – –





















2, 679 states –
83, 471ms




Figure 9.5: Hazard-freedom model checking results. Maude 2.5, Intel Xeon
X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MB L3), 24GB RAM, 64-bit Linux, kernel version 2.6.18.
“–” means timed out or exhausted memory resources.
171





– 9, 051, 904
rewrites
yes



















– 55, 523, 752
rewrites
1BitFullAdderFixed 118rl – –
PCHBAndToggle 130rl – –



























Figure 9.6: Deadlock-freedom model checking results. Maude 2.5, Intel Xeon
X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MB L3), 24GB RAM, 64-bit Linux, kernel version 2.6.18.
“–” means timed out or exhausted memory resources.
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Circuit Name Size speed-independence
3InverterRing 12rl
yes
6 states – 1ms
– 9, 514 rewrites
ClosedBuffer 26rl
yes
















1, 800 states –
117, 925ms




2, 844 states –
76, 436ms
– 298, 696, 957
rewrites
Figure 9.7: Hazard-freedom model checking results, “no wires” optimization
for speed-independence. Maude 2.5, Intel Xeon X5570 (2.93GHz, 8MB L3),




This chapter develops an executable semantics in rewriting logic for a language
called BTRS [21], which is a simplified form of a more feature-rich hardware
description language called Bluespec [8]. Bluespec is based on guarded atomic
actions, or rules, and aims to realize the productivity and correctness benefits
of a modern high-level language; what sets it apart is that it attempts to do
this in the context of digital design, where the evolution of languages has
languished. The Bluespec compiler can be used as part of a synthesis chain
generating efficient hardware from Bluespec source.
The syntax of BTRS and a big-step operational semantics [43] are devel-
oped in [21], and it is upon that formalization that our executable one in
rewriting logic is based. Our aim in developing our formalization in rewrit-
ing logic is that it mimics the one from [21] extremely closely, so that the
correctness of the rewriting logic specification is straightforward.
In addition to the formalization of BTRS in rewriting logic, this chapter
makes a few additional contributions. First, a couple of quite small bugs in
the operational rules from [21] are discovered and fixed. Second, an explicit
rule, both in the style of [21] as well is in rewriting logic, is developed for
driving the execution of a BTRS program. Third, we present a small case
study involving a version of a completion buffer that, in some situations but
not all situations, may deadlock; we demonstrate how to use the execution
and formal analysis tools provided by our rewriting logic specification and
the rewriting logic tool Maude to expose this deadlock, something testing
could miss.
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m ::= Module name
[Register r v] // Regs w/ initial values
[Rule R a] // Rules
[ActMeth g λx.a] //Action method
[ValMeth f λx.e] //Value method
a ::= r := e // Register update
‖ if e then a // Conditional action
‖ a | a // Parallel composition
‖ a ; a // Sequential composition
‖ a when e // Guarded action
‖ (t = e in a) // Let action
‖ m.g(e) // Action methcall g of m
e ::= r // Register Read
‖ c // Constant Value
‖ t // Variable Reference
‖ e op e // Primitive Operation
‖ e ? e : e // Conditional Expression
‖ e when e // Guarded Expression
‖ (t = e in e) // Let Expression
‖ m.f(e) // Value Methcall f of m
op ::= && | || | ... // Primitive operations
Figure 10.1: BTRS Grammar (verbatim copy of [21, Figure 1]).
10.1 Syntax
The grammar defining BTRS syntax is shown in Figure 10.1; it is a verbatim
reprint of [21, Figure 1]. Each of the relevant syntactic categories, expressions,
actions, and so forth, is mapped to an associated sort in our rewriting logic
semantics; for example, expressions will become terms of sort Expression.
All of the sorts used in the rewriting logic specification of BTRS syntax,
save for one, are declared in the module SYNTAX-SKELETON, displayed next.
Program is commented out by necessity since, as we will see, it has a depen-
dency that cannot yet be resolved. In addition, a few sorts are included in the
rewriting logic semantics that have no analogous production in the grammar















--- sort Program (TBD)
endfm
Terms of each of these sorts are added through the notion of an extending
module importation in Maude [15, §8.1.2]. This is a common technique in
rewriting logic semantics [77, 19, 78], as it enhances modularity; for example,
we avoid having to fix a set of identifiers, values, or operators. See Section
10.3 for an example.
One of the main goals stated at the outset of this chapter was to develop
a rewriting logic semantics for BTRS that is “evidently correct”; that is,
representationally so near to the original semantics in [21] that its correctness
is essentially evident. In what follows, each segment of the rewriting logic
specification is accompanied by the associated portion of [21, Figure 1] from
which it was derived, so that the two specifications may be easily compared.
The syntax of expressions deviates only slightly from the original BTRS
grammar in Figure 10.1. A constructor is added for prefix expressions.
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e ::= r // Register Read
‖ c // Constant Value
‖ t // Variable Reference
‖ e op e // Primitive Operation
‖ e ? e : e // Conditional Expression
‖ e when e // Guarded Expression
‖ (t = e in e) // Let Expression
‖ m.f(e) // Value Methcall f of m
fmod EXPRESSION is extending SYNTAX-SKELETON .
subsort Identifier Literal < Expression .
op __ : PrefixOp Expression -> Expression .
op ___ : Expression InfixOp Expression -> Expression .
op _?_:_ : Expression Expression Expression -> Expression .
op _when_ : Expression Expression -> Expression .
op _=_in_ : Identifier Expression Expression -> Expression .
op _._(_) : Identifier Identifier Expression -> Expression .
endfm
Actions effect state changes, similar to how statements do in procedural
languages, though as we will see below, with substantial differences. The
only deviation in the rewriting logic specification is the addition of a second
dot for action-method invocation. This is simply to disambiguate it from
value-method invocation and to suppress a warning from Maude.
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a ::= r := e // Register update
‖ if e then a // Conditional action
‖ a | a // Parallel composition
‖ a ; a // Sequential composition
‖ a when e // Guarded action
‖ (t = e in a) // Let action
‖ m.g(e) // Action methcall g of m
fmod ACTION is extending SYNTAX-SKELETON .
op _:=_ : Identifier Expression -> Action .
op if_then_ : Expression Action -> Action .
op _|_ : Action Action -> Action .
op _;_ : Action Action -> Action .
op _when_ : Action Expression -> Action .
op _=_in_ : Identifier Expression Action -> Action .
op _.._(_) : Identifier Identifier Expression -> Action .
endfm
Modules are essentially named packages of different “components”: register
declarations, method definitions, and rules. Although the original BTRS
grammar does not associate individual productions to these components,
we find it convenient in the rewriting logic semantics to give each type of
component its own sort. We start with the individual components and then
move on to full modules.
m ::= Module name
[Register r v] // Regs w/ initial values
[Rule R a] // Rules
[ActMeth g λx.a] //Action method
[ValMeth f λx.e] //Value method
fmod COMPONENT is extending SYNTAX-SKELETON .
op Register__ : Identifier Literal -> Register .
op Rule__ : Identifier Action -> Rule .
op ActMeth_\_._ : Identifier Identifier Action -> Method .
op ValMeth_\_._ : Identifier Identifier Expression -> Method .
subsort Register Rule Method < Component .
endfm
178
With these module components defined, we simply instantiate the parame-
terized SET module from the Maude prelude [15, §9.12.2] with an appropriate
view and add a constructor symbol to get modules.
view Component from TRIV to SYNTAX-SKELETON is
sort Elt to Component .
endv
view Module from TRIV to SYNTAX-SKELETON is
sort Elt to Module .
endv
fmod PROGRAM is extending SYNTAX-SKELETON .
protecting SET{Component}
* ( op _‘,_ to __) .
protecting SET{Module}
* ( sort Set{Module} to Program
, op _‘,_ to __) .
op Module__ : Identifier Set{Component} -> Module .
endfm
The syntax of BTRS, according to our rewriting logic semantics, is then
just the collection of all of the above modules. Specific identifiers, literal
values, and the basic operators are defined on a by-need basis. An example is








The grammar of BTRS allows for some programs that we will assume to be
outside the scope of what our semantics considers. These limitations mostly
have to do with how identifiers are used. For example, modules are assumed
to be uniquely named and, therefore, assuming m1, f0, and f1 are terms of
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Similarly, all register names should be unique, even across separate mod-
ules. Therefore, the following modification to the above BTRS program
addresses the module naming problem, but since the register names now









ActMeth enq(x) = (vf0 := true | f0 := x) when !vf0
ActMeth deq() = (vf0 := false) when vf0
ValMeth first() = f0 when vf0
Figure 10.2: BTRS Single-Element Queue (verbatim from [21, Figure 3])
.
Consider the BTRS module shown in Figure 10.2, which implements a
single-element queue. Some syntactic liberties have been taken in the FIFO
module. Register f0 is not provided with an initial value, and both deq and
first omit their argument binding. In addition, a non-binary operator, !, is
used.
The single-element queue is specified in Maude by first extending the
SYNTAX module with all necessary literals, identifiers, and operator symbols.
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fmod SYNTAX-EXT is extending SYNTAX .
including NAT .
sort Boolean .
subsort Nat Boolean < Literal .
ops fifo vf0 f0 x : -> Identifier .
ops enq deq first : -> Identifier .
op ! : -> PrefixOp .
ops True False : -> Boolean .
endfm
With the additional syntax, the specification of the queue is straightfor-
ward.
fmod EXAMPLE is including SYNTAX-EXT .





(ActMeth enq \ x . (vf0 := True | f0 := x) when ! vf0)
(ActMeth deq \ x . ((vf0 := False) when vf0))
(ValMeth first \ x . (f0 when vf0)) .
endfm
10.4 Semantics Overview
The semantics of BTRS expression and action evaluation are defined in [21,
Figure 4] through a set of operational-style inference rules. As a convenience
for the reader, the content of that figure is reprinted in a set of figures
apportioned across Sections 10.5 and 10.6, according to subject. Section 10.5
details expression evaluation and Section 10.6 details action evaluation. Our
aim is to mimic these rules as closely as possible in rewriting logic.
In addition to expression and action evaluation, the semantics of BTRS
must specify how changes to program state are driven by repeatedly selecting
any ready BTRS-level rule and executing its body; this is detailed in Section
10.7.
Some essential infrastructure is required throughout the semantics speci-
fication. One of the essential concepts that is needed is that of a mapping
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from identifiers to values, something we call a store. Stores are implemented
via Maude’s parameterized MAP module [15, Ch. 9.13.1].
fmod SEMANTICS-SKELETON-1 is including SYNTAX .
protecting MAP{Identifier,Literal}
* ( sort Map{Identifier,Literal} to Store
, op _[_] to _(_) ) .
endfm
The general forms given in [21] for expression evaluation and action
evaluation are 〈S, U,B〉 ` e v and 〈S, U,B〉 ` a U ′, respectively; where
the S, U, U ′, B are all stores, e is an expression, v is either a program value
or a special term, NR, denoting a “not-ready” condition, and a is an action.
Corresponding operators are introduced according to the following module.
fmod SEMANTICS-SKELETON-2 is including SEMANTICS-SKELETON-1 .
sort EvaluationState .
op <_,_,_> : Store Store Store -> EvaluationState .
op _|-(_)_->> : EvaluationState Program Expression ~> Literal .
op _|-(_)_->> : EvaluationState Program Action ~> Store .
op NR : -> [Literal] .
endfm
Unlike the ` symbol used in [21], our |- operator makes explicit the BTRS
program in which the evaluation is taking place. The |- operator differs in
another way with `: it is a term that stands for any result that, with `,
goes syntactically after the  in the relation. If this result, when it exists, is
unique, then we can employ Maude-level equations to define |-; if it is not,
we must use Maude-level rules to define the |- operators. It so happens that
equations suffice. The operators are partial (as indicated by the ~> arrow),
and therefore defined at the kind level, both to support the NR “result”, and
because not all actions can be meaningfully evaluated with respect to a given
evaluation state and program; for example, because of the failure of a _when_
guard.
In addition, note that literals are employed as the result of successfully
evaluating an expression. For this to be valid it is assumed that data values
and the space of program literals are isomorphic. NR is an error value and is
182
treated in the usual fashion of Maude error terms, meaning that it is a term
in the same kind of sort Literal, but does not have a sort.
Operator evaluation is handled via Maude’s meta-level [15, §14]. Each
operator will be mapped to a meta-level representation of another operator
with the intended semantics. There is one such lookup table for PrefixOps
and a separate lookup table for InfixOps. As with the operator symbols
themselves, the intention of these tables is that they are populated on an
as-needed basis through module extensions.
fmod SEMANTICS-SKELETON-3 is including SYNTAX .
including META-LEVEL ...necessary renamings omitted
including QID .
op prefixOpLookup : PrefixOp -> Qid .
op infixOpLookup : InfixOp -> Qid .
endfm
Booleans are required so that conditional and guarding expressions and
actions can be evaluated.
fmod SEMANTICS-SKELETON-4 is including SYNTAX .
sort Boolean .
ops True False : -> Boolean .
subsort Boolean < Literal .
endfm
Two forms of substitution are defined on stores: one which does a single
substitution for a given identifier and value, and a second one that updates a
store from a set of mappings provided by a second store. In either case,
identifiers previously mapped have their values updated, and identifiers
without previous mappings are in some sense newly inserted.
fmod SEMANTICS-SKELETON-5 is including SEMANTICS-SKELETON-1 .
... variable declarations omitted
op _[_/_] : Store Literal Identifier -> Store .
eq S[V / I] = insert(I, V, S) .
op _[_] : Store Store -> Store .
eq S[empty] = S .
eq S[(I |-> V) , S’] = (S[V / I])[S’] .
endfm
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The topmost level of our semantics will rewrite pairs containing a BTRS
program and a store mapping each device register to its current value; such
pairs are called configurations.
fmod SEMANTICS-SKELETON-6 is including SEMANTICS-SKELETON-1 .
sort Configuration .
op <_,_> : Program Store -> Configuration .
endfm
The basic infrastructure for defining the BTRS semantics is then just the










Expression evaluation is defined in [21, Figure 4] through a set of operational-
style rules. Our rewriting logic semantics simply attempts to follow these
rules in a very close way. For convenience, these operational-style rules are
reprinted in Figure 10.3.
For each of the operational-style rules shown in Figure 10.3 we will have
a corresponding equation in rewriting logic. The remainder of this section
presents those equations, one-by-one and side-by-side with the appropriate
operational-style rule from Figure 10.3. The multiple printings are simply
intended to serve as a convenience to the reader; the aggregated rules allow-
ing for easy reference of the entire space of rules, and the embedded rules
serving to justify the equational definition as well as demonstrate the small
representational distance between the two semantic formalizations.




reg-read 〈S,U,B〉 ` r  (U++S)(r)
const 〈S,U,B〉 ` c c
variable 〈S,U,B〉 ` t B(t)
op
〈S,U,B〉 ` e1  v1, v1 6= NR
〈S,U,B〉 ` e2  v2, v2 6= NR
〈S,U,B〉 ` e1 op e2  v1 op v2
tri-true
〈S,U,B〉 ` e1  true, 〈S,U,B〉 ` e2  v
〈S,U,B〉 ` e1 ? e2 : e3  v
tri-false
〈S,U,B〉 ` e1  false, 〈S,U,B〉 ` e3  v
〈S,U,B〉 ` e1 ? e2 : e3  v
e-when-true
〈S,U,B〉 ` e2  true, 〈S,U,B〉 ` e1  v
〈S,U,B〉 ` e1 when e2  v
e-when-false
〈S,U,B〉 ` e2  false
〈S,U,B〉 ` e1 when e2  NR
e-let-sub
〈S,U,B〉 ` e1  v1, 〈S,U,B[v/t]〉 ` e2  v2
〈S,U,B〉 ` t = e1 in e2  v2
e-meth-call
〈S,U,B〉 ` e v, v 6= NR,
m.f = 〈λt.eb〉, 〈S,U,B[v/t]〉 ` eb  v′
〈S,U,B〉 ` m.f(e) v′
Figure 10.3: Expression Evaluation Rules (verbatim from [21, Figure 4]).
〈S, U,B〉 ` r  (U++S)(r)
becomes
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) R ->> = (S[U])(R)
if $hasMapping(S[U], R) .
The condition in the above equation is needed to distinguish terms of sort
Identifier that are being used as registers, as opposed to local bindings.
The distinction that is made is whether the variable has a mapping in the
S component of an evaluation state, meaning it is a register, or if it has a
mapping in the B component of the evaluation state, meaning it is a local
binding. The caveats explained in Section 10.2 allow us to use this mechanism
soundly. Aside from the condition that ensures the identifier is, indeed, a
register, and using [ ] for ++, the two definitions are almost identical.
Constants, defined in via rule “const”, are handled next. Recall that we
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identify program values with program literals.
〈S, U,B〉 ` c c
becomes
eq < S, U, B > |-(P) C ->> = C .
For the “variable” rule, a condition is added having the same purpose as
the one introduced for the “reg-read” rule.
〈S, U,B〉 ` t B(t)
becomes
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) T ->> = B(T)
if $hasMapping(B, T) .
Compared to the earlier semantics equations, and the ones that follow,
handling operators requires the most sophisticated use of Maude’s built-in
features, specifically the meta-level [15, §14]. Maude’s meta-level is used to
reify the meaning of each operator; that is, going from op to op in the “op”
rule.
〈S, U,B〉 ` e1  v1, v1 6= NR,
〈S, U,B〉 ` e2  v2, v2 6= NR
〈S, U,B〉 ` e1 op e2  v1 op v2
becomes
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) E1 OP E2 ->> = evalInfixOp(V1, OP, V2)
if V1 := < S, U, B > |-(P) E1 ->>
/\ V1 =/= NR
/\ V2 := < S, U, B > |-(P) E2 ->>
/\ V2 =/= NR .
op evalInfixOp : Literal InfixOp Literal ~> Literal .
eq evalInfixOp(L1, OP, L2) = downTerm(
infixOpLookup(OP) [upTerm(L1), upTerm(L2)]
, NR) .
evalInfixOp first constructs the meta-level representation of a term that
captures the intended semantics of OP/op. The crucial part of the meta-level
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term construction is done through the table infixOpLookup, which takes
OP/op as an argument and returns the meta-level representation of op as its
result. Finally, downTerm brings the meta-level representation of v1 op v2 to
the object-level.
Although [21] does not explicitly handle unary prefix operators, their
semantics is evident from the above rule.
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) OP1 E1 ->> = evalPrefixOp(OP1, V1)
if V1 := < S, U, B > |-(P) E1 ->>
/\ V1 =/= NR .
op evalPrefixOp : PrefixOp Literal ~> Literal .
eq evalPrefixOp(OP1, L1) =
downTerm(prefixOpLookup(OP1) [upTerm(L1)], NR) .
The conditional operator is defined with a pair of equations, just as it
is defined via a pair of rules, “tri-true” and “tri-false”, in [21]. Note that
it is this rule that necessitates the inclusion of Booleans in our semantic
infrastructure.
〈S, U,B〉 ` e1  true, 〈S, U,B〉 ` e2  v
〈S, U,B〉 ` e1 ? e2 : e3  v
〈S, U,B〉 ` e1  false, 〈S, U,B〉 ` e3  v
〈S, U,B〉 ` e1 ? e2 : e3  v
becomes
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) E1 ? E2 : E3 ->> = V
if True := < S, U, B > |-(P) E1 ->>
/\ V := < S, U, B > |-(P) E2 ->> .
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) E1 ? E2 : E3 ->> = V
if False := < S, U, B > |-(P) E1 ->>
/\ V := < S, U, B > |-(P) E3 ->> .
As with conditional expressions, guarded expression evaluation in the two
systems is nearly identical.
187
〈S, U,B〉 ` e2  true, 〈S, U,B〉 ` e1  v
〈S, U,B〉 ` e1 when e2  v
〈S, U,B〉 ` e2  false
〈S, U,B〉 ` e1 when e2  NR
becomes
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) E1 when E2 ->> = V
if True := < S, U, B > |-(P) E2 ->>
/\ V := < S, U, B > |-(P) E1 ->> .
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) E1 when E2 ->> = NR
if False := < S, U, B > |-(P) E2 ->> .
Local bindings are held separately in the third component of what we
have termed the evaluation state; that is, the component that is denoted B
to suggest bindings. As expounded upon in Section 10.8, this rule must be
slightly modified in translation so that variable names match appropriately.
〈S, U,B〉 ` e1  v1, 〈S, U,B[v/t]〉 ` e2  v2
〈S, U,B〉 ` t = e1 in e2  v2
becomes
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) (T = E1 in E2) ->> = V2
if V1 := < S, U, B > |-(P) E1 ->>
/\ V2 := < S, U, B[V1 / T] > |-(P) E2 ->> .
The equation for method invocation demonstrates why we have included
the BTRS program as an argument of the |- operators. We use AC-matching
[15, §4.8] to pick the appropriate method from the appropriate module.
〈S, U,B〉 ` e v, v 6= NR,
m.f = 〈λt.eb〉, 〈S, U,B[v/t]〉 ` eb  v′
〈S, U,B〉 ` m.f(e) v′
becomes
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) M . F(E) ->> = V’
if (Module M ((ValMeth F \ T . EB) CS)) P’ := P
/\ V := < S, U, B > |-(P) E ->>
/\ V =/= NR




〈S,U,B〉 ` e v, v 6= NR
〈S,U,B〉 ` r := e U [v/r]
if-true
〈S,U,B〉 ` e true, 〈S,U,B〉 ` a U ′
〈S,U,B〉 ` if e then a U ′
if-false
〈S,U,B〉 ` e false
〈S,U,B〉 ` if e then a U
a-when-true
〈S,U,B〉 ` e true, 〈S,U,B〉 ` a U ′
〈S,U,B〉 ` a when e U ′
par
〈S,U,B〉 ` a1  U1, 〈S,U,B〉 ` a2  U2
〈S,U,B〉 ` a1 | a2  U1 unionmulti U2
seq
〈S,U,B〉 ` a1  U1; 〈S,U1, B〉 ` a2  U2
〈S,U,B〉 ` a1 ; a2  U2
a-let-sub
〈S,U,B〉 ` e v, 〈S,U,B[v/t]〉 ` a U ′
〈S,U,B〉 ` t = e in a U ′
a-meth-call
〈S,U,B〉 ` e v, , v 6= NR,
m.g = 〈λt.a〉, 〈S,U,B[v/t]〉 ` a U ′
〈S,U,B〉 ` m.g(e) U ′
Figure 10.4: Action Evaluation Rules (verbatim from [21, Figure 4]).
10.6 Action Evaluation
Equations for action evaluation continue along in a similar vein. First is
“reg-update”.
〈S, U,B〉 ` e v, v 6= NR
〈S, U,B〉 ` r := e U [v/r]
becomes
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) R := E ->> = U[V / R]
if V := < S, U, B > |-(P) E ->>
/\ V =/= NR .




U1 unionmulti U2 = error if ∃r.{r 7→ v1} ∈ U1 ∧ {r 7→ v2} ∈ U2
otherwise U1 ∪ U2
{}(x) = ⊥
S[v/t](x) = v if t = x
otherwise S(x)
Each action rule gives a list of register updates given an environment 〈S,U,B〉 where
S represents the register state, U is the observable updates, and B represents the local
bindings. NR represents the “not-ready” value and can be stored in a binding, but
not assigned to a register. The strictness of method calls is enforced by checking that
parameter values are not NR. Initially U and B are empty and S contains the value of
all registers. One can think of ++ as list concatenation. If the system gets stuck because
no rule is applicable, it is assumed than an empty U is returned.
Figure 10.5: Auxiliary Definitions (verbatim from [21, Figure 4]).
〈S, U,B〉 ` e true, 〈S, U,B〉 ` a U ′
〈S, U,B〉 ` if e then a U ′
〈S, U,B〉 ` e false
〈S, U,B〉 ` if e then a U
becomes
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) if E then A ->> = U’
if True := < S, U, B > |-(P) E ->>
/\ U’ := < S, U, B > |-(P) A ->> .
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) if E then A ->> = U
if False := < S, U, B > |-(P) E ->> .
Instead of propagating a special value when a guarded action’s condition
is false, we simply omit an equation for this case. This meets the intention
of the operational-style system, as described in Figure 10.5, which is taken
directly from [21].
〈S, U,B〉 ` e true, 〈S, U,B〉 ` a U ′
〈S, U,B〉 ` a when e U ′
becomes
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) A when E ->> = U’
if True := < S, U, B > |-(P) E ->>
/\ U’ := < S, U, B > |-(P) A ->> .
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The equations defining the semantics of parallel composition require an
additional function corresponding to the unionmulti operation [21, Figure 4] (see Fig-
ure 10.5). Note that rewriting logic equations differ rather substantially from
the original operational-style rules (see errata, Section 10.8)
〈S,U,B〉 ` a1  U1, 〈S,U,B〉 ` a2  U2
〈S,U,B〉 ` a1 | a2  (U1 unionmulti U2)
becomes (see errata)
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) A1 | A2 ->> = U[U’]
if U1 := < S[U], empty, B > |-(P) A1 ->>
/\ U2 := < S[U], empty, B > |-(P) A2 ->>
/\ U’ := U1 uplus U2 .
op _uplus_ : Store Store ~> Store .
ceq U1 uplus U2 = U1 , U2
if not overlap(U1, U2) .
op overlap : Store Store -> Bool .
eq overlap(((R |-> V1) , U1), ((R |-> V2) , U2)) = true .
eq overlap(U1, U2) = false [owise] .
In contrast to the definition of parallel composition, the definition of
sequential composition is straightforward and follows [21] directly.
〈S, U,B〉 ` a1  U1; 〈S, U1, B〉 ` a2  U2
〈S, U,B〉 ` a1 ; a2  U2
becomes
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) A1 ; A2 ->> = U2
if U1 := < S, U , B > |-(P) A1 ->>
/\ U2 := < S, U1, B > |-(P) A2 ->> .
Local bindings are handled exactly as for the expression case.
〈S, U,B〉 ` e v, 〈S, U,B[v/t]〉 ` a U ′
〈S, U,B〉 ` t = e in a U ′
becomes
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) (T = E in A) ->> = U’
if V := < S, U, B > |-(P) E ->>
/\ U’ := < S, U, B[V / T] > |-(P) A ->> .
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The same is true for method invocation.
〈S, U,B〉 ` e v, , v 6= NR,
m.g = 〈λt.a〉, 〈S, U,B[v/t]〉 ` a U ′
〈S, U,B〉 ` m.g(e) U ′
becomes
ceq < S, U, B > |-(P) M .. G(E) ->> = U’
if (Module M ((ActMeth G \ T . A) CS)) P’ := P
/\ V := < S, U, B > |-(P) E ->>
/\ V =/= NR
/\ U’ := < S, U, B[V / T] > |-(P) A ->> .
10.7 Semantics
In addition to the equations defining expression and action evaluation, all that
is needed for a complete semantics is a rewriting-logic-level rule driving the
execution of a BTRS program. This is accomplished by using AC-matching
to select any rule from the program, executing its body, and modifying the
register state with any updates that result from executing it.
mod RULE-EXECUTION is extending SEMANTICS-SKELETON .
... variable declarations omitted
var U’ : Store .
crl < P, S > => < P, S[U’] >
if (Module M ((Rule R A) CS)) P’ := P
/\ U’ := < S, empty, empty > |-(P) A ->> .
endm
One subtle aspect of the above rule is the handling of rules that are not
enabled; for example, because the condition of a when embedded into the
body of the rule evaluates to false. By declaring U’ to be of sort Store, as
opposed to its associated kind, we ensure that only rules that are enabled
to execute actually do. Recall that the |- operator is declared only to have
kind Store, and so only takes sort Store as a “special” case.










We briefly explain the two very minor errata in the SOS rules from [21], were
were noted above. The local binding rule for expressions exhibits a small typo
where it is written B[v/t]; v is unbound. Therefore, the original rule
〈S, U,B〉 ` e1  v1, 〈S, U,B[v/t]〉 ` e2  v2
〈S, U,B〉 ` t = e1 in e2  v2
should instead be
〈S, U,B〉 ` e1  v1, 〈S, U,B[v1/t]〉 ` e2  v2
〈S, U,B〉 ` t = e1 in e2  v2
The second erratum is slightly more significant. The rule for parallel
composition (verbatim from [21])
〈S, U,B〉 ` a1  U1, 〈S, U,B〉 ` a2  U2
〈S, U,B〉 ` a1 | a2  (U1 unionmulti U2)
U1 unionmulti U2 =
error if ∃r.{r 7→ v1} ∈ U1 ∧ {r 7→ v2} ∈ U2U1 ∪ U2 otherwise
should only take into account collisions from register assignments that occur
during the evaluation of a1 and a2, and not those that were already part of U .
One way of fixing this is to recast the rule in a way similar to our specification
in rewriting logic.
〈S[U ], ∅, B〉 ` a1  U1, 〈S[U ], ∅, B〉 ` a2  U2 , Dom(U1) ∩Dom(U2) = ∅
〈S, U,B〉 ` a1 | a2  (U [U1])[U2]
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10.9 Example: A Deadlocking Completion Buffer
When used in conjunction with a rewriting logic engine such as Maude [15],
the executable semantics serves not only as a correct-by-construction BTRS
simulator (relative to the correctness of the given semantics in rewriting logic),
but also as a multipurpose formal tool for analyzing BTRS programs. Indeed,
Maude provides the ability to simulate BTRS programs, to prove and disprove
invariants, to prove and disprove the existence of deadlock, and to perform
full linear temporal logic (LTL) model checking, among other abilities (see
Chapter 2). As an example utilizing these abilities in the context of BTRS,
this section demonstrates a deadlock in a completion buffer.
A completion buffer is a structure that maintains ordering among opera-
tions whose results may be generated out of order. Our BTRS implementation
is based on a completion buffer that was part of a Bluespec circuit for process-
ing a stream of IP lookup requests; the latency of each request can vary based
on how deep into a hierarchical set of tables one needs to look to process it.
This deadlock that gets exposed was injected into the example knowingly
and does not occur in the original device. Nevertheless, it is an instructive
example.
Each operation begins by calling an action-method getTokenAct to reserve
an entry in the buffer; when the operation completes its calculation, it puts
the result into the buffer and signals its completion with a call to an action-
method done. Results are taken from the buffer and space is ultimately freed
by a call to an action-method finishedAct. The entire BTRS source is
available at [45].
Corresponding value-methods getTokenVal and finishedVal return an
id for the reserved buffer entry and the next operation’s result, respectively.
These are essentially the same set of functions from the original Bluespec
source, aside from the splitting of getToken and finished into action and
value parts.
First, we extend the syntax of BTRS with necessary identifiers, operator
symbols, etc. In the module given below we omit all but the operator symbols
and literals, as everything else will be clear from context.
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ops Free Out Done : -> EntryState .
subsort Nat EntryStatus < Literal .
ops +mod8 == /= && : -> InfixOp .
ops isOut isDone : -> PrefixOp .
... operator table definitions omitted
endm
Each entry in the completion buffer has, in addition to a data field, a
current status which is characterized by the sort EntryStatus. The operator
+mod8 does 3-bit addition, == and /= are equality and inequality predicates
for 3-bit values, and && is logical-and on the sort Boolean. isOut and isDone
are predicates on sort EntryStatus.
We will start with the register declarations and then move on to describe
each action method individually. This is an 8-entry buffer having a data field
and a status field for each entry, as well as head and tail pointers, i and o. i


















A place in the completion buffer is reserved through a call to getTokenAct.
The code for getTokenVal that returns the entry id is omitted.
(ActMeth getTokenAct \ dummy .
(idx = (i +mod8 1)
in (( (i := idx)
| (if (i == 0) then (valid0 := Out))
| (if (i == 1) then (valid1 := Out))
| (if (i == 2) then (valid2 := Out))
...repeated to t == 7
)
when (idx /= o))
))
When a computation is finished, it places its result into the buffer entry
it reserved, using the token as an argument. Note that for analysis purposes,
since we are concerned with deadlock, we have used a data abstraction that
places a fixed value into the buffer entry.
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(ActMeth done \ t .
(if (t == 0) then
(((valid0 := Done) | (buff0 := 777)) when (isOut valid0)))
| (if (t == 1) then
(((valid1 := Done) | (buff1 := 777)) when (isOut valid1)))
| (if (t == 2) then
(((valid2 := Done) | (buff2 := 777)) when (isOut valid2)))
...repeated to t == 7
Results are pulled from the completion buffer by calling finishedAct and
finishedVal (omitted).
(ActMeth finishedAct \ dummy .
(idx = (o +mod8 1)
in (( (o := idx)
| (if (idx == 0) then ((valid0 := Free)
when (isDone valid0)))
| (if (idx == 1) then ((valid1 := Free)
when (isDone valid1)))
| (if (idx == 2) then ((valid2 := Free)
when (isDone valid2)))
...repeated to idx == 7
) when (i /= o))))
To test for deadlock in this system, we construct a set of rules, one for
each combination of method and possible method argument, and then ask
Maude if a deadlocked term is reachable from the initial state.
mod TESTBENCH is including CBUFFER .
op TESTBENCH : -> Module .
eq TESTBENCH =
Module Testbench
(Rule r0 (CBuffer .. getTokenAct(0)))
(Rule r1 (CBuffer .. finishedAct(0)))
(Rule r2 (CBuffer .. done(0)))
(Rule r3 (CBuffer .. done(1)))
(Rule r4 (CBuffer .. done(2)))
...repeated to done(7)
... continues
The initial state is given by a term initialC defined as
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... continued from above
op SIGMA : -> Store .
eq SIGMA =
(buff0 |-> 0)
, (valid0 |-> Free)
, (buff1 |-> 0)
, (valid1 |-> Free)
, (buff2 |-> 0)
, (valid2 |-> Free)
...repeated to buff7, valid7
, (i |-> 1)
, (o |-> 0) .
op initialC : -> Configuration .
eq initialC = < CBUFFER TESTBENCH, SIGMA > .
endm
We can run the following command in Maude [15, §6.4.3] to search for a
terminated (deadlocked) state.
search [1] initialC =>! C:Configuration .
Subsequently, Maude notifies us of a deadlock in the buffer. The deadlock
comes from an incorrect guard in the definition of the function finishedAct,
(i /= o), which fails when the buffer is full. Depending on the particular
usage pattern, this bug may or may not become manifest during use. That is,
it may or may not be found during testing.
The buffer can be made correct, in the sense that the above deadlock is
removed, by changing the guard to (idx /= i). If the above command is
run with this guard, Maude instead reports the following
Maude> search [1] initialC =>! C:Configuration .
No solution.
states: 3833 rewrites: 10058295 in 7481ms cpu ...





This dissertation addresses a specific problem in contemporary functional
verification practice, namely the difficulty of automating the coverage closure
feedback loop, and also contributes substantially to the rewriting logic seman-
tics project [77, 19, 78]. The way in which we address the automation problem
is through the design of a programming language where simulation becomes
a first-class concept. As a result, verification engineers are able to write
both general-purpose and specialized programs to discharge coverage goals,
which is perhaps the most time-consuming and difficult part of functional
verification.
In addition to identifying the problem and proposing a high-level solution
in the form of a meta-language about simulation, we have advanced the idea
with a set of additional contributions. Specifically, we formalized the language
precisely within rewriting logic, implemented a tool that allows programs in the
meta-language to be constructed and executed on a computer, demonstrated
a broad set of novel capabilities made possible through the language, and
we demonstrated applications of the language to more substantial devices,
including a bus-master controller and a simple microprocessor. As a result, we
were able to uncover a subtle timing bug in the multi-mastering capabilities
of the bus-master controller, which had been tested previously with some
rigor.
Regarding the rewriting logic semantics project, besides the above-mentioned
formalization in it of our meta-language for functional verification, we have
also formalized a substantial portion of Verilog, as well as formalized com-
pletely two much smaller languages, namely, production rule sets, which are
used to design asynchronous circuits, and BTRS, which is a simplified version
of the Bluespec hardware description language. In doing so, we were able
to find bugs in a widely-used open-source Verilog simulator, clarify greatly
the semantics of production rule sets, and, in the case of BTRS, demonstrate
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once again the suitability of rewriting logic as semantic framework, as well as
uncover a couple of small oversights in the original SOS specification.
Digital hardware design is an extremely complex and multi-faceted en-
gineering process, and many challenges must still be addressed so that the
current pace of innovation in digital electronics can continue into the future.
This dissertation considers just one aspect of the process, carefully chosen
however to address a problem that is especially serious with regards to posing
an impediment to future progress. Our belief is that the best solutions must
attempt to balance the abilities of the engineers involved with algorithms
and other tools available to an engineer. That is why we have looked into
the problem of how to design a more suitable programming language for
orchestrating simulation-based functional verification. A related belief is that
formal semantics matters, and can be key not only for traditional formal
methods such as model checking or theorem proving, but also for testing-based
functional verification of hardware, as our rewriting logic based approach to
the metalanguage [L]ml, and the semantics of specific HDL’s has shown in
practice.
Although this dissertation makes substantial progress, much work still
must be done to provide more feature rich and efficient tool support and to
integrate other aspects of the verification process when there is a thoughtful
way of doing so. For example, a more sophisticated formal definition of
what verification closure means and the kind of coverage that is relevant to
hardware design is an open problem that is crucially important to simulation-
based functional verification. A related issue is how to incorporate formal
verification where appropriate, integrating the two approaches both in terms
of tools and definition of verification closure.
Regarding the formal semantics work. The experimental results for pro-
duction rule sets indicate that additional optimizations, based on abstractions
perhaps, or other means must be developed to rein-in the state-space explosion
problem. A formal-statistical approach may ultimately be the most appropri-
ate, since such techniques are much more scalable. For the Verilog, BTRS,
and even production rule sets, an important avenue of future work is also
coming up with a general methodology through which symbolic simulation
can be achieved in such a way that the resulting simulations are amenable to




The following subsections provide details on how the three functions start,
concretize, and simulate from Chapter 5 are implemented. They reflect
the vast majority of the implementation work in vlogml. In total, the three
functions represent approximately ten thousand lines of Haskell and C++
code, whereas the other operations that we will present are implemented in
just a few lines of code.
A.1 start
Internally, the structure of the implementation of start is reminiscent of a
compiler. Verilog is first parsed and then goes through a series of canonical-
ization and optimization passes until it is converted into a representation that
can be easily simulated, specifically, a value of type Simulation.
The sequence of steps that are exected when start is called can be
broken-down as follows.
• parse: This function reads Verilog source code from files on disk,
parses the source code, and generates values of a first intermediate
representation. In the actual implementation [46], the most difficult
part is parsing, which is handled with source code from the Icarus
Verilog simulator [101]. One small difficulty is that the parser populates
C++ object instances, which must first be converted to C structs and
subsequently marshalled over Haskell’s foreign function interface to
generate values of Haskell data types.
• pretty: The first intermediate representation is rather inconvenient
for processing purposes in Haskell, due to the different paradigms
emphasized by C++ and Haskell. Therefore, this function converts
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the first intermediate representation into one more suitable for use in
Haskell. This second intermediate representation simply consists of the
data types exported by VlogMetaLang.Syntax.
• canonicalize: This phase in the processing pipeline consists of a num-
ber of passes that operate over the second intermediate representation,
transforming it in various ways that make later operations easier. As just
one example, case statements are turned into a cascade of conditional
statements. Some operations not exported by VlogMetaLang.Syntax
and not part of Verilog are used during this phase, such as labels and
gotos. Additional examples of transformations are elaborated on below.
• codegen: The data value resulting from the previous phase has essen-
tially removed all uses of structured syntax from the Verilog program
and has been partitioned into basic blocks. The final phase of the
pipeline converts each block into the internal “instruction set” used
during simulation, which is stack-based, and initializes a value of type
Simulation, which is the final result of start.
Transformation Examples: Two examples of transformations performed
during the canonicalize phase are presented. The first transformation
converts port connections to continuous assignments. Consider a module m
with interface




and an instance of m in another module declared as follows:
m inst(x, y, z);
The canonicalization pass adds to the module containing this instance decla-
ration the following three continuous assignments:
assign inst.i1 = x;
assign inst.i2 = y;
assign z = inst.o;
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The second example simplifies structured delay statements, which are
of the form <delay> <statement>, by pulling the statement body out and
sequentially composing it with a simple delay having an empty statement
body. The canonicalization phase contains a number of passes that effectively
eliminate the structured nature of delay controls so that. Consider
#5 x = 0;
which, as indicated above, is syntactically of the form <delay> <statement>.
The transformation under consideration converts the above statement into






The concretize function corresponds to ruleS from RIR. Therefore, its main
purpose is to perform a substitution on the symbolic state of a simulation.
In addition, however, concretize also performs constant folding and propa-
gation, as opportunities for these simplifications are typically made possible
after the substitution is made. An example is given next to clarify the process.
Consider, for example, simulating a Verilog device containing the following
process:
always @(posedge clk)
count <= count + 1;
which contains uses of two identifiers, clock and count. Values of type
Simulation contain a set of mappings that determine the current value of
each identifier and variable that is relevant to the simulation. Let us assume
in this case that we are in possession of a simulation of this device where




count 7→ x+ 1
where x is a symbolic variable. The simulation contains a separate mapping
yielding the current value of each symbolic variable; in this case we assume
that it has not yet been instantiated, meaning that it maps to itself.
x 7→ x
If one uses concretize to apply a substitution σ to the above simulation,
with σ(x) = 0, the first operation that is performed is to modify the mapping
for symbolic variables referenced by σ. Therefore, the combined mappings
get updated to
clk 7→ 1
count 7→ x+ 1
x 7→ 0
Constant propagation and folding are then applied structurally. In the case
of the example, constant propagation first yields a combined set of mappings
clk 7→ 1
count 7→ 0 + 1
x 7→ 0






simulate functions as a special kind of simulator for Verilog devices. Its type
signature is,
simulate :: (Input a) => a -> Simulation -> Simulation
where a denotes any time which can be transformed into a proper input
stimulus. The usual way in which a user interfaces with a simulator is quite
different, roughly speaking the interface is
f :: Input -> Device -> Waveforms
Our notion of “simulation”, while containing waveform information, also
contains enough information to continue simulation from where the waveforms
leave off, and is therefore something altogether different.
Therefore, one of the main distinguishing features of simulate is that
simulations are treated as first class data values. This allows a complete
simulation run to be constructed piecewise, with different parts of the in-
put decided at different times. The second main distinguishing feature of
simulate, which is not evident from its type signature, is that it fully supports
symbolic simulation, that is, input stimulus is allowed to contain symbolic
variables.
To understand the implementation of simulate within vlogml, we walk
through the main components of simulate’s implementation, which in many
ways matches quite closely the conceptual description given in the Verilog
Standard [36].
1 type Simulate a = State Simulation a
2 simulate_ :: Input -> Simulate ()
3 delta :: Simulate Bool
4 epsilon :: Simulate Bool
5 eval :: Event -> Simulate ()
Figure A.1:
Overview. The implementation of simulate within vlogml will be de-
scribed at the level of the functions named in Figure A.1.
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1 simulate i sim = evalState (simulate_ i’) sim
2 where i’ = toInput i
Figure A.2:
• (Simulate a): This type synonym is an instance of Haskell’s (rather,
GHC [95], the most widely used Haskell compiler) State monad [94]
(see [98, 99, 100] for underlying concepts), where the backing state is
a simulation. One of the advantages of using a state monad is that it
provides for a clean implementation of computations that are intuitively
“stateful”. In the case of simulate, a monadic implementation allows us
to pass the simulation being modified without explicitly binding it as
an argument for every function involved in simulation, of which there
are many.
• simulate_: This is the main entry point for simulation internally.
As shown in Figure A.4, simulate essentially just calls this function,
with some additional code to resolve its type with the monadic type
of simulate_. evalState is a standard function that unwraps state
monads [94].
• delta: This function is called to perform a “delta cycle”, which is defined
in vlogml as progressing simulation until, and including, the next point
that internal simulation time is increased, causing the earliest scheduled
events from the future stratum of the event queue to be promoted to
zero-time events. In the terminology of the Verilog Standard [36], it
corresponds to the combination of a “simulator cycle” (processing all
zero-time events) and a clock update.
• epsilon: This function is called to perform an “epsilon cycle”, which
does one of two things: evaluate all pending active events, or move
pending zero-time events to active status in the event queue.
• eval: This function takes an event as an argument and evaluates the
body of that event, which is a list of simple instructions, such as reading
a current value of a source identifier, or performing an addition.
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Queue Management. As described in the Verilog Standard [36], simula-
tion proceeds by repeatedly processing events from a stratified event queue
comprised of five strata named as follows: (1) active, (2) inactive, (3) non-
blocking, (4) monitor, and (5) future. We now describe how this stratified
queue is represented in vlogml within a simulation and how the functions
simulate_, delta, and epsilon are used to manage the queue in Standard-
conforming manner. To do this, Figures A.3 – A.7 are presented in detail.
1 data ZeroTimeQueues = ZeroTimeQueues {
2 activeNotOrdered :: [Event]
3 , activeOrdered :: [Event]
4 , inactive :: [Event]
5 , nonblocking :: [Event]
6 }
7
8 data Queues = Queues {
9 zeroTime :: ZeroTimeQueues
10 , future :: (Map Int ZeroTimeQueues)
11 }
Figure A.3:
Figure A.3: Queues. These are the data types used to represent the
stratified event queue defined in the Verilog Standard [36].
• (lines 1 –6): These are the strata containing events that will execute
before the next update of the clock; hence, the “zero-time” designa-
tion. Active events are the highest priority, followed by inactive events,
followed by non-blocking assignment update events. vlogml does not
currently support monitors, which is why the record does not contain a
field for that stratum. In addition, vlogml partitions the active queue
into ordered and unordered lists of events to help avoid subtle event
ordering issues that arise when non-blocking events are made active.
• (lines 8 – 11): The entire event queue is then represented as a record
containing the current value of the zero-time strata, and a mapping
from integers, representing time in the future, to an updated zero-time
queue in which events that occur in the future are placed.
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• (line 2): Inject the input stimulus, given as an argument, into the
simulation instance. The injection process uses some of the same
machinery as the start function to generate new code blocks from the
input and then propagate events that reference these newly generated
blocks into the event queues.
• (line 3): Continually execute delta cycles until the input stimulus is
consumed. delta returns a boolean, and whileM is function we have
defined that executes the given function until it returns false.
1 delta = do
2 whileM epsilon
3 x <- clockTick
4 case x of
5 (Just t) -> return True
6 Nothing -> return False
Figure A.5:
Figure A.5: delta
• (line 2): Continually execute epsilon cycles until there are no remaining
zero-time events.
• (line 3): If there are future events, update the simulation clock to the
time of the earliest future event and substitute its zero-time events for
the current, empty, zero-time events; decrement the time values stored
in the future stratum. In this case, the amount of time added to the
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simulation clock is returned. If the stimulus has been used up, the
value Nothing is returned; this is generated from a special flag used
internally.
• (line 4 – 6): If there continue to be events that may be executed and
the stimulus has not been used up, which would set the internal flag
mentioned above, return True, otherwise return False, indicating that
the stimulus has been used up entirely.
1 epsilon = do
2 xs <- getActiveEvents
3 case xs of
4 x:xs -> eval x >> return True
5 ( []) -> updateZeroTimeQueues
Figure A.6:
Figure A.6: epsilon
• (line 2): Retrieve a list of all active events. This is the concatenation
of the ordered and unordered lists.
• (line 4): If there is at least one pending active event, evaluate it. The
eval function is explained below.
• (line 5): If there are no pending active events, management of the
zero-time queues is invoked. The management process is dictated by
the Verilog Standard [36] and is described next.
Figure A.7: updateZeroTimeQueues
• (line 2): Get the list of inactive events and generate a boolean indicating
if the list is non-empty. The result of this check is bound to the variable
s0.
• (line 3): Get the list of non-blocking events and generate a boolean
indicating if the list is non-empty. The result of this check is bound to
the variable s1.
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1 updateZeroTimeQueues = do
2 s0 <- notNull <$> getInactiveEvents
3 s1 <- notNull <$> getNonblockingEvents
4 cast (s0,s1) of
5 (True , _) -> do
6 activateInactiveEvents
7 return True
8 (False,True ) -> do
9 activateNonblockingEvents
10 return True
11 (False,False) -> return False
Figure A.7:
• (lines 5 – 7): There are pending inactive events, promote all of them to
active status and return True, indicating that there are still zero-time
events to be processed.
• (lines 8 – 10): There are no pending inactive events, but there are
pending non-blocking assignment update events; promote all of them
to active status and return True.
• (line 11): There are no pending inactive events and no pending non-
blocking events. Therefore, there are no pending zero-time events at all
and we return False to indicate this fact, which is used above in delta
to initiate the clock tick procedure.
Event Evaluation. The purpose of what is described above is as a structure
to hold pending events and to maintain the appropriate ordering constraints
among them. Evaluation of an event is handled through the eval function.
To describe how this function is implemented, a few additional data types
are needed; a few of these are simplified for the following discussion to just
the most essential information.
Figure A.8
• Instruction: This data type represents the internal instruction set of







the code generation phase of start. It is a stack-based instruction set,
and includes various operations, a few of which are shown in Figure A.9
and elaborated on below.
1 data Instruction =
2 InstValue Expression
3 | InstAdd
4 | InstGoto TargetId
5 | ... -- additional instructions
Figure A.9:
• Target and TargetId: For our purposes here, a target can be considered
just a labelled list of instructions; that is, it contains a value of type
[Instruction]. Each value of type Simulation contains a mapping
from “target identifiers”, given by the type TargetId, to targets.
• Event: For our purposes here, an event can be considered as just a
target identifier which provides a location from which to start executing
instructions.
1 eval :: Event -> Simulate ()
2 execute :: [Instruction] -> Simulate ()
Figure A.10:
Figure A.10: eval and execute
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• eval: This function does some internal setup for symbolic simulation
and other things that are not described here; however, its main purpose
is to use the target identifier of the given event to look up the associated
target and call execute to process the associated instructions.
• execute: This function interprets the internal simulation instruction
set. A few examples of how instructions are processed are given next.
Execution Examples. The terminal case of execute is given by the empty
list of instructions, from which we simply return unit.
execute [] = return ()
In addition, there is a separate case for each instruction type. We next
explain the implementation of the instructions shown above in Figure A.9.
The implementation assumes monadic stack operations push and pop, a
function that performs Verilog-compliant addition, as well as a function to
look up targets, lookupTarget.
Immediate values are processed according to the following definition
execute ((InstValue x):xs) = do
push x
execute xs
Addition pops two values from the top of the stack, yielding expressions
x1 and x2, performs addition, and then pushes the result onto the stack.
execute ((InstAdd):xs) = do
x1 <- pop
x2 <- pop
push (vlogAdd x1 x2)
execute xs
The implementation of vlogAdd is slightly involved. As x1 and x2 are
possibly symbolic expressions, a new expression is first created representing
the addition; this expression is then subjected to constant folding to simplify
the result.
For an unconditional branch, or “goto”, the target associated is looked up
and the instruction stream is redirected immediately.
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execute ((InstGoto j):xs) = do
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